... might of the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by self-proclaimed Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, while to the west, the real power on the ground is often held by various armed groups and militias.
Ruslan Mamedov, Grigory Lukyanov:
Playing Pick-Up-Sticks in Libya
In 2020, thanks to the mediation of Russia and Turkey, a ceasefire was established in Libya, making it possible to stop large-scale armed clashes between the LNA and the GNU forces that had lasted since April 2019 and to start resetting of the political process in late 2020–early 2021....
... regional agenda. Within the framework of the workshop two sessions were held. The first session was devoted to the prospects for the settlement of the conflict in Yemen. The second one was dedicated to the views of Russia and the UK on the situation in Libya.
Leading Russian and British experts took part at the meeting.
... there are important deviations from this general rule and even explicit exceptions from it. Sometimes, the Kremlin seems to care more about the declaratory statements of its partners in the region rather than their actual practice. For instance, in Libya Russia supported Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar partially because he positioned himself as a committed opponent of Islamism though he had Salafi units in his army and explicitly associated himself with various fundamentalist clergymen. Moreover, the Kremlin ...
... acceptance of Moscow’s dominant position in the post-Soviet space.
However, Erdogan’s frustrations with Moscow in the Syrian and Libyan theatres
led him to do the unthinkable
—violate this rule in the fraught conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan ... ... political dividends. Erdogan’s “quick war” in the Caucasus strengthened his position at home, while critically weakening Russia’s main strategic ally in the region (Armenia) and thus Moscow’s regional standing generally. Overall, a combination ...
... Wagner to the Russian government. Still, it is not a state endeavor and should not be considered as such. At the end, it is definitely private and not very impressive.
During the initial period of official engagement in Syria and the unofficial one in Libya, Russia faced several challenges that it learned to cope with, except for that of Turkey. Ankara became active in the Middle East some time ago, recently arriving in Eastern Mediterranean. This was probably something new for the “front-line” Mediterranean ...
... narrative engagement with them. Although they can be read separately, it is recommended that they are reviewed together in order to obtain a better understanding of everything.
Andrew Korybko:
The Geostrategic Challenges of Russia’s “Ummah Pivot”
Russian Interests
North Africa: Becoming the Libyan Power Broker
In North Africa, Libya is the scene of intense competition between Turkey on the one hand and Russia, Egypt, the UAE, and France on the other. Russia must therefore seek a compromise solution that prevents either side from becoming ...
... which could be instrumentalized to open up other regional entry points elsewhere in the future, such as in the
Horn of Africa
, where Abu Dhabi has recently become the most influential external actor.
Besides, it should not be forgotten that Algeria is Russia’s historical and loyal partner as well. The country, too, aspires for stability in Libya, but it is also caught in a never-ending “Cold War” with the neighboring Morocco, with which Russia is also
seeking to cultivate ties
as part of its regional balancing act. Speaking of which, the unresolved Western Sahara conflict remains a ...
The participants of the seminar discussed issues of political settlement of the Libyan conflict and security problems
On April 1, 2020, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) organized a closed online seminar on the Russian perspective on the Libyan crisis. The participants of the seminar discussed issues of political settlement of the Libyan conflict and security problems. In addition, the topic of the recovery of the Libyan economy after the possible end of the civil war was discissed.
From ...
... Turkey and the GNA have also negotiated a maritime pact that cuts across internationally recognized waters in the Mediterranean which belong to Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, and where competition, having discovered natural gas reserves, is heating up.
Russia’s motives in Libya are primarily economic. After Gaddafi was toppled, Russia, much like Turkey, lost lucrative contracts, and Moscow is now keen on
salvaging
unfulfilled deals. Unlike Turkey, however, Russia has fewer political goals in Libya, which allows for a ...
... April 2018 Bucharest Declaration, members concurred that the alliance “welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership ... [and] these countries will become members of NATO.” [
28
]
On war in Syria, regime change in Libya, and Kosovo’s independence
Cohen writes that a U.S.-Russia détente also died in Syria, where the two largely failed to cooperate to defeat Islamist extremist forces. And while some American politicians (such as Hillary Clinton) were promoting a logical “no fly zone” in Syria, Cohen thinks such a plan,...