... the Ukrainian crisis. At that time, it seemed that Moscow was doomed to oppose a powerful and consolidated enemy on its own. In a matter of months, their relations lost all remnants of partnership of the previous 20 years and entered a stage of a new Cold War. As distinct from the Soviet Union, Russia found itself in a much more vulnerable position. Its economic, military and human potential was incomparably lower whereas the West had greatly increased its potentialities. In addition, Russia avoided ideology in its foreign policy whereas the Soviet Union offered the world a full-scale ideological alternative.
However, the new structural realities of international relations ...
It is time for us to quit constantly complaining about the treachery of the West, and stop dwelling on who cheated us and how in the 1990s
The new cold war between Russia and the West is characterized by the absence of a clear ideological confrontation. This constitutes its fundamental difference from the era of bipolarity, when the Soviet Union and the United States were irreconcilable ideological enemies. Both sides offered ...
... the so-called “hybrid relations” model.
Hybrid vehicles use two or more sources of energy, usually a conventional internal combustion engine (ICE) and an electric battery. In our case, the old model of geopolitical confrontation between East and West (the Cold War model) plays the role of an ICE. This model is expensive and outdated, but did provide sufficient stability and predictability, both in Europe and around the world.
It offered numerous channels for political cooperation, military contacts, risk ...
... over Ukraine allowed for the need for an ‘enemy’ in this regard to be met, which serves to reinforce the present geo-strategic superiority of the Eurasian chessboard in favour of the US.
REUTERS/Marko Djurica MDJ
Andrey Kortunov:
Russia and the West: What Does “Equality”
Mean?
Conclusion
Despite the end of the Cold War, the emergence of ‘the American unipolarity’ in world politics has led to a necessity for Washington to spread itself on the global stage on the one hand, but on the other it has paved way for Russian anxiety caused by being exposed to a ...
... relevant programs
. According to some U.S. analysts, this does not serve U.S. interests because the leaders risk being deprived of knowledgeable Russia experts, misunderstanding Russian developments, and in the worst-case scenario plunging
into a new Cold War
.
Russian and Western experts may differ on their interpretation of events and codes of behavior, but they need to reach a consensus on basic principles and the common denominator in their approach to dealing with the situation and the Russia-West controversy.
Nor ...
... member-states, and is rejected outright by the majority of the elite. The dramatic crisis of confidence between Russia and the West that has peaked with the Ukraine crisis has led to both sides testing each other’s defence capabilities, seemingly ... ... to coexist in a paradigm of deterrence, discussing whether the current state of affairs represents a new configuration of the Cold War and the chances of it turning “hot”.
As a result of these developments, the decisions adopted at the September ...
Instead of a new Cold War, someday we could face a real, large-scale military conflict
Since the crisis in Ukraine began, many have claimed that a new Cold War between Russia and the West already exists. This rhetoric, used even by high-profile politicians, in my opinion, is driven mostly by emotions and is meant to justify difficult positions taken by one or the other side.
I am convinced that no Cold War of the type we experienced ...
... military encounters between Russian and West in 2014 after the onset of the Ukrainian crisis. The RIAC team asked Dr. Ian Kearns, ELN Director, to shed some light on the methodology and tools used to create the report. Some questions on the period of the Cold War and the future of Russian-Western military coexistence also arose.
The first question is about the methodology of your research. What were your principles for monitoring, gathering and processing the data?
We based the report on open sources. So we were drawing initially on the ...
... ensure restraint at all levels of command and to reduce any potential for an actual exchange of fire. Similarly, Russia and the West both need to use all their respective influence to ensure that there are no flare-ups in any of the other frozen conflicts ... ...
Second, we badly need to improve military-to-military communication and engagement between NATO and Russian commands. If the Cold War taught us anything, it was that steps to reduce the fear of a surprise military attack by one party increase the decision ...
