... deficit market. The question remains open, is the trade-off worth it?
Energy Weaponry Myth:
Pathological fear does exist, that Gazprom may in some way use its power to influence Europe as a dominant supplier. However, in reality, if we look retrospectively ... ... Russia, this is especially a major issue as all the loans for developing new fields and constructing new pipes are done via long-term contracts. This is vital for Gazprom, as the lending banks absolutely adore long-term contracts, especially if they ...
... torn between its long-standing Western ties and its Neo-Ottoman future. The tension between pragmatic ties with the West and the Kremlin’s determination to preserve Russian’s “sphere of privileged interests” in the Caucasus and Central Asia are palpable. In the South and East of its vast country, Moscow acts more like a neo-imperial power. Like Beijing and (to a much lesser extent) Ankara, it operates a tributary system with smaller neighbours, providing “security” ...
... ¼ of Russia’s oil and gas proven reserves, but these regions are extremely underdeveloped making casing, extraction and transport difficult. Key gas fields, like Kovykta, are isolated by taiga or encircled by canyons – these are not Gazprom friendly areas due to a lack of piping expertise. Besides technical issues, political factors have also strained development. Like the 10 year dispute amid TNK-BP, Interros, Gazprom and other stakeholders, but a light at the end of the tunnel ...
... only possible conclusions around the end of 2013 (See: FoxBusiness). The most recent negotiations have lasted since 2004, when Gazprom signed a cooperation deal with its Chinese counterpart for up to 68 bcm of gas (See: Bloomberg). This was a sizeable figure ... ... its customers compete against each other (See: Reuters). However, on the brightside Gazprom agreed with China in regards to long-term contracts, thus allowing it to develop the riskier fields as export was more guaranteed. At first, I was sceptical about ...