... ruled out that in a few months Iran – mostly due to domestic, but partly to foreign policy reasons as well – may decide to respond to the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and begin to “test” other countries’ reaction to its exceeding some of the JCPOA limits. If nothing extraordinary happens in the next months, and exposure to possible secondary US sanctions continues to threaten doing business in Iran, many in Iran could conclude, even reluctantly, that the Islamic Republic has no more incentives to continue meeting its obligations under the JCPOA in full. Particularly, if the European countries ...
... accord spilled into the streets of Iranian cities. This was Rouhani's finest hour. However, he and his supporters instilled too much hope in the Iranian population as to the lifting of the sanctions. The Iranians came to believe that the signing of the JCPOA meant immediate changes for the better.
In reality, the sanctions proved much more difficult to get rid of. The process turned out to be protracted and controversial.
Foreign companies had their own plans for Iran as a potential market, but the country's negative history of doing business stood in the way....
... is, however, a political dimension to the issue. Should Washington decide to reactivate the sanctions, or even introduce new sanctions, they will affect actors wishing to return to the Iranian market, including Total and Peugeot, which have recently signed ... ... speak of a moral victory, but the question remains as to how the economic players will behave in the worst-case scenario for the JCPOA. Morality, justice and other attributes of the idealistic world are foreign to the Trump administration’s realistic take ...
... of that government. Tillerson went on to say, «Those elements are there certainly, as we know.» In other words, providing support for peaceful regime change in Tehran.
Abdolrasool Divsallar:
Judging the Effects: The Shaping Iranian Perspective on JCPOA and Trump's Options
The harsh rhetoric of the White House and the State Department is accompanied by the regular introduction of new sanctions against Iran. In 2017, almost every month, the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and President Trump
imposed sanctions
against companies and individuals involved in the development of the Iranian missile program related to ...
... it is sure that the energy sector of Iran will not be able to fulfill even half of its great potential without vast international investment.
The analysis leads us to three possible scenarios. Under the first – negative – scenario the USA leaves JCPOA which sparks an antagonistic reaction from Teheran. The return of American sanctions strengthens the position of Iranian conservatives, and all that combined inevitably throws the Iranian economy and its oil and gas sector back to isolation.
Under the second scenario, the USA and Iran stick to the nuclear deal. However, the ...
... interpreted in two ways throughout the nuclear deal. E3/EU+3 side, sees its eligible effect and final outcome in dismantling weapon capabilities in Iran's nuclear program. In Iranian view, effect sought is assurance of gaining full economic benefit from sanctions relief. JCPOA will be prolonged if these two effects are met simultaneously on both sides. On E3/EU+3 side, there are defined procedures and mechanisms enforced by IAEA that could verify Iranian course of action. These verification measures enable E3/EU+3 to ...