... After the Expiration of UN Security Council Resolution 2231.”
Ivan Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), delivered the keynote presentation. In his remarks, he focused on the evolving dynamics of Russian–Iranian relations, noting that the expiration of Resolution 2231 and the triggering of the “snapback” mechanism did not result in major changes, as most sanctions had already been reimposed following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA.
... States, Great Britain, and France voted against. China and Russia voted in favour. The vote a
week earlier
had the same result. The JCPOA, enshrined in
UN Security Council Resolution 2231
in 2015 proposed the lifting of international and unilateral sanctions against Iran in exchange for the cessation of its military nuclear programme. A vote against the draft resolution extending the JCPOA effectively triggers the UN Security Council's snapback mechanism. Such a development is unlikely to strengthen international ...
... institutions—a move that effectively paralyzed Afghanistan's entire financial system. This action came after decades of U.S. economic dominance in Afghanistan, where foreign aid constituted 75% of the national budget during the
2001-2021 period
.
Unlike Iran's sanctions—which primarily affected its own economy—these measures against Afghanistan directly destroyed the country's governance capacity, banking infrastructure, and humanitarian lifelines, creating the precise conditions that forced
500,000
Afghans ...
... which is the lowest level of trade between the two countries in the last three decades. The volume of trade between Iran and Russia in the same year was USD 1.9 billion. Will Russia jeopardize its trade relations because of Iran? What will Russia do if sanctions against Iran are tightened?
The Russia-US trade reached its peak during the first Obama Administration (USD 45 billion) and later on plummeted due to US sanctions and major US companies leaving Russia. Trade relations between Russia and Iran have never been ...
... roof, but this instability would also have unpredictable political and economic consequences—most likely, detrimental to long-term Russia’s interests.
The second Trump Administration is going to take a tough approach to Tehran. We can expect more sanctions related to the Iranian nuclear program, more pressure on Iranian regional partners and proxies, more support for the Iranian political opposition with the ultimate goal of a regime change in the Islamic Republic. Though one cannot completely rule out a transactional ...
... Joker
The coming to power of Donald Trump will most likely return Iran to the list of priorities.
We should expect a more complete coincidence of policies at the level of the Administration and Congress, given that the overwhelming majority of bills on Iran sanctions are proposed by Republicans or Republicans in coalition with Democrats. It is possible that new executive orders will tighten sanctions regimes, the passage of further laws supplementing the “legislative web” of restrictive measures against ...
... elections may well lead to a tougher American policy towards China. Given this scenario of exacerbation, the politicisation of finance in the form of sanctions is also likely. Among the new members of the Association, the interested parties include Iran, which has been under US sanctions for more than 40 years and is effectively excluded from the world of global finance, with its dominance of dollar payments. The remaining countries which were in BRICS prior to this year (India, Brazil and South Africa), and most of the new ...
... president, retained the strategy of his predecessor in terms of sanction pressure on Damascus.
The vagueness and breadth of the sanctions permeated an atmosphere of over-compliance that also affected donor governments, businesses and NGOs, causing many of ... ... Some Gulf Arab states have signaled that they might be willing to support reconstruction, perhaps hoping to get Syria out of Iran’s orbit. But for now, they are hesitant to take the risk. For the same reason, Damascus’ other allies—Russia and Iran—which,...
... the end. For one, timelines have not been set out for most of the projects, and not all of them will even reach the stage of implementation. And those that do—for example, the supply of aircraft parts—will concern a limited set of products. The Iranian aviation industry has been in a rut for a number of years now, thanks to the
sanctions
. They have learned to make certain things on their own, sure, but most parts are either imported through third countries or stripped from old planes that no longer fly.
Despite all this, some projects might turn out to be rather successful....
... situation is
emerging
on the gas market, where Asia’s interest in Tehran may notably fall on account of Moscow’s pivot to the east.
Potentially, Iran could take over Russia’s place on the hydrocarbons market—but this requires that the West-imposed sanctions against Iran first be lifted. Even then, Iran’s oil production is greatly restricted by its capacities. In order to ramp them up, Iran needs investment and equipment, which takes time and effort. As for gas, the issue boils down to Iran’s capacities to deliver ...
