Trump and Gorbachev: Will the US Suffer the Fate of the USSR?

Donald Trump and Mikhail Gorbachev, at first glance, are very different from each other. One comes from a wealthy family, the other was a self-taught person from the lower class. One is tough and assertive, the other was friendly and diplomatic. One is a playboy and bon vivant, the other was a monogamist who did not make billions, even in troubled times of change. One has gone through the crucible of the market and then an electoral competition. The other was a master of the behind-the-scenes nomenklatura struggle. One is a product of digital postmodernism, the other was a modernist with faith in the rational restructuring of the state and world order. One is a champion of national egoism and the priority of national interests, the other was a supporter of universal human values.

Nevertheless, along with the steepness of changes in foreign and domestic policy, the two leaders are united by a remarkable feature. For both, a significant motive for changing their foreign policy was an attempt to “reorganise liabilities”—getting rid of frankly outdated (in their opinion), excessive and at the same time expensive obligations and processes. “Liabilities reorganisation” and an attempt at large-scale changes in foreign and domestic policy resulted in the complete collapse of the state and the socialist project.

Trump’s team also began with quite reasonable purges of non-core assets. The confrontation with Russia has driven the United States into a trap of double containment. Tens, if not hundreds of billions of dollars in direct and indirect expenses are being spent on Ukraine and disappear as if into a black hole, despite the fact that, strictly speaking, Russia does not pose a fundamental threat to the United States. In other words, the burden on Washington is growing, including taking into account allied obligations in Europe. The political return on the burden is minimal or negative against the backdrop of fundamentally new challenges.

Could the United States meet the same fate as the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev era? At present, this appears improbable. Unlike the USSR, America enjoys a considerable margin of safety—and not simply by virtue of its vast geography and economic heft. After all, the Soviet Union was equally formidable in scale. The distinction lies in structural resilience: the US benefits from adaptable institutions, a dynamic private sector, and (thus far) a political culture capable of navigating internal strife without systemic disintegration. The American system is capable of producing Trump. But it can also swing quite successfully in the opposite direction without significant risk to its own basic foundations.

In addition, Gorbachev at a certain stage became a hostage to his own peacemaker philosophy. At critical moments, it prevented him from toughening and taking action. With Trump, it’s exactly the opposite. He is already a “bad guy” for many of his allies. This means that he has no comparable limitations in terms of tough measures. Taking advantage of the US’s margin of safety, Trump can afford to experiment. US allies, in all likelihood, will have to be not only bystanders, but also test subjects.

Gorbachev’s rule put an end to the Cold War, and the Soviet Union itself soon became a matter of the past. Will Trump become the new Gorbachev? How far will he go? And what could be the fate of America as a result of his presidency?

Donald Trump’s second presidential term has been marked by a series of unpredictable and often disruptive foreign policy moves. These included overtures to normalise relations with Russia, public chastisement of Ukraine’s president, sharp criticism of European allies over perceived democratic shortcomings, and trade conflicts with long-standing partners. More eccentric episodes—such as expressing interest in purchasing Greenland, jesting about Canada as the “51^st US state,” and dismantling key instruments of American soft power like USAID, Radio Liberty, and the Voice of America—further underscored the administration’s unorthodox approach.

Such radical shifts in policy invite historical comparison. Four decades ago, the Soviet Union witnessed a similarly transformative moment when Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Communist Party. Beginning with cautious reforms, his tenure soon gave way to a sweeping “new foreign policy thinking”—a dramatic reorientation of priorities that ultimately hastened the end of the Cold War and, inadvertently, the USSR itself.

Could Trump’s presidency precipitate a comparable upheaval for the United States? To what extent might his policies reshape America’s global role? And what lasting consequences could his governance have for the nation’s future?

Vladislav Belov:
US-EU Economic and Political Conflict in the Second Trump Era

Donald Trump and Mikhail Gorbachev, at first glance, are very different from each other. One comes from a wealthy family, the other was a self-taught person from the lower class. One is tough and assertive, the other was friendly and diplomatic. One is a playboy and bon vivant, the other was a monogamist who did not make billions, even in troubled times of change. One has gone through the crucible of the market and then an electoral competition. The other was a master of the behind-the-scenes nomenklatura struggle. One is a product of digital postmodernism, the other was a modernist with faith in the rational restructuring of the state and world order. One is a champion of national egoism and the priority of national interests, the other was a supporter of universal human values.

Nevertheless, along with the steepness of changes in foreign and domestic policy, the two leaders are united by a remarkable feature. For both, a significant motive for changing their foreign policy was an attempt to “reorganise liabilities”—getting rid of frankly outdated (in their opinion), excessive and at the same time expensive obligations and processes. Gorbachev set himself the ambitious task of bringing the economy and society out of the stagnation of the previous years. Brezhnev’s stability is still perceived with nostalgia, but the rise of corruption, the slowdown in economic growth, the decline in economic efficiency, the pupation of the political elite, and the descent of society into alcoholism noticeably developed during his reign. Colossal military expenses were in the budget. The USSR spent considerable resources on supporting its Warsaw Pact allies and socialist states in different parts of the world, and on maintaining parity with the USA and NATO in the missile and nuclear sphere and conventional weapons. At the same time, in the East, it was necessary to contain China, which since the late 1960s had been in a de facto state of cold war with the USSR and was actively pursuing a policy of normalising relations with the USA and the West. The military campaign in Afghanistan was the culmination of this. Such a burden would have been fully justified if it had proportionally contributed to an increase in the USSR’s security, as well as to the further successes of the socialist project abroad.

In fact, the arms race was yielding fewer and fewer tangible political results, the loyalty of the allies was becoming more and more expensive, and in some cases the Soviet Union was falling prey to parasites in different parts of the world. Gorbachev made an attempt to shed the accumulated liabilities by defusing the accumulated political conflicts. The treaties limiting the use of ​​nuclear missiles and conventional weapons gave a start to the reduction of excessive arsenals. The process of normalising relations with China began. The presence in Afghanistan was curtailed. Soviet diplomacy at first successfully gave the political efforts a value dimension—the USSR initiated the process of reducing the danger of war, and supported dialogue and development for the sake of the whole world. The international authority of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev personally increased sharply.

However, the new course soon began to falter. Despite the obvious advantages of reducing the arms race and de-escalating tensions with the West, Moscow sometimes made unjustified concessions. Here we see the not entirely justified elimination of some classes of missiles, and unconditional support for the unification of Germany without noticeable concessions from the opposite side, and the absence of clear guarantees regarding NATO’s further expansion eastward. But it was increasingly difficult to obtain such guarantees. In the late 1980s, a cascade of velvet revolutions began in Eastern Europe, during which socialist regimes collapsed one after another. Unlike in 1968, the USSR no longer wanted and could not afford a military intervention similar to the Czechoslovak scenario. It was becoming increasingly clear that the Soviet Union was losing control over its allies, and therefore losing the ability to dictate the terms of further coexistence with NATO. The situation in the USSR itself became an even more serious problem. Long overdue economic reforms, changes in the state apparatus and glasnost provoked a process that was becoming less and less controlled by the authorities, similar to what happened with the Chernobyl reactor. The legitimacy of the authorities and ideology was declining. Nationalism was growing in the Soviet republics. Attempts to stop the disintegration of the USSR using forceful half-measures only accelerated the collapse. “Liabilities reorganisation” and an attempt at large-scale changes in foreign and domestic policy resulted in the complete collapse of the state and the socialist project.

Andrey Kortunov:
Russia and the United States beyond the Ukrainian Crisis

Trump’s team also began with quite reasonable purges of non-core assets. The confrontation with Russia has driven the United States into a trap of double containment. Tens, if not hundreds of billions of dollars in direct and indirect expenses are being spent on Ukraine and disappear as if into a black hole, despite the fact that, strictly speaking, Russia does not pose a fundamental threat to the United States. Russia is a capitalist country that was previously quite closely integrated into the global economy. It is the normal reaction of a major power to upholding security interests on its periphery. This is also typical of the United States itself: it is enough to recall Washington’s reaction to the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Russia’s conservative turn is not a big problem either. Upholding traditional values, like any conservative course, is defensive and local in nature, unlike socialism, which had enormous potential for ideological expansion and was once perceived in the United States as a deadly ideological threat. If Russia is not a fundamental enemy, then what is the point in excessive spending? An important role was also played by the fact that in the three years of the Special Military Operation, the West failed to ensure the defeat of Russia. Russia suffered considerable losses and was unable to quickly defeat Ukraine. However, the West also failed to collapse the Russian economy and political system. Moreover, Moscow has begun to actively support the opponents of the United States. In such conditions, an attempt at compromise with Russia became a completely rational strategy for Washington.

Relations with Russia have also raised a more significant question: does it make sense to preserve the legacy of the Cold War? Yes, it ended with a unipolar moment for the United States, when the Americans achieved total dominance in security and economic matters. But is the system of principles and institutions inherited from that time capable of preserving American leadership? The attempt to “squeeze” Russia in the logic of the Cold War victors, ignoring its interests, led to the opposite results. From a predictable and advantageous partner, Moscow has turned into a dangerous adversary. Everything would be fine, but in addition to Russia, powerful and rapidly growing centres of power have appeared on the horizon. Even regional and relatively small powers, such as North Korea, have become a problem for the United States that cannot be solved by military means. In other words, the burden on Washington is growing, including taking into account allied obligations in Europe. The political return on the burden is minimal or negative against the backdrop of fundamentally new challenges.

However, a possible revision of relations with allies is clearly going overboard. The annexation of Greenland, if it happens, will be an unprecedented humiliation of one of Washington’s most loyal allies. The same applies to the rhetoric regarding Canada. Trade wars against allies are becoming toxic, although this has already happened in the past, for example, in American-Japanese relations. It turns out that following the Atlantic line in the form it had taken over the last thirty years now does not guarantee anything. Washington does not hesitate to demand the payment of bills without any sentimentality. This is not only and not so much about the political will and eccentricities of Trump himself. He is surrounded by a team of fairly young and energetic like-minded people. If some hot head decides to physically deal with Trump, Vice President JD Vance will be an even more vigorous destroyer of the legacy of the past.

Could the United States meet the same fate as the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev era? At present, this appears improbable. Unlike the USSR, America enjoys a considerable margin of safety—and not simply by virtue of its vast geography and economic heft. After all, the Soviet Union was equally formidable in scale. The distinction lies in structural resilience: the US benefits from adaptable institutions, a dynamic private sector, and (thus far) a political culture capable of navigating internal strife without systemic disintegration. The American system is capable of producing Trump. But it can also swing quite successfully in the opposite direction without significant risk to its own basic foundations.

In addition, Gorbachev at a certain stage became a hostage to his own peacemaker philosophy. At critical moments, it prevented him from toughening and taking action. With Trump, it’s exactly the opposite. He is already a “bad guy” for many of his allies. This means that he has no comparable limitations in terms of tough measures. Taking advantage of the US’s margin of safety, Trump can afford to experiment. US allies, in all likelihood, will have to be not only bystanders, but also test subjects.

First published in the Valdai Discussion Club.