The Law Banning the UOC: Can Religious Policy Coexist with Freedom of Religion?

The crisis in relations between the church and the state in Ukraine, centered around the country’s oldest religious institution—the Orthodox Church—has long ceased to be a domestic issue. The crisis has taken on an international dimension, involving both state and religious actors on the global stage. Law 8371 “On Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Field of Activities of Religious Organizations” (commonly known as the “Law Banning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church”) that was passed by Ukraine’s parliament, Verkhovna Rada, on August 20, 2024, marks a key milestone in this crisis. Overall, it is fair to say that those who view this legislation through the lens of modern norms of international law on freedom of religion and belief have a generally negative perception of it. On August 24, 2024, the World Council of Churches published a statement on its website, declaring that it is “deeply alarmed by the potential for unjustified collective punishment … under a new law” in Ukraine. On August 25, 2024, Pope Francis addressed the new law in his Sunday homily: “... let those who want to pray be allowed to pray in what they consider their Church. Please, let no Christian Church be abolished directly or indirectly. Churches are not to be touched!” The religious leaders’ statements underscore the separation of church and state. The suggestion for Ukraine is to abandon coercive tactics and simply return to the path it had followed for the past three decades, when it was considered a state with liberal religious legislation and a diverse religious landscape. The careful choice of words by these religious leaders shows that neither states nor churches operate in isolation from the political and ethical fabric of the global community that determines what actions and statements are deemed acceptable.

The statement made by the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church references past and present cases of persecution of Ukrainian Orthodox believers and expects a response similar to the global campaign defending religious rights in the Soviet Union. The text describes pressure on the UOC as a wave of violence and hostility that the state is either unwilling or unable to contain: there is an “anti-church campaign in the Ukrainian mass media aimed at defaming the canonical Orthodoxy,” mass seizures of churches, orchestrated by radical nationalists, and beatings of the clergy and believers. The ROC bishops see these developments not as an overreach of state power, but rather as the opposite—a lack of state power or the ineffectiveness of political institutions.

The most important part of the Synod’s statement, in terms of international relations, is its reference to the negative role of the Patriarch of Constantinople. This may be the first time that the ROC has openly criticized Patriarch Bartholomew in a document addressed to a wide range of international organizations and the world community. The reference to Patriarch Bartholomew in this way poses a significant threat to his political clout. After all, his symbolic weight in international politics stems from the fact that he “represents 300 million Orthodox Christians worldwide” (most of whom belong to the Moscow Patriarchate). The Patriarch of Constantinople positions himself as the “spiritual leader” of all Orthodox Christians. The statement by the ROC bishops to international organizations, asserting that Patriarch Bartholomew cannot represent their faithful, changes the whole situation so much that it has not even been contested—it was simply ignored in the Western press.

The statement by the Synod of the ROC is clearly not going to elicit an international response capable of changing or improving the situation for the Ukrainian Orthodox. Nevertheless, it is an important acknowledgment of the real problems that can be discussed in better days.

The crisis in relations between the church and the state in Ukraine, centered around the country’s oldest religious institution—the Orthodox Church—has long ceased to be a domestic issue. The crisis has taken on an international dimension, involving both state and religious actors on the global stage. Much like the current military-political conflict, where new technologies and tactics are being applied, Ukrainian Orthodoxy has become a battleground, not only for fundamental principles of the past but also for different strategies for the future in religious affairs [1].

Law 8371 “On Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Field of Activities of Religious Organizations” (commonly known as the “Law Banning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church”) that was passed by Ukraine’s parliament, Verkhovna Rada, on August 20, 2024, marks a key milestone in the church-state crisis. The legislation outlaws religious groups affiliated with foreign religious associations based in countries recognized as having committed armed aggression against Ukraine. This creates legal grounds to prosecute and dissolve parishes and dioceses of the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate solely because of their canonical communion with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), even though the Council of the UOC proclaimed the “full autonomy and independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church” on May 27, 2022. The law does not directly mandate the dissolution of the UOC, but only because it does not exist as a single legal entity under Ukrainian law; only its components (dioceses, parishes, monasteries and educational institutions) are legally recognized. Their future will be decided in nine months through court proceedings initiated by state bodies for religious expertise.

The law had been in the making for a year and a half. Its draft drew criticism from human rights groups and politicians both domestically and in countries supporting Ukraine in the ongoing military conflict [2]. The most serious warning came from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, which delivered an official letter to Ukraine’s ambassador to the U.S. on April 9, 2024. The letter expressed concern about the situation caused by the consideration of Bill 8371 in the Ukrainian parliament, questioned the vague criteria for determining affiliation with a foreign state and the impossibility of criminalizing the “ideology of the Russian world.” The Commission suggested that the bill be submitted for review to the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe or the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief [3] to confirm its compliance with international law [4]. These critical objections did not prevent the passing of Law 8371 by an overwhelming majority of lawmakers in Ukraine’s parliament on August 20, 2024. The controversial and at the same time populist law, with its vague implementation mechanism, was ratified largely due to electoral competition between two major parties, European Solidarity and Servant of the People. For either party, rejecting the bill would have meant conceding the credit for its promotion (in the eyes of ultranationalists) to the rival. After the law’s passage, responses ranged from sharply negative to moderately concerned. Overall, it is fair to say that those who view this legislation through the lens of modern norms of international law on freedom of religion and belief have a generally negative perception of it. Of course, those who speak out against it or express concern both at home and abroad are not necessarily showing solidarity with the UOC (and even less with the ROC), and many still back other initiatives of Ukrainian lawmakers or the government. Yet, in this case, it is almost impossible to remain silent, as the provisions of Law 8371 strike at the fundamental principles that underpin the modern world, which include the resolution of religious conflicts through state-church compromise, tolerance and freedom of religion.

International Criticism from Human Rights and Religious Groups

Irina Borshch:
Why International Institutions Overlook the Persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church?

On August 24, 2024, the World Council of Churches (WCC) published a statement on its website, declaring that it is “deeply alarmed by the potential for unjustified collective punishment … under a new law” in Ukraine.

The WCC, headquartered in Geneva, was conceived in the 1930s and 1940s as an international organization, somewhat akin to the League of Nations, but focused on uniting church leaders. In the end, the WCC did not become part of the UN system due to the principle of state secularism, but it has a consultative status nonetheless. Today, it functions more as an international global forum with ample opportunities for mutual influence, where almost all Christian church organizations are represented.

The statement dated August 24, 2024, signed by South African Pastor Jerry Pillay and German Protestant Bishop Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, said that “[t]he government of Ukraine has the sovereign right and responsibility to defend the nation’s territorial integrity and to protect its citizens ... Ukrainian authorities have a right ... to prosecute individuals guilty of crimes against the interests of Ukraine. At the same time, the WCC is deeply alarmed by the potential for unjustified collective punishment of an entire religious community and violation of the principles of freedom of religion or belief under a new law ... Neither the crimes of some individuals, nor the historical affiliations of a particular religious entity, can be a sufficient basis for measures tantamount to collective punishment of a living worshipping religious community in Ukraine. The government of Ukraine is responsible for protecting the rights of all its citizens.”

On August 25, 2024, Pope Francis addressed the passage of the new law in his Sunday homily: “... in thinking about the laws recently adopted in Ukraine, I fear for the freedom of those who pray, because those who truly pray always pray for all. Praying is not committing evil. If someone commits evil against his people, he will be guilty for that, but he cannot have committed evil because he prayed. So let those who want to pray be allowed to pray in what they consider their Church. Please, let no Christian Church be abolished directly or indirectly. Churches are not to be touched!”

In this case, both Protestant and Catholic perspectives have much in common. The religious leaders’ statements underscore the separation of church and state, as well as the compromises dating back to early modern Europe. While expressing loyalty to the state with its neutral territorial principle of power organization and monopoly on force (as well as the Ukrainian state as a specific case), they stress the right of individuals to choose their faith and to collectively exercise that choice in the form of established religious practices. Proclaiming the public freedom of “those who pray” (a term Pope Francis used to refer to mass religious activity) does not exclude the possibility or necessity for the state to seek loyalty from religious leaders and to pursue its own interests in this area. However, this issue should be settled privately (i.e., through agreements between state and church elites), outside of public legislation, avoiding polarization of society and discrimination. Pope Francis also implicitly invokes the idea of the “common good” (“those who truly pray always pray for all”).

Overall, it is fair to say that Law 8371 is painted by its Western critics as a one-off and exceptional occurrence, lacking the important historical context of the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. Ukrainian authorities are being taught a lesson in institutional pluralism. Censure by global religious leaders, however, does not translate into economic sanctions (and possibly obviates the need for them). The suggestion for Ukraine is to abandon coercive tactics and simply return to the path it had followed for the past three decades, when it was considered a state with liberal religious legislation and a diverse religious landscape. The careful choice of words by these religious leaders shows that neither states nor churches operate in isolation from the political and ethical fabric of the global community that determines what actions and statements are deemed acceptable.

Statement by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church

Ivan Timofeev:
British Sanctions Against Patriarch Kirill. Forgiveness and Humility in Response

The statement made by the Synod of the ROC on August 22, 2024, has certain similarities with the remarks cited above in its condemnation of Law 8371 and its appeal to international law (it even contains a direct call to international human rights organizations “to give an immediate and unbiased response to the flagrant oppression of the faithful in Ukraine”). However, the Synod’s statement is built on other principles: rather than describing the norm of religious freedom, it cites specific cases of violation. Furthermore, it was one of the earliest reactions to the law [5]. The tone is sharper and more accusatory, as the ROC has more freedom to speak, unburdened by the constraints that accompany the official status of an international actor. The Synod references past and present cases of persecution of Ukrainian Orthodox believers and expects a response similar to the global campaign defending religious rights in the Soviet Union.

The statement sees the new law in a historical context as the culmination of a long-standing effort to pile pressure on the UOC to nationalize it, restructure its internal organization and change canonical norms. The Ukrainian crisis is seen through the lens of a trail of problems ranging from the Union of Brest to the communist regime of the Soviet Union. The text details direct pressure on UOC clergy from Ukrainian authorities, which is expected to intensify as the new law legitimizes practices that are already being enforced locally. The legislation is perceived as aiming at liquidating UOC communities “or at forcibly transferring them to other religious organizations.” As a result, “[h]undreds of monasteries, thousands of communities and millions of Orthodox Christians in Ukraine will find themselves outside the legal framework and lose their property and places of worship.”

The statement also portrays public pressure on the UOC and general hostility toward it. This is a wave of popular unrest that the state is either unwilling or unable to contain: there is an “anti-church campaign in the Ukrainian mass media aimed at defaming the canonical Orthodoxy,” mass seizures of churches, orchestrated by radical nationalists, beatings of the clergy and believers, as well as closures of churches by local authorities. So the ROC bishops see these developments not as an overreach of state power or excessive concern for sovereignty, but rather as the opposite—a lack of state power or the ineffectiveness of political institutions. The Orthodox Church is no stranger to proactive state policy in religious affairs. It is well-known that no Orthodox autocephaly in Eastern Europe has ever been proclaimed and recognized without the active involvement of foreign affairs authorities [6]. However, in this case, it is not the strengthening but the weakening of sovereignty that has led to a clash between state elites and the historic church [7].

This is not surprising if we recall that, contrary to the superficial impression of liberal denominational diversity, Ukraine’s religious legislation—the current law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations,” dated April 23, 1991, No. 987-XII—almost literally repeats many articles from the Soviet law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations,” dated October 1, 1990, merely supplementing them with clauses allowing international contacts and even subordination to governing centers abroad. In other words, the liberal phase of Soviet religious policy in 1988–1991 was of great importance for Ukraine [8].

Since the 1991 law (modeled after the Soviet law of 1990) is still in effect today, many institutions typical of Soviet religious law remain in place, particularly the non-recognition of the UOC as a legal entity. This provision, in turn, dates back to the “Decree on Separation of Church from State and School from Church” of 1918, which deprived religious organizations of the rights of a legal entity. The laws passed in the late Soviet era restored these rights only partially. This creates a paradox where the UOC is not recognized by the state as a legal entity due to the transplanting of Soviet norms into Ukrainian law. At the same time, the UOC is not recognized by the Patriarchate of Constantinople as an independent church, based on Ukraine’s official stance [9].

Daniil Parenkov:
The Politics of Canons and Borders (2018)

The most important part of the Synod’s statement, in terms of international relations, is its reference to the negative role of the Patriarch of Constantinople. This may be the first time that the ROC has openly criticized Patriarch Bartholomew in a document addressed to a wide range of international organizations and the world community. His unilateral actions, inconsistent with the internal rules of the Church, have deepened the crisis. “Therefore, the Patriarch of Constantinople is personally responsible for orchestrating the persecutions against the faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”

The Synod’s statement places Ukrainian religious policy within a broader narrative of Christian persecution, sending a pointed message to international experts on religious freedom. While drawing parallels between the persecution of Christians in pagan Rome and under 20^th-century communist regimes is commonplace, the history of Ukraine in the 16^th and 17^th centuries—during the era of the Wars of Religion and later the formation of the Westphalian system—remains largely unexplored from the perspective of religious freedom. Not to mention the impact of French revolutionary anticlericalism on the state elites who persecuted Orthodox Christians. The Synod’s statement, recalling that the Church is a transnational institution with a thousand-year legacy, raises the important issue of future historical accountability for all those involved in the current pressure campaign against the UOC, including Patriarch Bartholomew (and not him alone, but also “the hierarchs who hold the same views”).

The reference to Patriarch Bartholomew in this way poses a significant threat to his political clout. After all, his symbolic weight in international politics stems from the fact that he “represents 300 million Orthodox Christians worldwide” (most of whom belong to the Moscow Patriarchate). The Patriarch of Constantinople positions himself as the “spiritual leader” of all Orthodox Christians. His traditional seniority, rooted in Byzantine-era formulas, has transformed into symbolic secular power in today’s system of international relations, becoming a form of expert and public representation. The statement by the ROC bishops to international organizations, asserting that Patriarch Bartholomew cannot represent their faithful, changes the whole situation so much that it has not even been contested—it was simply ignored in the Western press.

The statement by the Synod of the ROC is clearly not going to elicit an international response capable of changing or improving the situation for the Ukrainian Orthodox. Nevertheless, it is an important acknowledgment of the real problems that can be discussed in better days.

1. As Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko aptly noted in 2018 on the occasion of establishing the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), “The future of global Orthodoxy is being decided here...”

2. Nikolai N. Petro. Ukraine Has a Civil Rights Problem (foreignpolicy.com)

3. The mandate was created in 1986. Since 2022, it has been held by Nazila Ghanea, an Iranian-born British lawyer. Her approach can be seen in the monograph “Freedom of Religion or Belief: An International Law Commentary” (Oxford, 2016), co-authored with Heiner Bielefeldt (UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief in 2010–2016) and Michael Wiener.

4. Notably, on March 24, 2024, the UN published a report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, which said that official actions targeting the UOC could be discriminatory.

5. On its basis, on August 24, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia called on religious leaders around the world to offer their support and prayers for the believers of the UOC.

6. See Emilov P. Borshch I. Modern Debates on Autocephaly in Orthodox Theology // Edward G. Farrugia, S.J.—Željko Paša, S.J. (eds.), Autocephaly: Coming of Age in Communion. Historical, Canonical, Liturgical, and Theological Studies, vol. II. Rome, 2023. P. 1011–1028.

7. Hence, the new law cannot be seen as implementation of the principle of cuius regio, eius religio, because it does not designate main religious denominations, but indirectly points to an “outcast,” while leaving the country an open missionary territory.

8. Let us recall that most churches reclaimed by the ROC in 1988–1989 were in Ukraine. See Shakhov M. Legal Basis for the Activity of Religious Associations in the Russian Federation. Moscow, 2013.

9. In their analysis of earlier actions of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, historians note a distinctive feature of its ecclesiastical policy: “The legitimate church faction is the one currently supported by the existing state power” (See the dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Theology by Priest Mazyrin A. “The Renovationist Schism in the Russian Church and the Orthodox East: Relationship Dynamics Between the Non-Canonical Organization and the Patriarchate of Constantinople and Other Local Churches.” Moscow, 2023. P. 457).