... identify foreign actors. Neither the foreign designation nor the identification of terrorism are in any way convincing. However caught between a domestic audience and the pseudo-legality of the CSTO, the Tokayev discourse is limited in its imaginatory scope. Kazakhstan’s discourse has thus centred on shifting agency away from both the factional power struggle as well moving culpability away from the
incensed local citizenry whose initial legitimate protests
appear to have been hijacked by political opportunism....
... respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. In this context, we have every reason to hope that Washington will at long last start taking into account the legitimate interests of other international players, including Russia and Kazakhstan, and their integration associations.
Question:
What is Moscow’s view on the further development of bilateral integration processes, including Russia-Kazakhstan interaction within the framework of the EAEU, the CSTO and the SCO? What are your priorities for the near future?
Sergey Lavrov:
You are aware that ...
... law-enforcement officers and improving the facilities and infrastructure for local police inspectors.
The measures taken by Kazakhstan to counter terrorism, as well as the government’s policy of tolerance towards all religions and nationalities, is ... ... cent of them accessing extremist content through social media either deliberately or accidentally.
Mikhail Konarovsky:
What the SCO Summit in Bishkek Confirmed
During their
meeting
in May 2018, President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon and President of Belarus ...
... University) and Andrey Kortunov (Russian International Affairs Council), the paper contextualizes the bilateral relationship in Central Asia, points of friction, and potential areas for cooperation amid an extremely tense relationship between Washington and Moscow.
Envisioning Opportunities for U.S.-Russia Cooperation in and with Central Asia
, 0.9 Mb
... continued. An important event in Russia–China relations in the run-up to the summit was the state visit by the President of the Russian Federation, which resulted in the deepening of the comprehensive bilateral strategic partnership. The leader of Kazakhstan made a similar trip to China, as did the President of Kyrgyzstan, the country which officially assumed chairmanship of the SCO for the upcoming year following the Qingdao summit.
Andrey Kortunov:
SCO: The Cornerstone Rejected by the Builders of a New Eurasia?
The endorsement of the principles and objectives set out in the 2001 Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation ...
... eventually lead to that organization replacing the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as the key driver of Eurasian integration, thus depriving Russia of the central role in this process.
As a result, the idea of a free trade zone was only actively supported by Kazakhstan and has not yet resulted in any detailed expert evaluations. China was eventually forced to shift the focus of its economic strategy in Eurasia from the SCO to the One Belt One Road Initiative, and the free trade zone idea is hardly ever mentioned in the latest SCO documents.
In practice, the role of the SCO was reduced to that of bringing bilateral or tripartite sub-regional economic projects together ...
... the extensive geo-political and geo-economic importance in the region. CARs include five republics of the former Soviet Union: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. All republics are land-locked and energy-rich.Pakistan and CARs ... ... economic infrastructure and transportation system in the region. Fortunately or unfortunately, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) while making headway with two major powers, Russia and China, has almost eclipsed the ECO that has caused the considerable ...
