... bloc had become a likely prospect.
There are no grounds at all to call the EU a “peaceful project” after the end of the Cold War. In fact, the recent collision over Kaliningrad transit was one of the consequences of the EU’s activities in that ... ... European countries began to rather aggressively establish control over Eastern Europe, while never considering the interests of Russia, their biggest partner in the East. Now nobody even conceals the fact that the EU expanded to the detriment of Russian ...
... international environment that is becoming less and less favourable.
It is widely known that just a few weeks before the post-Cold War European international order came to its logical end, the CSTO countries were able to decisively and effectively use ... ... their CSTO allies and the immediate decision to respond to this appeal by the other 5 countries - Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan - turned out to be surprisingly effective steps. The deployment of the CSTO peacekeeping contingent in Kazakhstan ...
... those that have arisen repeatedly in the history of clashes of states in international politics. However, for the time being, we can assume that what is happening will have a stabilising effect in relation to the orders that emerged as a result of the Cold War, correcting existing distortions, but not eliminating their fundamental basis.
In this case, no matter how frightening the already-observed consequences may look, both for Russia or Europe, and indirectly for the rest of the world, their practical expression will affect the specific forms and manifestations of interaction between states. This, in fact, may be of interest to us now, since the most radical scenario makes ...
... eras of the Soviet Union and Russian Federation. He was appointed as envoy to Washington by Russian President
Vladimir Putin
in September 2017 and he has served as the face of the powerful nation's diplomatic presence in the U.S.
Relations between Cold War-era rivals the U.S. and Russia have long been defined by tensions and marked with significant points of cooperation. But a serious downturn occurred in 2014 after Washington supported an uprising opposed by Moscow in Ukraine, where Russia would go on to annex the Crimean Peninsula ...
... time China and Russia, and attempts to build a new bipolarity, where one pole would be the “world of democracies” led by the United States, and the other pole would be the “world of authoritarians” with the leading roles played by China and Russia. From attempts to universalise the American-centric world order, the United States has moved to its consolidation and defence, and from the “post-Cold War” era to the era of a new global confrontation.
US foreign policy is by no means becoming less ideological. Liberal ideology in its newest left-liberal form is turning from a means of expansion into an instrument for consolidating the “collective ...
The Soviet Union might have lost the first Cold War, but Russia is ahead in the rematch with the US and, this time, has every chance of coming out on top
The Soviet Union might have lost the first Cold War, but Russia is ahead in the rematch with the US and, this time, has every chance of coming out on top....
.... He loved Russia, the Russian intelligentsia and believed in our country’s future” (quoted in Steele, “Stephen Cohen obituary,” 2020).
2
. Chomsky. “... We’re facing ...,” 2015.
3
. Eric Engle argues that “[the] U.S. did not win the cold war: Russia lost it.” He further claims that “Russia and the West are unlikely to “enter into a new cold war, but most likely will enter [a] new era of ‘cold peace’ [due to the fact that] Russian ideology, [though] domestically popular ..., lacks ...
... Soviet Union. The countries with the largest nuclear arsenals and military establishments were also the two principal antagonists in the competition not so much for state primacy but for world ideological and socio-political hegemony. With the end of the Cold War, this is all over. Russia and the United States still possess the world’s largest by far nuclear weapons arsenals, but their relationship is no longer the main axis of world politics. The United States continues to be a superpower, but Russia is now a power of a different ...
... Soviet Union and the US were in confrontation. There was a high mutual interest on both sides then. Restrictions on contact and cooperation were extremely severe. But the trend was different, and reversed into a rapid and exponential growth once the Cold War ended. Today, the limits are far less rigid. But the outlook for the future is pessimistic. Any Black Swan event could turn this downtrend into a landslide fall. Russia and the US have ever fewer areas for cooperation. Economic ties are still growing despite the sanctions, but their total volume is as miserable as it has ever been. US trade with Russia amounts to half of its trade with Belgium. Arms control, which ...
... that its national security interests be respected were ignored in the process of NATO enlargement. And so from the early 2010s, the Kremlin started charting a course that was clearly at odds with its earlier policies of Western integration.
With the Russian military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, the breakout from the post-Cold War, Western-dominated order was complete. The takeover of Crimea and support for separatism in Donbass did not presage a policy of reconquering Eastern Europe, as many in the West feared, but it clearly set Ukraine and other former Soviet republics ...
