... reliable navigation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, maintain control over the Kerch Strait, and prevent deployment of NATO troops in Ukraine. Even in the best-case scenario (which we may be observing at the moment, because the situation could certainly be much worse), these issues cannot be entirely resolved in the foreseeable future; they will continue to demand Russia's attention and resources.
Georgia on the periphery of focus
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, partially recognized Transcaucasian ...
... order was complete. The takeover of Crimea and support for separatism in Donbass did not presage a policy of reconquering Eastern Europe, as many in the West feared, but it clearly set Ukraine and other former Soviet republics off limits to any future NATO enlargement. The security buffer was back. If the use of force in Ukraine, from the Kremlin’s standpoint, was essentially defensive, Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015 was a risky gambit to decide geopolitical outcomes in the Middle East — a famously treacherous area for outsiders vacated by the Soviet Union at the time of the Persian Gulf war of 1991. Since then, the results ...
... Korea, the Middle East (predominantly Syria, Turkey and Iran), China, Venezuela, and Ukraine. And this inconsistency doesn’t seem to be a part of a grand strategy defined... ... West, and particularly the United States, is undoubtedly Turkey, still a member of NATO. The country disrespected international norms and laws and
initiated
active hostilities... ... violations were not shackled completely, but with the latest
engagement
of U.S. and Russia, they were temporarily stopped from escalating. Back in the day, Turkey would...
... time in Russia-EU relations, with intense feelings of malaise on both sides.
Despite the ongoing U.S.-Russia confrontation, the NATO-Russia military standoff in Europe is still relatively low-level. While preparing for various contingencies, neither side seriously ... ... escalate to a nuclear level, after which it would be impossible to limit or contain it.
That said, the recent political changes in Ukraine have given reason to hope that the 2015 Minsk agreement on ending the conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas region might actually ...
... criticism from the numerous opponents of a rapprochement with Moscow, and EU policy will devolve into its lowest common denominator from among the positions of its members every single time. Furthermore, since new problems will continue to pop up for bureaucrats in Brussels, the “Russian folder” will end up buried under a thick layer of other, equally important but more urgent cases.
In the immediate future,... ... costs look particularly important.
First, there needs to be a new consorted effort on reaching a sustainable peace in Eastern Ukraine. Political developments in Ukraine might present new opportunities — if not for a comprehensive settlement, then for ...
... generations. The future positioning of Belarus as an intermediary between Russia and Europe is a coming challenge to the wisdom of Moscow’s foreign policy. This will not be easy, given that virtually the entire western border of Russia, from Norway to Ukraine, has turned into a new line in the military standoff between Russia and NATO countries and their partners and wards.
This article was originally published in Spanish as “La cambiante identidad de Rusia: en busca de un papel en el siglo XXI,” in Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior, no. 115, Jan-April 2019, 27–43.
...
... pragmatism. Still, I think we should wait for his first key staff appointments. In any case, they will be working within the pro-Western paradigm and lead the country towards collaboration with international financial bodies, the European Union and NATO. Russia–Ukraine relations will largely depend on the general trends in U.S.–Russia relations, and I think gradually moving away from escalation is the maximum that Kiev would be willing to do in its relations with Moscow. This should probably start with goodwill ...
... withering away. It would behoove Moscow to avoid escalations.
Looking at the West today, a Russian who witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall 30 years ago sees a striking picture... ... incidents from spinning out of control; to avoid escalation of running conflicts such as Ukraine; and to minimize mutual misperceptions. Crucial here is a 24/7 US-Russian military-to-military... ... have to take a back seat: Europeans cannot decide alone on the issues that fall within NATO’s competence. The OSCE is essentially irrelevant, and the Russia-NATO communications...
... because otherwise they should use their right to leave Ukraine. A supervised demilitarization from by Kiev of Luhansk and Donetsk will be needed to secure their rights on the ground.
Andrey Kortunov:
Russia and Ukraine: Four Scenarios for the Future
Russia should have a written document presupposing that Ukraine never becomes a part of NATO, and that NATO (or the EU, or individual NATO-countries) will not build up Ukraine with heavy military (tanks, artillery, combat air craft). In other words, Ukraine could continue as a kind of “military vacuum”. An alternative way of doing this ...
... Kortunov:
Europe and Russia: Four Scenarios for the New Cycle
If this scenario materializes, then for Russian authorities, Ukraine will become not merely a major nuisance, but a fundamental existential challenge. The prospect of Ukraine inevitably joining NATO entails the intensive militarization of the Russia–Ukraine border. Perceiving the Ukrainian development model as a functional alternative to the political system established in Moscow, the Russian opposition will borrow inspiration and practical experience from the story of Ukraine’s success. Young ...
