... politically sensitive energy issues still need further clarification of policies: the future fiscal regime for oil and gas that could incentivize output and prevent production declines; industrial and technological policy; the choice of the future model for Russia’s gas industry and whether it is going to develop under continued state regulation or in the market environment; climate policy and the strategy to promote (or not) renewables and other technologies of energy transition; and the future of competition in ...
..., while the U.S. sanctions do not prohibit foreign vessels from participating in further repair or maintenance works.
Meanwhile, Germany and the EU have already voiced strong discontent with the U.S. sanctions. Indeed, they benefit from the project. Russia has agreed to preserve a considerable part of its gas transit via Ukraine — this has been one of the key demands to support the project. The European Union has never invited the U.S. to protect them from the NS2, though there was a heated debate inside the EU. Apparently, sanctions emerge as an instrument ...
... post-war period under sanctions against Iran. Special attention is paid to the Kurdish factor and the role the Kurds play in the future of energy in the region, the possibility of subregional integration in the Arab Mashreq and the increasing influence of Russian energy companies in regards to gas projects located in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Russia’s Interests in the Arab Mashreq: Analyzing the Future of Oil and Gas in Iraq and Syria
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... real military presence here is in Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. These ports are Russia’s only access point to the world’s ocean. Strategically, there are no other viable options. Developing the Arctic economically through new shipping routes or oil and gas projects is made all the more difficult by the harsh climate, the poor existing infrastructure and the Arctic’s vast expanses. Today, there is no success story that Russia might use as a template to follow. Time and money are the only answers to this problem. What’s more, Russia will increasingly have to compete with other countries’ Arctic aims. In particular, Moscow should continue negotiations with China, ...
... acting on behalf or owning over 50 percent of the above organizations (if the entities were established inside the EU). Also Gazprombank and other ones listed in Annex III are prohibited to provide investment services.
Such restrictions negatively impact Russian oil and gas industry since it significantly depends on foreign know-how and technologies despite import substitution programs.
Threats and Challenges for Russia’s Arctic Activity under Sanctions
Currently, the success of developing Arctic hydrocarbon deposits ...
... should rescue it from the burden of long-standing gas cooperation problems. The pipeline could carry gas from four Iranian fields being developed with Gazprom’s participation, and might also supply Iranian gas from the Persian Gulf in exchange for Russian gas to be sent to northern Iran via the Caspian Sea.
There is the risk that India, ever sceptical of an energy partnership with Pakistan, might eventually abandon the project. Should this happen, China could potentially step in. If Beijing manages to ...
... of gas supplied to Europe (including Turkey) in 2017 – 194.4 billion cubic metres. Meanwhile, the United States delivered just 2.75 billion cubic metres to Europe during the same period.
This difference poses a risk both for Nord Stream 2 and for Russian gas exports to Europe as a whole. The United States hopes to increase LNG exports and become the main supplier of liquefied natural gas to the global market. There is information that U.S. companies have submitted applications to the Department of Energy ...
... additional sources of income as a transit country. Moreover, Armenia as the main rival of Azerbaijan pretends to play a similar role, though with obviously less success.
Perhaps the main innovation of the trilateral negotiations was the project to
create a gas corridor
from Russia to Iran through the territory of Azerbaijan. It is difficult to call this result a breakthrough, but the successful implementation of the new project combined with the launch of the North-South transportation corridor might increase the importance ...
... Yemen. It is the modern “Cold War” of the Middle-East. One of the reasons Saudi Arabia did not join the Astana initiative is that Iran is a founder. The Saudis does not fear a Russian influence in Syria, but they rather fear an Iranian one. Plus, Russians and Saudis have a lot to discuss and cooperate such as Oil and Gas markets, they have to deal openly at some point. It is in none favour to go into a confrontation in Syria or the Middle-East. As a result, the Saudis had started to view the Russian role in the Middle-East as stability guaranteer. The Saudis also ...
... most important topics of contemporary economic discourse, with a focus on Russia’s position and development. He divided the presentation into three parts: the sanctions and their effect on the Russian market, the world price of oil, and the role of gas in Russia’s future.
He first discussed the impact of sanctions on the development of Russian energy, claiming that the sanctions themselves did not cause significant damage to Russia’s energy industry, but contributed instead to the balancing of industry ...
