The Impact of Trump’s Tariff Policy on Food Security for BRICS States

U.S. President Donald Trump issued a stern ultimatum to Russia, BRICS member states, and their economic partners. He warned that unless a peace agreement with Ukraine is signed within 50 days—by September 3, 2025—Washington will impose a 100% import tariff on goods from Russia, as well as “secondary” tariffs on countries that would continue buying Russian oil and gas. Speaking in the Oval Office alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Trump emphasized that he is “discontented” with Moscow’s unwillingness to compromise and is ready for “extremely tough” measures.

In the meantime, he threatened to increase sanctions pressure on any country “sympathizing with the anti-American course of BRICS,” by introducing an additional 10% tariff on top of the base rates. According to Trump, “there will be no exceptions” for those who support BRICS plans for de-dollarization or the creation of alternative global governance institutions.

Tariffs are not only about trade but also—as U.S. experts point out—control. Trump is trying to contain the rise of new alternative globalization, which is forming around BRICS and even broader, around BRICS+. However, the paradox of this situation is that such measures do not restrain the development of trade and financial directions within BRICS but rather accelerate it.

U.S. President Donald Trump issued a stern ultimatum to Russia, BRICS member states, and their economic partners. He warned that unless a peace agreement with Ukraine is signed within 50 days—by September 3, 2025—Washington will impose a 100% import tariff on goods from Russia, as well as “secondary” tariffs on countries that would continue buying Russian oil and gas. Speaking in the Oval Office alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Trump emphasized that he is “discontented” with Moscow’s unwillingness to compromise and is ready for “extremely tough” measures.

In the meantime, he threatened to increase sanctions pressure on any country “sympathizing with the anti-American course of BRICS,” by introducing an additional 10% tariff on top of the base rates. According to Trump, “there will be no exceptions” for those who support BRICS plans for de-dollarization or the creation of alternative global governance institutions.

Economic and Financial Repercussions

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The statement by the President of the United States regarding the introduction of a universal 10-percent tariff on BRICS member states is not merely guided by populism or a trade measure, but rather the beginning of a new phase in the economic conflict targeting both the redistribution of trade flows and fundamental rethinking of the U.S. role in the global economy.

The reason is quite obvious—BRICS countries are visibly stepping up their efforts to create a parallel financial, economic and institutional architecture, thereby undermining the status quo in which the dollar and the U.S. have been the uncontested centers of power.

Washington’s response in the form of tariff pressure is aimed at destabilizing this alternative BRICS model. The tariffs announced by Donald Trump are not only an economic measure but also a kind of political weapon meant to dismantle alternative centers of power.

However, in this case, the result can be quite the opposite. The U.S. risks losing its role as an arbiter in global trade, while the reaction of BRICS nations will likely be not only symmetrical but also strategic, and range from accelerating de-dollarization to moving towards a new architecture of global settlements. This could betoken the end of Washington’s dominance in the global economy and trade, fueling the formation of a new multipolar trade architecture. Thus, the world is entering an era of new turbulence, where non-economic factors will increasingly determine the economic future.

Speaking generally about the impact of the announced tariffs on the global economy, a number of BRICS nations, as well as key economies of the Global South and the global majority, have already reacted in one way or another. For instance, China condemned the actions of the U.S. and the announced tariff policy, viewing them as economic blackmail. As is well known, China is currently activating the CIPS platform for settlements with Brazil, South Africa, Russia, and other BRICS member states.

Tariffs are not only about trade but also—as U.S. experts point out—control. Trump is trying to contain the rise of new alternative globalization, which is forming around BRICS and even broader, around BRICS+. However, the paradox of this situation is that such measures do not restrain the development of trade and financial directions within BRICS but rather accelerate it.

A new wave of protectionist trade policies in the U.S, which surged after the announced plans to raise the “basic mutual” tariff rate to 15–20% and extend it to partners importing Russian or Iranian oil on July 10, 2025, has once again called into question the sustainability of global agri-food supply chains. Negotiations between the finance ministers of the “Group of Twenty” in Durban on July 17, were effectively under the threat of a new tariff escalation, with European and Asian countries warning of a possible mirror response, increasing the risk of further global trade fragmentation.

Impact of Trump’s Tariff Policy on Food Security in BRICS Countries

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The final declaration of the XVII BRICS Summit, adopted in Rio de Janeiro, includes several substantial and comprehensive provisions dedicated to food security in the member states.

First, the document emphasizes the key role of BRICS member states in global food production and in assuring global food and nutritional security. The parties condemn unilateral coercive measures, primarily referring to economic sanctions, whose imposition negatively affects the realization of human rights, including the right of access to food resources. Furthermore, the declaration once again highlights the relevance of the initiative to establish a BRICS grain exchange and its development.

The emerging food sovereignty of the alliance, as well as the idea of creating a grain exchange, inevitably raises concerns in Washington regarding the preservation of its role as a regulator of prices, demand, and supply, even though the process of implementing the grain exchange initiative is rather gradual and unhurried.

The economic protectionism policy pursued by the Trump administration since 2017, including the introduction of tariff restrictions against China, Brazil, India, and other trading partners, has had significant repercussions for global agri-food chains. For BRICS nations, which play a key role as producers and importers of food, these measures have exacerbated food instability risks, increased external trade costs, and have stimulated the development of their own agrarian strategies that respond to current realities.

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Washington’s decision to impose a universal 10% tariff on all imports to the U.S., along with the threat of additional charges for countries that “have joined the anti-American policies of BRICS,” has actually marked a new milestone in the escalation of trade conflicts. Formally, this concerns tariffs, but in reality, such measures are nothing else than a tool of geopolitical pressure called to restrain the growing influence of BRICS and to hamper its de-dollarization initiatives. A wide circle of states is affected, however a key question remains: how capable are these measures of undermining BRICS food security and economic stability?

Below is a chart of the current and upcoming tariffs to be imposed on all BRICS member states starting August 1, 2025. Another 10% tariff for BRICS ideological solidarity should be imposed in addition to the existing ones.

Source: Compiled by the authors based on open data.

Russia and Iran will most likely be indirectly affected by the potential tariffs. Formally, Washington has imposed a 10% “basic” duty on all imports, but for Iranian food products, it is purely theoretical: food shipments from Iran to the U.S. have been banned since September 29, 2010, by OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury) and their sanctions.

Considering that fertilizers are an important element of food security, in 2024, about 7% of Russia’s fertilizer export revenues came from U.S supplies. (approximately 2.5 million tons of urea, ammonium nitrate, and potassium salts). Of course, there is no threat to food security; the measures taken by the U.S. will mainly affect producers and tax revenues flowing to the national treasury. A decrease in fertilizer supplies to the U.S. will push domestic producers to diversify their exports. For example, in the first half of 2025, exports of Russian fertilizers to Brazil increased by almost 30%.

A different situation is observed for BRICS member states located in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The fact is that the existing 10% basic tariff and the deprivation of Ethiopia’s AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) benefits affect the supply of a key food product—coffee—while the impact of tariffs on non-food products (clothing) reduces the availability of hard currency in the country, with grain, fertilizers and bread prices steeply rising and the national currency being destabilized as a result. Egypt and the UAE, on the contrary, find themselves in relatively benign circumstances: their food chains are diversified, and the costs are currently limited to rising transactional expenses.

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South Africa has not gone unnoticed either. For South Africa, the U.S. market accounts for only about 8% of its exports, but the share in citrus fruits reaches up to 16%, making the 30% customs hit (which may be accompanied by additional measures) surgical but strong and painful. Undoubtedly, South Africa has numerous markets, including those in BRICS, to reorient to. Moreover, the country remains a major producer of maize and fruits. However, the tripling of tariffs will severely impact the incomes of countless farming families, increasing pressure on the local currency. As a result, access to and stability of food for low-income groups will deteriorate, while the prices for imported bread and sunflower oil will rise. The key question is whether Pretoria can negotiate partial exemptions or expedite the reorientation of its exports before the tariffs begin to take a heavy toll, in order to prevent hunger and maintain the availability of existing products for the local population.

In Southeast Asia, Indonesia—also a member of BRICS since this January—has become the main target of Washington D.C. In addition to the base tariff, the U.S. has imposed a separate 32% duty on palm oil, with Jakarta covering 85% of U.S. imports required for this product.

In terms of seafood (mainly shrimp), only a 10% tariff was imposed in 2024. For Indonesia, U.S. tariffs are not a threat to food availability per se, but rather a blow to exporter revenues, and through them, to the financial access to food for people residing in coastal and palm regions. Additional tariffs on top of the existing ones will have a more destructive effect, which is why Indonesia is currently combining “tough bargaining” with Washington (for example, a guarantee for the purchase of 2 million tons of wheat, reorientation of export flows, and targeted fiscal measures domestically) with subsidies to Indonesian farmers.

Overall, this gives a chance to limit the macroeconomic damage done by tariffs (reaching around 0.05% of GDP) and prevent the further deterioration of food security for vulnerable population groups.

It is not that easy for U.S. customs duties to “bend” the Celestial Empire.

The United States accounts for about 5% of China’s total agricultural exports. Washington’s tariffs of 10% and 55% would eliminate a significant portion of these sales, but will affect only a small portion of the entire sector’s foreign exchange earnings. The introduction of effective supportive domestic measures by Beijing—including an increase in the budget for domestic grain reserves, subsidizing agricultural insurance, and loans for fish processors—will neutralize the potential systemic threat to China’s food security considering the existing and potential tariff measures taken by the United States.

As for India, U.S. tariffs will undoubtedly take a heavy toll on the export revenues of certain sectors (shrimp, spices, basmati), but they will not undermine the overall food security of this nation. The U.S. imports about 12% of India’s total agricultural exports. In turn, Delhi adheres to the diplomatic principle of “removing the surcharge” and has already proposed to the U.S. the reduction of its own tariffs on several U.S. goods, as well as guaranteed wheat purchases in exchange for exempting shrimp and rice from excessive customs duties. Simultaneously, the government is already launching market reorientation and targeted subsidies to soften the impact on farmer incomes.

The tariff policy unfolding around Brazil may well be the most notorious “tariff case.” Trump, accusing Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of a “witch hunt” against former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, intends to impose a record 50% tariff (the highest since China) on imports from Brazil starting August 1.

Brazil is quite unusual among Trump’s recent tariff targets, as it has a trade deficit with the U.S., while nearly all other countries have significant surpluses. In 2024, this country imported goods worth about 44 billion USD from the U.S., while exports from Brazil to the U.S. amounted to around 42 billion USD.

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Brazil is a net exporter of grains, sugar, and meat. The surplus supply in a closed U.S. market lowers domestic prices; however, the incomes of 2 million coffee producers, 60,000 citrus growers, and 120,000 people employed in meat processing are declining.

Currently, the United States is the largest buyer of Brazilian coffee. If a tariff is implemented, U.S. roasters will have to seek alternative sources of coffee from other countries, while Brazilian coffee exporters are likely to redirect their supplies to markets in Europe and Asia, as well as BRICS member states, to make up for the U.S. market. U.S. coffee roasters will not be able to absorb a 50% increase in prices for Brazilian beans, while Brazilian exporters do not have sufficient margin flexibility to lower prices, to offset such a significant tariff. Again, Brazil’s food supply system will not be affected, even though without targeted government support, the incomes of coffee producers, citrus farmers, and meat processors are vulnerable.

Thus, U.S. tariff pressure does not lead BRICS nations to a direct food deficit, but it increases currency volatility and impacts the incomes of millions of households. The reciprocal strategies used by BRICS economies are similar: market diversification, subsidies for key exporters, increasing domestic reserves, and in some cases, negotiations with Washington on regulating mutual tariffs, or bargaining.

However, national measures are already insufficient. Washington is accelerating what it is actually trying to avoid: the rapprochement of BRICS member states, the rapid formation of alternative financial institutions and integration mechanisms, including the launch of a payment system based on national currencies, the reorientation of food sale and import markets, as well as the development of a consolidated geopolitical strategy for BRICS. The declarative nature of the initiatives gives way to joint practical steps.

Washington is shifting away from “targeted” sanctions to tough tariff diplomacy, where trade duties serve as the main tool of coercion. For the United States, the outcome of the confrontation will depend on how willing it is to endure real economic losses for the sake of achieving geopolitical objectives. As for BRICS states, the burdensome consequences of the U.S. tariff policy will directly depend on their ability to develop a unified position and not to allow tariff aggression to disrupt their cohesion. It is extremely important to strengthen unity in views and perspectives, strive for the further expansion of BRICS economies and markets, providing each state with mutual trade preferences and financial support.