Taksim Is Not Tahrir

Well-known Russian scholar and diplomat Pyotr Stegny, a RIAC member, speaks on current events in Turkey. He regards the confrontation between the government and protesters as the conflict between Erdogan's ruling style and the pluralistic and democratic Turkish political culture. "The situation is rather similar to the recent marches in New York City. Occupy Wall Street is an inter-democratic type of conflict."

Interview

Well-known Russian scholar and diplomat Pyotr Stegny, a RIAC member, speaks on current events in Turkey. He regards the confrontation between the government and protesters as the conflict between Erdogan's ruling style and the pluralistic and democratic Turkish political culture. "The situation is rather similar to the recent marches in New York City. Occupy Wall Street is an inter-democratic type of conflict."

Q: Good morning, Mr. Stegnyi. We’d like to ask you a few questions about recent developments in Turkey. Which steps by the Turkish government, do you think, have caused such an angry public reaction and provoked mass protests?

A: I think this is a classic situation, in the sense that there is a gap between the perfectly apolitical, environmental protests in the centre of Istanbul, and the set of reasons causing adverse reactions which have proven quite unexpected both in Turkey and abroad. These protests may seem spontaneous, triggered by a combination of a series of random events. However, some observers argue they have been in fact caused by a number of objective as well as subjective reasons.

I would like to draw your attention first of all to the site of protests, a place of a unique conjunction of symbols that reflect all of the contradictions that exist in the current political situation in Turkey. Taksim is Istanbul’s central square with the Monument to Independence, the key Kemalism symbol. There is one more, unrelated but colourful detail located there: the pedestal of the Independence Monument. It features among the important figures that were key to the establishment of the republic in Turkey in the 1920s Semyon Aralov, one of the first Soviet ambassadors, who you can see standing right behind Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

In addition, at and around Taksim Square, there are many historic buildings dating back to the Ottoman era, as well as mosques, Catholic and Orthodox churches. The neighbouring Gomhuria Street houses most of the Consulates General, including that of Russia. On the opposite side on İnönü Prospect is the home ground of the Beşiktaş football club. Taksim is the business card of Istanbul, a middle-class district favoured by the young people. This is where the support has come from for the spontaneous protests by roughly 500 environmentalists who demonstrated against the destruction of old trees, ordered by the city council in the adjacent Gezi Park.

They all had different motives. The young people were trying to save their favourite park; others remembered the anti-alcohol laws passed recently by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP in Turkish); the middle class was annoyed by the mushrooming new shopping malls, one of which was planned right on the site of the doomed trees; while the Besiktas fans joined for the fun of it. Any attempts by the authorities to cancel the shopping mall development at Taksim and replace it with plans for a reconstruction of the historic monument, the Ottoman-era artillery barracks, have only added to the numbers of disaffected protesters. Importantly, the areas around Taksim are traditionally inhabited by the Shi’ite minority of Alevi, for whom the AKP’s neo-Ottoman tastes are a sad reminder of the hard times they endured during the Ottoman Empire. Besides, on the eve of the Taksim events, the authorities announced plans to name a third bridge, which is being built across the Bosphorus, after Sultan Selim who had persecuted the Alevis.

True, the events from the outset were associated with protests by the secular opposition against the ruling Islamist party. The AKP is in fact trying to combine democracy with Islamic traditions, but its programme is quite secular. In recent years, the party has introduced serious, comprehensive reforms and has done much to promote Turkey’s integration within Europe. It is the paradox of Taksim that the protests have erupted against the backdrop of a quite trouble-free socioeconomic situation.

Photo: Pyotr Stegny

Q: So what has caused the escalation then?

It must be the reaction by the authorities that has caused the explosion. At the very beginning of the sit-in at Taksim, Prime Minister Erdoğan left for a planned visit to North Africa. Talking to the media at the airport, he called the protestors “political riffraff”, which only poured gasoline on the flames. The protests and demonstrations began to grow and spread to two-thirds of the Turkish provinces. There were instances of assaults on the ruling party’s headquarters. And thus, the protests began to acquire a political tone. It was at this stage that the police used tear gas and water cannons, and everything started to escalate. Luckily for Turkey, with all its intrinsic contradictions, it is an exceptionally tolerant country: those injured and wounded numbered in thousands, but there were only three deaths: one policeman and two protestors. One wants to believe that the peak of the escalation is behind us, although it is still difficult to predict where it will all end.

Yet another fine point: from the beginning, the Taksim protests were likened to Cairo’s Tahrir, with comparisons drawn between the events in Turkey and the Arab Spring. There might be some parallels – mostly exterior, organizational or formal. In particular, that the media, under pressure by the government, under-reported the events: CNN Turk, the local CNN channel in Turkey, could find anything better to do but air a culinary show right at the peak of the clashes. This promoted a specifically local, Internet-based, informal television with social networks used extensively: although, since the Arab Spring began over two years ago, the police effectively could cut this off. There was, as a result, another surge of popular unrest in the region, but with a different political lining. In contrast to the Arab Spring directed against authoritarian, “lifetime” presidencies, this was a first ever organized mass demonstration by a secular opposition against an Islamist - or alleged to have a hidden Islamist agenda - party.

Of certain consequence has been the growing criticism by the secular, pro-Western segment of the society of not so much the policies as the style of Prime Minister Erdogan. During last year’s parliamentary elections, his party won almost 50 percent of the votes, and the prime minister’s resulting claim to national leadership may have led him to a sort of authoritarian model of behaviour which in a way may be contributing to the popular reactions.

The Prime Minister himself, back from his trip to Maghreb countries, listed three reasons for the events. First, he alleged that certain political forces in the country resented his revolutionary attempts to seek reconciliation with the Kurds, which were initiated a few years back and have been very dynamic and overall successful. This is an important development not only for Turkey, but for the whole of the region as the Kurdish issue has been quite relevant to the Arab Spring. The second reason, according to the Prime Minister, is a conspiracy among bad-faith bankers who were responding to the government’s decision to place a five per cent ceiling on lending interest rates: he suspected them of having funded the opposition. His third reason was outside assistance provided to the opposition. Although he did not point to any specific source, analysts believe he had in mind the notorious Fethullah Gülen, the US-based leader of the influential Islamist Said Nursi sect.

Observers also noted that among those arrested as a result of mass protests were some foreigners from Iran and from some European countries. Rather peculiar details were offered regarding alleged seized explosives. However, so far there have been more questions than answers. Importantly, there were external trails alleged by Erdogan.

Finally, our comments on the political context of the events in Turkey cannot but allude to yet another detail. Political life in Turkey should be taken in the context of the forthcoming presidential election in August 2014, which will be preceded by municipal elections. The political race, quite naturally, is intensifying, and AKP opponents suspect that Erdogan may try to amend the current restrictions on the political office of the president so that he can himself run for the presidency.

Q: One question is how broad the public support is for the protests. Would it be correct to say there is a kind of schism in Turkish society?

A: I would suggest a more moderate description because there are no irreconcilable social antagonisms, or a life or death situation in Turkey. Why? For a start, the country enjoys a very favourable economic environment. People are more prosperous now, and, on contrast to the Middle Eastern countries of the Arab Spring era, the local youth have jobs and opportunities to apply their university-acquired knowledge. So I would not go as far as calling it a radical confrontation. This is more likely a conflict between the style of the AKP and Erdogan, on the one hand, and the general political culture espoused in a pluralist, democratic Turkey, on the other. It is more like recent Occupy-Wall-Street events in New York, an inherently democratic type of conflict.

Q: Will these protests lead to any government reshuffles? Is it likely that Prime Minister Erdogan will resign, or will he stay?

A: Premier Erdogan’s position seems solid enough for him to retain his influence and his seat at the head of the government. As for reshuffles in the government, there has been no targeted criticism against any of the ministers, and there is no direct evidence to expect any such changes. However, there have been too many rumours alleging that not all is fine inside the ruling party. In particular, there are rumours of disagreements between Prime Minister Erdogan and President Abdullah Gül, who are supposed to be close associates and co-founders of the ruling party. When the party won election in 2002, and Erdogan was still in prison, it was Gül who became the acting prime minister. They are both close in their ideology, and have long-established political ties.

However, Gül tried to contact the protestors at the very start of the Taksim events. He held meetings with key opposition forces and accepted their demands. Even more importantly, in their statement, both the President and Vice Prime Minister Bülent Arınç accepted that most of the protest demands were quite legitimate, and they should be addressed in a legal way.

Prime Minister Erdogan, immediately on his return from the Maghreb tour and still at the airport, made a very angry speech, this time calling the protestors “vandals”, an improvement on “political riffraff”. On the same day, he addressed meetings in five Turkish cities in a similar vein. Then he met with representatives of the demonstrators, although they had been broken up by the police the day before. There are plans to hold meetings on 15 June in support of the AKP across the country, and there are conflicting messages coming from Turkish towns. We will know in the next few days how these developments will unfold, and what compromises the authorities will have to accept.

Q: Is there a public consensus in today’s Turkey about the country’s position in the world? Some argue that Turkey is a leader among the Turkic peoples, and is also a leader of moderate Islam. Or is it, rather, a modern nation with European values? Will the current situation it give rise to any confrontations in Turkey or disputes that may lead to conflict?

A: You have correctly pointed out a very serious set of reasons that have indirectly influenced the recent developments. I would call it an identity crisis that Turkey is currently facing. Turkey is a Eurasian nation, with the associated political culture. Following the intensification of EU negotiations that are proceeding very slowly and have now virtually stalled, Turkey and its ruling party have started to turn towards the region. The Arab Spring, too, has highlighted the need for Turkey to play its role in the region. The Turkish model is now perceived as exemplary, to be emulated and to be relied upon to build democracy in a Sunni Islamic society. True, recent developments may lead to certain adjustments in the perceptions of the Turkish model.

Q: How do you think the recent protests will influence the situation in the whole of the region?

A: The process of democratization and reform in the Greater Middle East will proceed both horizontally and vertically. There will be an ever-growing number of countries facing a necessity of tackling much needed or even overdue reforms. Internal struggles around the reform agenda are expected to intensify. In that sense, recent developments in Turkey are important and substantial, or even, in some aspects, decisive in the overall regional context.

The Arab Spring has created uneasy challenges for Turkey itself. It has been noted repeatedly that Turkey’s deep involvement in the Syrian civil war on the side of Bashar Assad’s opponents is unpopular. It is hard to see how this fits into Turkey’s “Strategic Depth” concept as it provides for zero problems in its relationships with neighbours.

Q: Do you think the events in Turkey will negatively affect Russian-Turkish relations?

A: Turkey is a reliable and true partner for Russia; our relationship is based on absolute respect for sovereignty and choices made by our respective peoples. The basis for our cooperation is grounded in the economy, and in that sense our relations with Turkey since 1991 have been evolving perfectly well. We have powerful economic and trade links, with growing business dynamics involving both our entrepreneurs and private capital. When I started my job in Turkey in 2003, our trade was worth USD 6.8 billion, which was a lot, but it has since grown to USD 38 bln. During their last meeting, Mr. Putin and Mr. Erdogan pledged to bring that number to USD 100 bln. I am quite confident that our relations in the economic, political and other spheres have quite good prospects.