... reductions in strategic nuclear weapons without them being linked to other issues. First and foremost, Washington is concerned about the radical growth of China’s nuclear capabilities—under the Trump presidency, Beijing’s inclusion in strategic arms control was, for some time, a
mandatory condition
for as much as extending the New START. Under the Biden administration, this issue was still in the initial stages, implying a softer touch, though it has never completely left the agenda and would probably rise to its full scale, should substantive negotiations commence. For two ...
... dominance.
The United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM and INF treaties, did everything in its power to prevent its partners in NATO from ratifying an adapted version of the CFE Treaty, and avoided a constructive dialogue on other areas of arms control. In this sense, the signing of the New START agreement in 2010 was rather an exception to the general trend.
Igor Ivanov:
Rethinking International Security for a Post-Pandemic World
That said, it would be a dangerous oversimplification to suggest that the United States is the only party ...
... countries. A more recent argument one hears in Beijing is that it's impractical and too complex to enlarge these treaties. The Chinese also accuse the U.S. of trying to shift the blame for the collapse of arms control on China.
Nonetheless, even if New START is extended, strategic arms control will die unless China is involved in these treaties. The U.S. Senate is hardly likely to ratify another such treaty without some limits on China’s arsenal. And I think it is possible China would join; we have seen China changing its policy ...
... drama to the inevitable demise of arms control. Irrespective of the administration occupying the White House, it is no longer possible for Moscow and Washington to return to the 1970s or even to 2010, when Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama signed the New START Treaty.
Clearly, it is unlikely that any new strategic arms control agreements will be signed in the next few years. First of all, the political background in Russia-US relations is not favourable for fruitful talks. Can such an agreement be discussed at all when the two countries’ leaders cannot coordinate ...
... will bring the issue of a nuclear agreement with Russia into the spotlight of the campaigns of Donald Trump and his opponent, and the demand for a tough stance here is greater than before.
The Day after Tomorrow
Andrey Kortunov:
Is There Life After Arms Control Death?
It is, thus, highly likely that New START will not be extended and will cease to exist in February 2021. And Russia needs to understand this. What will this mean for relations between the great powers, arms control, and, most importantly, national security and the development of military ...
... (INF Treaty). Russia, in turn, also suspended its participation in the INF. According to Andrei Kortunov, Director General of the Russian Council on International Affairs, the United States’ decision can create a “domino effect” in the nuclear arms control: by quitting the INF Treaty, Washington puts in question the prolongation of the New START agreement, and without the New START, there will be a broader issue of maintaining the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime.
Three levels of argumentation
Igor Ivanov:
Nuclear Catastrophe: Myth or Reality?
There are three circumstances ...
... and Eastern Europe. On the contrary, the emergence of a purely European arms control regime should help the disintegrating U.S.–Russia system of treaties remain in place. This, however, would require both parties to act fairly boldly.
The Future of New START and Arms Control
It should be stressed here that, unless the United States resorts to overly provocative activities in terms of deploying new intermediate and shorter range missile systems aimed directly at the Russian strategic nuclear forces (SNF), then ...
... unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Yes, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty was signed in Moscow in 2002, and the New START was signed in 2010. And both these documents are, without a doubt, very important. However, they came as a result of ... .... relations?
It could never have ended well. Mistrust and suspicion began to grow. Security contacts, including contacts on arms control, that had taken years to build up started to deteriorate. There is no way that this could not have had an effect ...
... United States and Russia, as well as by a large group of states that have the necessary capabilities. Many of those countries are in high-risk regions where military tensions are already elevated.
Dmitry Stefanovich:
Post-Helsinki Opportunities for New START and the INF Treaty?
I would venture to suggest that, following the withdrawal from the INF Treaty, the U.S. Administration will waste no time in making the decision not to prolong the New START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) signed ...
... three decades—for instance, the New START Treaty, not Russia’s accession to the WTO or the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, was considered the main accomplishment of the Obama administration’s “reset” policy. As the extension of the New START Treaty is also up in the air, removing the centrality of strategic arms control not only deprives the U.S.-Russia relationship of its special status in global politics, but also drastically reduces both countries’ importance to one another.
Russia and the United States will not be the only countries to suffer. The ...