... as a result of lackluster efforts in this respect. When it comes to Syria, Russia must begin floating pragmatic compromise solutions to provoke wider discussion about them in order to discover whether they are acceptable for all stakeholders. As for Turkey, Russia did indeed unofficially legitimize its sphere of influence in Syria, but should begin talking more about how destabilizing it is become and how counterproductive Ankara’s unrealistically recalcitrant stance on compromising on President Assad’s ...
... Central Asia and South Asia, the first-mentioned region is plagued by the security threats emanating from the war-torn Libya, where a slew of external powers is competing to shape the outcome of its ongoing civil war. First and foremost among them are Turkey, Russia, France, Egypt and the UAE, though the U.S. also plays a naturally important role, even if the country has tended to neglect this conflict over the past few years—despite being responsible for it over a decade ago.
The region’s future will ...
... mutual compromises in order to restore the lost trust between them, especially in the economic-financial-tech spheres, in order to ensure that BRI and the AAGC converge rather than compete, heralding the best-case scenario of a “
Renaissance 2.0
”;
Russia and Turkey must sustainably regulate their “friendly competition” through more than just the trust between their present leaders that has been responsible for managing this so far, necessitating some sort of institutionalized framework among them as well ...
... May 20–21, 2021, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in partnership with the American Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) held an international conference on relations between Turkey, Russia and the West and what the stakes are in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean.
On May 20–21, 2021, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in partnership with the American Foreign Policy ...
.... Russia will not like that it is an extension at all. But for all sides the benefits should outweigh the downsides.
Russia will know that Western actors will respond to failure by unilaterally channelling non-UN legitimised aid into the country via Turkey. Russia will lose the opportunity to slowly move Idlib back into Damascus’s orbit and the country’s de facto partition will be entrenched. This outcome is also likely to lead to increased instability as aid flows decrease, with subsequent tensions ...
... agreed October deadline for foreign forces to withdraw from the country. It is unclear how the withdrawal will take place, and no definitive outcome was ultimately likely. Erdogan has said he will not pull troops out until others do so first, with both Turkey and Russia denying any use of unconventional forces in Libya.
Another largely unknown variable is the attitude of the new U.S. President Joe Biden. Libya did not quite feature during his electoral campaign. Under Biden, though, the U.S. Department of State ...
... low-budget military operation quickly made Moscow the principal external actor in Syria. As far as we can see, though, Moscow has failed to design any exit strategy over the five years of its immediate involvement in the Syrian conflict. The degree of Russia’s influence on the Damascus regime is also an open question. Is the dog wagging the tail or is the tail wagging the dog?
Could Turkey be the principal beneficiary? Establishing buffer zones in Idlib and in Syria’s northern provinces is Erdogan’s unquestionable achievement. Yet to what degree is Ankara really in control of the situation in Idlib? This continuously festering ...
... prompted to recognise, at least at expert level, the need to work on technical deconfliction measures in this part of the world. This requires finding a way to untangle the Cyprus, Libya and Syria questions.
Artyom Semyonov:
Gas Without a Fight: Is Turkey Ready to Go to War for Resources in the Mediterranean?
As for Russia’s policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, we should recall Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov visited Damascus and Cyprus in 2020. Mr. Lavrov emphasised that escalation was inadmissible and called for peaceful resolution of the ...
... it as an independent entity controlled by Russian peacekeepers, allowing Armenians and Azerbaijanis to co-exist and live together again. Historical and cultural monuments—both Christian Armenian and Islamic—would be restored and preserved under Russian protection. These would include the
Dadivank
and
Amaras
monasteries.
Basel Haj Jasem:
Will Moscow Lead a Historic Reconciliation Between Turkey and Armenia?
The road to such a peace is certainly not easy, but Moscow understands that decisive steps must be taken to ensure (1) that any peace is lasting peace, (2) that its position as a regional arbiter is preserved, and (3) that a balance ...
... a rising regional power, cooperating where interests are sufficiently close, and managing differences, preventing them from degenerating into conflicts," Trenin, who is a former Russian military-intelligence colonel, said.
Looking at the recent Russia-Turkey deal in the South Caucasus, he said: "Cooperation on Nagorno-Karabakh [a region at the heart of the conflict] creates a better climate for interaction across the board. Lack of cooperation there would have soured relations across the board"....
