... everyone. But without addressing the strategic issues that gave rise to this conflict, a long-term solution seems difficult.
In Russia, we appreciate the 12 proposals for resolving the conflict put forward by the Chinese diplomacy. They seem timely and constructive,... ... it is extremely difficult to reach a new system of Euro-Atlantic security.
From a theorist's perspective, how do you assess China's efforts to attach Chinese characteristics to Western political theories - such as Marxism - so that it works for China's development? What do you think of the Chinese government's ...
... reluctantly, in the direction of a new geopolitical, economic and technological bipolarity. This is clearly not what most of us hoped for earlier this century, but this trend cannot be ignored and it affects both Moscow and New Delhi.
Year after year, Russia is moving farther east, strengthening and developing its multiple ties with China. Year after year, India is shifting further west, increasing various forms of cooperation with the United States. This is the reality we have to acknowledge before moving any further.
This trend contains considerable risks. If it continues in the medium term, the two friendly nations may eventually ...
...
end of the war can be seen clearly. As long as the war is still going on, all kinds of accidents and losses of control may suddenly break out and turn the whole situation upside
down. The future situation is not optimistic. China’s policies, China–Russia relations,
and relations between China and the West all may yet face new tests and challenges.
Originally published in the China International Strategy Review.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-023-00129-2
Read the full text of the article
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42533-023-00129-2
... state; not to speak of the suspension of air travel and other forms of free movement of individuals and goods— all this, unthinkable only recently, amounts to a de facto blockade.
Ivan Timofeev:
A State as Civilisation and Political Theory
Yet, the Western effort to completely isolate Russia has fallen far short. China and India, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, Brazil and South Africa, along with many others, have refused to join the U.S.-led sanctions coalition—no matter how some of them vote at the UN General Assembly. Moreover,...
Working Paper No. 74 / 2023
Working Paper No. 74 / 2023
The working paper seeks to analyze constitutive voting patterns of Sub-Saharan states of Africa at the UN General Assembly. The methodology proposed in this paper offers an opportunity to explore this issue topic-wise as well as in a broader sense. The paper considers a number of indicators that help assess the involvement of the continent’s different countries in the voting processes, builds on the various types of strategic behavior in the...
... Ukraine ends. In Europe, Russia will play the role of North Korea, but at the same time it will have much greater potential. Whether Ukraine has enough strength, will and resources to become a European South Korea is a big question. The conflict between Russia and the West will strengthen the role of China as an alternative financial centre and source of modernisation. The rise of China will only accelerate its growing rivalry with the United States and its allies. “The End of History” ended with a return to its usual course. One of the usual ...
... the first place.
But the recurrence of systemic unipolarity is not unique to the West. For example, the threat of secondary sanctions by the US has in many cases proved to be a decisive factor in determining the opportunities and constraints for non-Western countries to develop economic and other cooperation with Moscow. Under US pressure, Turkey decided to refuse to service Russian Mir payment cards, and China’s Huawei was forced to begin winding down its activities in Russia.
The new US National Security Strategy recently signed by Biden is steeped in outright restorationist pathos. The document speaks of the indispensability of American leadership,...
Working paper № 69 / 2022
Working paper № 69 / 2022
The working paper explores the factors that predetermined the Western switch from divergence to convergence in the 2020s along with the key features of the commenced consolidation within the ... ... of the major power centers of the Collective West diverge? How likely is this unity to extend to subsequent engagement with China as a major strategic adversary? What are the prospects for a significant number of states in the Global South to join the ...
... heard louder than in Russia and China, and to some it may seem that they are singing this tune in unison. At the same time, the two countries have a number of differences and contradictions, and the Chinese political agenda is even less clear than the Western one. Thus, Russia and China should not be lumped together into some kind of “axis of authoritarianism,” not only because there is no military–political alliance between the two countries (this is just a formality), but also because the terms “democracy” and “authoritarianism” ...
... Russia-West confrontation climbing to a new, unprecedented level. One cannot envy Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov: He is doomed to get an ice-cold treatment from his Western peers who stay firm in their intention to ignore him in Bali. Still, Russia will hardly be fully isolated at the FMM: Lavrov can count on a chain of bilateral consultations with his counterparts from several non-Western G20 countries including China, Mexico, South Africa and Brazil, as well as with the invited leaders of some international organizations.
However, the FMM intrigue is not limited to Russia's place within G20. The West comes to Bali more united than it has ever been since the ...
