With the rise to power of Vladimir Putin the relation between Russia and the Vatican has gradually strengthened, combining pragmatic convergences on various issues of international politics to a strategic and ideological vision with several points in common. Such approach could have even stronger connotations during the pontificate of Francis I.
So, the visit of Vladimir Putin to the Holy See on June 10th 2015 will be an opportunity to test the potential of the dialogue between Moscow and the Vatican.
In 1991, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has not only marked the beginning of the definition of a new political balance of power in Europe, but it has also been the genesis of the new course in diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the Russian Federation, after 70 frosty years of Cold War characterized by the ideological and values confrontation between Catholicism and Communism.
It appears intriguing how, in a relative short time, the Kremlin and St. Peter have gone from an open geopolitical clash, culminated with the Vatican support to the Polish Solidarnosc, to a frequent commonality of views both in foreign policy and on the ideological and value orientation. Just think of the war in Yugoslavia and in Kosovo, when the Holy See and the Kremlin shared opposition to the US and NATO strategy in the Balkans.
With the rise to power of Vladimir Putin the relation between Russia and the Vatican has gradually strengthened, combining pragmatic convergences on various issues of international politics to a strategic and ideological vision with several points in common. Such approach could have even stronger connotations during the pontificate of Francis I.
So, the visit of Vladimir Putin to the Holy See on June 10th 2015 will be an opportunity to test the potential of the dialogue between Moscow and the Vatican.
First, to unite Vladimir Putin and the Pope is the common commitment against Islamic fundamentalism inspired terrorism. In this sense, the two leaders agree on the need to establish a strong and lasting relation with the moderate members and actors of the Islamic World, in the aim to isolate the more radical movements and, if necessary, decisively strike jihadist groups that threaten world stability, from Caucasus to Central Asia, from Middle East to Africa and Europe. In this sense, Putin and Pope Francis I share the apprehension towards the thinly veiled support that some Monarchies of the Gulf (Qatar and Saudi Arabia) continue to offer to the networks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and to their affiliates and allies in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern region. A tangible example of the Moscow-St.Peter “axis” is the Syrian crisis, where Russia and the Vatican, for different reasons and with different goals and methods, aim to support Assad or a "secular" - Baathist power that can offer substantial guarantees of both geopolitical interests (for Putin) and the protection of Catholic and Orthodox minorities against jihadi fanaticism.
The same goes for the dialogue with Iran. Russia and the Vatican are among the staunchest supporters of the need to bring back Tehran into the centre of the Middle East chessboard and gradually free it from the international isolation imposed by the United States. Despite being concerned about the Iranian nuclear program, The Catholic Church believes that, at present, there are more room for negotiation with Iran than with other Middle Eastern realities. For the Vatican, Teheran is essential to stem the global Wahhabi Saudi project and to try to influence the policies of Hezbollah in Lebanon, where the conspicuous Christian presence imposes to Pope Francis I a peculiar attention.
However, in the meeting of June 10 2015, Putin and Pope Francis I will definitely talk about the Ukrainian crisis and the new winds of Cold War blowing in Europe. Regarding the war in Donbass and the secession of Crimea, the Vatican has favoured a very moderate diplomatic line, combining repeated appeals for peace and substantial reprimands on the need for dialogue between the West and Russia. It seems likely that, during the next meeting, Pope Francis I will ask for a greater Russian political effort to lower tensions and uphold the full accomplishment of Minsk II agreements.
It should be emphasized how Ukraine has always been a country of confrontation and clash between Vatican and Russia, especially for the tensions between Ukraine Uniate Church and Russian Orthodox Church. In more than one occasion, the Orthodox clerics have accused the Vatican to make "unfair" proselytism among believers. The face-off between Catholicism and Orthodoxy became even tougher after the "Revolution of Dignity" and the Civil War, when the two Churches have aligned respectively with the pro-European front and the pro-Russian front. It would not be surprising if Putin would explore the possibility of getting a kind of Vatican neutrality in Ukraine in exchange for specific guarantees on the rights of Catholics both in Ukraine and in Russia. It is a difficult game for Putin, as the Russian diplomacy should confront the hard-line positions of Polish and the US clergy, unwilling to find a compromise.
Knowing the political weight of the Vatican in Italy and in Europe, Putin could also assess if there is the possibility to count on the support of the Holy See against the anti-Kremlin hard-liners, the so-called hawks of sanctions. In Italy, where the pro and anti-Russia fronts are equivalent, any possible Vatican sympathies could make the difference. However, also in this case, it is a very complex game of chess, as Vatican diplomacy could not ignore the accusations coming from part of International Community against the Kremlin about hits direct involvement in Donbass war.
Within these complicated dossiers of international policy, the dialogue between Moscow and St. Peter has necessarily to take place according to an ad hoc formula.
However, beyond the contingent crisis, there is a significant ideological bond that links the views of Vladimir Putin and Pope Francis I. In fact, both are fiery critics of the political, economic and moral process of globalization that crushes diversity and seeks to impose a standardized and homologating model for all peoples and States. Both do not sympathize with US unilateralism and its effects on the international stage. Both are supporters of the re-thinking of the current world order on the basis of multipolarism and recognition of the emerging political and economic realities (BRICS and Co.).
Above all, they both recognize the importance of traditional values, the centrality of family, national identity and Christian principles as a ethic milestone for modern societies. Despite the modernist openness, Pope Francis I is always a Jesuit, a sincere conservative and a close supporter of the indivisibility between religion oriented ethics and politics. For his side, Putin, in the construction of Putinism as an exportable model, based on the combination of market economy, State supremacy (Gosudarstvo), conducted democracy and conservatism could have the Vatican as a privileged listener. Without forgetting that the Resident of the Kremlin could promote with his mediation the process of reconciliation between Catholics and Orthodox.