... demonstration of resources and opportunities for confrontation.
However, before and after the “Hot August”, both Russia and the West were engaged “competitive cooperation” in the Caucasus despite a complete incompatibility of their positions regarding Georgia’s NATO membership. The OSCE Minsk Group on the Karabakh settlement, co-chaired by the U.S., France and Russia, survived not only the “five-day war” of 2008, but also the “Russian spring” of 2014. Two military escalations in the Karabakh in 2016 ...
... also led to total abandonment of those ties that previously existed. The newly formed pro-Western elites were mainly focused on what they perceived as “historical goal” of the nation – to become member of the Western world, meaning integration to NATO and EU. Thus, Tbilisi experienced a move from the post-Soviet space to an area politically and economically dominated by the West; for example, USA, EU member states and Ukraine. The same changes took place at Georgian universities and academia. Armenia as a strategic ally of Russia as well as other states, for example, in the Central Asia simply fell out. This detachment from non-West-oriented states/regions grew over the years and caused a significant gap ...
...,European%20and%20Euro%2DAtlantic%20institutions
.
Osborn, A., (2018). Russian PM warns NATO admission of Georgia could trigger ‘terrible conflict’.
Reuters
[online]. 6 August 2018, 18:26. [Viewed 13 February 2021]. Available from:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-georgia/russian-pm-warns-nato-admission-of-georgia-could-trigger-terrible-conflict-idUSKBN1KR1UQ?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews
Pryce, P., (2020). Why is Russia Modernizing Abkhazian Forces?.
Offiziere.ch
[online]. 29 January 2020. [Viewed 13 February ...
... a good idea. For example, the Turkish political scientist Mitat Çelikpala and his Greek colleague Dimitrios Triantaphyllou
state
that “three of the six littoral states are NATO members (Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria) and two others (Ukraine and Georgia) seek to enhance their relationship with NATO.” At the same time, we would like to note that if Çelikpala and Triantaphyllou support the territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine (which is certainly true), then they must at the very least recognize that opinions are split on the matter....
... a kind of “democratic beacon” governed by a successful oligarch?), security or territorial integrity.
“NATO is hesitant in its relations with Georgia. Brussels, Washington and major Western European capitals likely view it as too dangerous for NATO to give Georgia security guarantees when Russian troops are located in Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, Silaev states.
Taking this assessment made in 2016 even further, one might say that these hesitations have only grown and will continue to do so in the near ...
... happened in Moldova was an attempt to restore at least some relevance to state institutions so that they can manage for themselves. Georgia, meanwhile, is remote even geographically, and is not a priority.
It’s not that European interest has been lost completely; ... ... to the role previously fulfilled by the OSCE, as the only space bringing together everyone, making it the lowest common denominator. Now it’s needed not to force members to obey certain norms, but to search for common ground at a time when Europe is ...
... should have a written document presupposing that Ukraine never becomes a part of NATO, and that NATO (or the EU, or individual NATO-countries) will not build up Ukraine with heavy military (tanks, artillery, combat air craft). In other words, Ukraine could ... ... levels, has not prevented enormous economic development in other countries like China and India, or even Brazil and Mexico.
Georgia
The situation in Georgia cannot be solved by force. Years ago, the US engineered the downfall of Shevardnadze’s Russia-friendly ...
... to join. This is not NATO reaching out to nations, invading them, inveigling them to join the Alliance. This is democratic nations of their own free will wishing to contribute to and receive the benefit of collective defense and security.
Should the Georgia – process be finalized soon, how do you see Russia – NATO dialogue moving forward from this point? This very aspect of our relations seems to be most sensitive militarily.
Dmitry Danilov:
NATO–Russia Council: What Are the Outcomes?
I accept that it is a sensitive part of the relationship between NATO ...
... Soviet
(sic!)
configuration.
Putting the State Together Again and External Assistance: Losses or Gains?
EPA/ALEXEY NIKOLSKY
Irina Bolgova:
Commonwealth of Independent States:
New Wine into Old Wineskins?
This was the case in the late 1990s, when the Georgian leadership despaired of regaining control over the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast and the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and chose NATO as its strategic partner. A similar drift occurred in Moldova, which lost control over Transnistria. The difference here was that it focused on cooperation with the European Union, rather than with NATO. Ukraine is acting in much the same way, abandoning ...
... dangerous position, with no opposition to keep it in check. Life without opposition corrupts, as we know from history. But it looks like Georgia has learned its lesson and is unlikely to act opportunistically again.
The West has taken its warning from the Georgian example. The August 2008 war put an end to the idea of NATO’s eastward expansion, which has not been discussed in the West since, at least not in practical terms. Only a major change in US policy would bring this issue back in focus. But so far events have been moving in the opposite direction. NATO’s ...
