The Baltic States’ Role in Russia-NATO Relations
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D.Sc. in Law, Professor, Department of European Law, MGIMO University; Professor, Institute of Management and Territorial Development, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic republics charted a course toward integration with the Euro-Atlantic institutions. How did the Baltic States’ accession to NATO affect Russia? How should Russia and NATO tailor their dialogue on European missile defense? Can the positive experience of cooperation they gained through the transit of military cargo into the Kaliningrad Region and out of Afghanistan, via the Baltic States, lay the foundations for broader Russia-NATO cooperation?
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic republics charted a course toward integration with the Euro-Atlantic institutions. How did the Baltic States’ accession to NATO affect Russia? How should Russia and NATO tailor their dialogue on European missile defense? Can the positive experience of cooperation they gained through the transit of military cargo into the Kaliningrad Region and out of Afghanistan, via the Baltic States, lay the foundations for broader Russia-NATO cooperation?
The Baltic States’ Accession to NATO: Political and Legal Implications for Russia
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia acceded to NATO on March 29, 2004. This step provoked a sharply negative response from Russia.
NATO’s eastward enlargement did not, of course, coincide with Russia’s national interests, as NATO’s military presence close to its borders might tilt the established balance of forces in Europe. The immediate vicinity of NATO military bases to Russian borders did nothing to help the spirit of good neighborly relations, and instead served to exacerbate tension in bilateral relations.
The appearance of NATO’s Baltic air base appearance provoked serious concern from Russia, because it meant that the fly-in time for combat aircraft to major Russian cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg shrank to between 5 and 30 min.
Lithuania’s orientation toward the Euro-Atlantic institutions also interfered with human and cargo movement, primarily servicemen and military shipments, into and out of the Kaliningrad Region,. Lithuania’s accession to NATO imposed additional commitments on the country, so the transportation of Russian military cargo ceased to be a purely bilateral issue.
Furthermore, the transit of military cargo was used repeatedly during periods of worsened relations with Russia as a means of exerting pressure on it. In particular, during the 2008 armed conflict in South Ossetia.
In general, the Kaliningrad Region found itself, to an extent, a hostage in this event, because Russia’s local armed forces were cut off from the main troop divisions. The Kaliningrad defense district is surrounded by NATO member-states, which makes it less secure. Given this fact, Russia’s leadership began to look for solutions to redress the balance of forces in the Baltic Sea region, and to guarantee security in the Kaliningrad Region.
In response to the Euro antimissile defense project (EAMDP) for Europe, Russia made public its plans to deploy Iskander short-range missiles in the Kaliningrad Region.
Mobile complex "Iskander-E"
Iskander missiles are truck-mounted, independently controlled, and are able to hit targets at distances of 50 to 280 km. Thus, these missiles’ effective zone includes the whole of Lithuania and a sizable part of Poland and Latvia.
The response to Russia’s plans by neighboring states in the Baltic Sea and in NATO more broadly was sharply negative.
In 2009, the plans to deploy Iskander in the Kaliningrad Region were frozen temporarily, in exchange for a US promise to suspend EAMDP. Although Russia and NATO agreed at the 2010 November summit in Lisbon to cooperate in this area, negotiations stalled in 2011.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced defense and diplomatic action would be taken, under which the Iskander missile system would be deployed and a missile-attack warning radar station would operate in the Kaliningrad Region.
In response, Lithuania expressed its intent to cooperate closely with NATO to protect its territory under the EAMDP.
The patrolling of Baltic air space by NATO military aircraft presents another issue.
The appearance of NATO’s Baltic air base appearance provoked serious concern from Russia, because it meant that the fly-in time for combat aircraft to major Russian cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg shrank to between 5 and 30 min./p>
McDonnell Douglas F-4, Baltic Air Policing
Currently, Baltic air space is being patrolled by other NATO members’ armed forces, on a rotation basis, under the Baltic Air Policing program. Each country is on duty for four months. The Czech Republic’s force has been on standby since August 31, 2012, and includes 60 servicemen and four Jas 39C Gripen fighter planes. The Zokniai air base near Šiauliai is used for support. The NATO Council in February 2012 extended the air policing period to 2014.
Certainly, the patrolling force does not necessarily pose any serious threat to Russia. It would be much more important for NATO to demonstrate its protection of the Baltic States. This is why Russia is less concerned about the growing NATO military presence, as it is about NATO’s actual air base deployment in immediate proximity to Russia’s borders.
Despite NATO’s sizable investment in air force infrastructure improvement in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, it is still too early to talk about the creation of a regional air force that is able to take on full responsibility for the mission [1].
In reality, the Baltic States’ accession to NATO has not significantly changed the existing balance of forces in Europe. Especially since NATO’s military involvement in the Baltic States has so far failed to create an armed force capable of damaging Russia’s defenses.
Mitigating the Adverse Implications for Russia of the Baltic States’ Accession to NATO
Baltic States’ accession to NATO has not significantly changed the existing balance of forces in Europe. Especially since NATO’s military involvement in the Baltic States has so far failed to create an armed force capable of damaging Russia’s defenses.
The EU and NATO membership of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia implies, in effect, these states’ partial waiver of their national sovereignty, including on defense issues. In discussing a variety of different aspects of their cooperation with Russia, the Baltic States are not free to act as full-fledged negotiators: they lack the authority. In this context, emphasis on cooperation over security issues shifts to the Russia-NATO and Russia-EU levels. In this regard, Russia should not want to see the Baltic States remain outside the negotiation process, but instead should welcome their proactive participation in producing constructive proposals.
Regretfully, the Baltic States’ engagement in recent years in Russia-NATO cooperation has, more often than not, been negative. The main reason for this lies in the huge number of stereotypes and lingering problems in bilateral relations, which together hamper sound cooperation.
In the Baltic States, for political reasons, Russia is still represented as an aggressor. This image of a potential enemy and all-round scapegoat is quite convenient when local political elites are faced with the need to justify domestic failures. This policy also triggers a response from Russia, and as a result, it is difficult for the countries to reach agreement.
In the interests of more fruitful cooperation, the parties should drop these inherited stereotypes and seek to resolve deep-rooted problems in their bilateral relations such as that of non-nationals in Latvia and Estonia, baseless property claims against Russia resulting from the Baltic States’ participation in the Soviet Union and so on.
Construction of Baltic NPP, September 2012
The parties should also take a more balanced view of potential threats to their security. Over the eight years since the Baltic States’ accession to NATO, it has become clear that the direct threat from NATO’s eastward enlargement was overestimated. Russia not a threat to the Baltic States, nor is NATO enlargement a serious threat to Russia’s security.
Economic ties between Russia and the Baltic States have been developing fairly vibrantly. As reported by the Federal Customs Service, trade in January-July 2012 totaled $11,705,700, compared to under $ 6,665,900 in 2004. This economic contact is what experiences the most positive impact from cooperation in the political and military spheres.
In order to neutralize the adverse effects of Lithuania’s accession to the EU and NATO, while also reducing dependence on Lithuania as a transit route, more focus should be given to Kaliningrad Region’s alternatives, in defense as in other areas. In particular, the sea ferry service should be developed more intensively, as should local power supply sources in the region, for instance, the Baltic nuclear power plant, the development of which would boost industry and other sectors of the economy. These steps would allow Russia be less reliant on the Baltic States’ policy, especially that of Lithuania.
Forms and Areas of Russia-Baltic States Cooperation in Security
Over the eight years since the Baltic States’ accession to NATO, it has become clear that the direct threat from NATO’s eastward enlargement was overestimated.
Russia and NATO are similarly keen on cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Both are well aware of the need for this cooperation, and are ready and willing to act to promote it.
The following areas for future cooperation can be identified:
First. Military cargo transit in and out of the Kaliningrad Region.
Military cargo transit takes place in the Kaliningrad Region by rail, and is of mutual interest for both Russia and NATO. Lithuania also has an interest in this military transit – primarily an economic one, the more so as Russia’s share in railway deliveries across Lithuania is fairly large. Approximately 18,000,000 t of cargo is transported by rail across the Lithuanian Republic per year.
However, the issue of military cargo transit via Lithuania may not be regarded as settled in full. Lithuania does not allow the transit of either weapons or hazardous cargo, with the railway carrying only fuel, food and other similar products for troops in the Kaliningrad Region.
The sea ferry service has been used intensively over the last decade to deliver weapons, ammunition and other cargo denied transit across Lithuania [2].
Despite the ferry service’s development, the military transit across Lithuania by rail is still important to Russia because it is more stable than air and sea routes, since it is not contingent on weather, and can also be the less expensive option. Moreover, given the current infrastructure in the region, neither the ferry service nor aviation can meet the needs of the armed forces located in the Kaliningrad Region.
Given this reality, Russia will not cut military cargo transit, and is willing to develop cooperation with the Lithuanian Republic in this area.
Second. Military cargo transit from Afghanistan across the Russian Federation.
Railway ferry complex, Baltiysk
Afghanistan is one of the few regions where Russian and NATO interests coincide. This is why Russia facilitated NATO’s military operations in Afghanistan from their very inception, and in particular allows the transit of cargo across Russia to Afghanistan [3].
In 2010, Russia and NATO agreed on military cargo return transit using railway, motor road and air [4]. And in 2012, Russia secured a combined back transit pattern involving all three means of transport [5].
The Baltic States also are part of this transport pattern, as cargo will be delivered by rail to the sea ports of Riga, Tallinn and Klaipeda.
This transit is primarily advantageous for Russia in economic terms. One container delivery would cost $ 1,800, while Russia’s yearly income is estimated at $ 15,000,000 to $ 20,000,000.
That said, fruitful cooperation also matters to Russia. And in addition, successful NATO cargo transit would secure Russia’s reliable military cargo transport to the Kaliningrad Region.
Third. EAMD cooperation.
The May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago agreed that the EAMD system would also include Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
It is not yet clear how NATO will cooperate with Russia over the EAMDP. The negotiations have come to an impasse. However, potential for continued talks remains. This further cooperation should envision a regular exchange of data on missile radar tracking, mutual AMD inspection, and the fair allocation of responsibility for respective areas.
Cooperation on security issues will benefit Russia, NATO and also third countries, since it will make it possible first to prevent new real threats to security and, second, to test efficient interoperability in regions facing a need for increased attention.
Thus, the Baltic States’ accession to NATO has not significantly affected Russia’s defensive capability. Issues arising from this accession have been identified, and the related solutions have also been outlined.
Russia understood that the Baltic States’ accession to NATO was their sovereign choice, and that Russia would not be in a position to hinder this process. That is why these countries’ membership of NATO should be taken as a given in developing future models for cooperation. In particular, this cooperation should be developed along those lines where the parties have already made progress, and where there is clear mutual interest. First and foremost, this is military cargo transit through Lithuania to the Kaliningrad Region and from Afghanistan across Russia and the Baltic States.
The positive results generated by cooperation in this area will, no doubt, facilitate closer integration, increased confidence, and broadly benefit the Russia-NATO partnership.
1. Malov I. The Baltic Countries’ Air Force // Foreign Military Review. 2010. # 6. 44–52.
2. The Baltic Transit // The Baltic Guardian, 22.06.2012.
3. Russian Federation Government Resolution Number 219, dated March 28, 2008: The Two-Way Onshore Transit via the Russian Federation of Weapons, Military Vehicles and Equipment to the International Security Assistance Force in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan // Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation, March 31, 2008, # 13, 1317.
4. Russian Federation Government Resolution Number 926, dated November 17, 2010: On Amending Russian Federation Government Resolution Number 219, dated March 28, 2008 // Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation, November 22, 2010, #47, 6142.
5. Russian Federation Government Resolution Number 637, dated June 25, 2012: On Amending Russian Federation Government Resolution Number 219, dated March 28, 2008 // Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation, June 2, 2012, # 27, 3746.
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