... into account such desires in the very last place. The dramatic fate of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) after the Cold War is a great illustration. The Western countries were immediately able to act within the framework of this ... ... of justice in relation to the basic interests of others: Russia, Kazakhstan or smaller states outside the European Union and NATO.
The fact that only Russia actively opposed it is connected solely with its own capabilities and ambitions. Small countries ...
... intensified the shelling of the separatists’ positions, which returned fire. Who has been doing what is clearly obvious from the OSCE Monitoring Mission maps (for example, for 17-19 February). What was also very strange that the US and UK called off their ... ... recognition of the two republics was seen by many in Russia as the least forceful from the rest of the toolkit to make the US and NATO to be more receptive to Russia's demands. This was the recognition of the fact that Kiev would never implement Minsk 2. Also ...
... legitimate security concerns of other States’.
It will not work that way. The very essence of the agreements on indivisible security is that either there is security for all or there is no security for anyone. The Istanbul Charter provides that each OSCE participating State has equal right to security, and not only NATO countries that interpret this right as an exceptional privilege of membership in the ‘exclusive’ North Atlantic club.
I will not comment on other NATO guidelines and actions that reflect the aspiration of the ‘defensive’ bloc to military ...
... member-states.
On September 23, 2021, after a summer break, Russia-NATO International Expert Dialogue resumed its work with a regular online meeting bringing together experts, former diplomats and military, public leaders from Russia, the USA, and European NATO member-states.
The organizers of the dialog on the Russian side included RAS Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies and RAS Institute of Europe. The first meeting focused on the role of the OSCE in the field of arms control and confidence-building measures in Europe. Keynote speech was made by Ambassador Thomas Greminger, former OSCE Secretary General. The discussion was moderated by Sergey Rogov, Academic Director of RAS Institute for the ...
... negotiation platforms, on the base of international institutions, such as Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), etc. In this article, I aim to look at the global structure and the roots of the Ukrainian conflict, in the context of ... ... the European path during the 2004 revolution. Institutionally, this path implies the country’s aspiration to join the EU and NATO. Recent amendments to the Ukrainian constitution legitimize this drive.
The European identity is historically a superstructure ...
... gained widespread popularity in Moscow. The requirements state that potential members first resolve, by peaceful means, any international disputes, as well as any ethnic, territorial and political conflicts in which they are involved, in accordance with OSCE principles. Stoking the flames of smouldering territorial or other conflicts in neighbouring states could, in theory, block the paths of these countries to NATO membership indefinitely.
However, even if we put rather important moral and ethical considerations to one side, as a long-term strategy, this route will not necessarily bring the desired results. First, it is entirely possible that the requirements ...
Interview with one of the co-authors of the OSCE Report “Reducing the Risks of Conventional Deterrence in Europe”
On October 24, 2019, the Russian International Affairs Council held a breakfast lecture on the topic “
Arms Control: Will Russia and NATO Reach a Deal?
” timed to the release of the OSCE Report “
Reducing the Risks of Conventional Deterrence in Europe
”. In an interview following his speech, Colonel (GS) Wolfgang Richter, one of the co-authors, discussed the art of conflict de-escalation, the changing nature of arms control and ...
... of the 2016 Steinmeier initiative, are focusing so much on CAC than on the issue itself. And finally, in the framework of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, a group of authors from Germany, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey,... ...
for sub-regional arms control in the Baltic region — “Reducing the Risks of Conventional Deterrence. Arms Control in the NATO-Russia Contact Zones”.
There are many, to some extent, reasonable arguments questioning new efforts for CAC. The Conventional ...
... rearranged to transfer our forces and assets to our borders. The destructive military activity of the alliance is accompanied by a line for scrapping the cornerstone agreements in the field of security - the ABM Treaty, the INF Treaty, and the Founding NATO-Russia Act, the START Treaty are destroyed.
The OSCE potential, which we considered as a core role in building a “common European home,” still cannot reach its “design capacity” due to the unhealthy atmosphere established in the Euro-Atlantic region. One of the few remaining confidence-building ...
... bilateral ones. While trade is only a bit more than half of what it was before 2014, it is still important, particularly in the energy sector. Security matters will have to take a back seat: Europeans cannot decide alone on the issues that fall within NATO’s competence. The OSCE is essentially irrelevant, and the Russia-NATO communications line is but an add-on to the US-Russian one. Yet, a few EU member states, including France, Germany and Italy, prefer to keep open their channels of political dialogue with Moscow. Despite ...
