... limiting the Russian-Arab cooperation to the extent possible. It will work hard to close any loopholes in US sanctions that creates opportunities for Moscow to use Gulf States, particularly—UAE, as international financial hubs to circumvent Western sanctions. It will try to erect various obstacles on the way to more active Russian-Arab military cooperation by offering attractive alternatives to its partners in the Arab world (for instance, dealing with UAE, Trump is likely to get back to previously stalled deals for the sale of F-35 fighter jets and armed drones). It will ignore or criticize any regional security proposals that might come from Moscow.
However, ...
... funds for early recovery projects using UN mechanisms, rather than directly. But this is probably the most they can do. The U.S. sanctions are imposed by Congress, which is not prepared to change anything until the Syrian government implements Resolution ... ... conclusion that Syria’s return to the LAS, even if it occurs, will not mean a swift restoration of full economic ties with the Arab world. Nevertheless, even moderate liberalization would benefit Syrian business and allow the population to breathe a little ...
... factors.
For official Damascus, a successful
détente
with the UAE is viewed as a means to overcome Syria’s isolation in the Arab world, which could eventually help restore its membership in the Arab League and be reintegrated into the Arab family. The ... ... Iranian influence in Syria.
Cooperation with the Emirates is also beneficial for economic reasons, such as circumventing Western sanctions on Damascus and giving Syrian entrepreneurs an opportunity to exploit Dubai’s financial center as a “hub” to access ...
