Why Nuclear weapons are strategically useless? Response to Alexei Fenenko

Nuclear Weapons and Survival States

First and foremost, my argument is that possessing nuclear weapons does not enable a state to solve the main and often vital problems of its own security. Second, nuclear weapons do not ensure “international stability” in any reasonable sense of the term. Thus the aim of my essay was confined to challenging the idea that is popular among politicians and experts, i.e. nuclear weapons are a necessary condition for national security and international stability.

One of the arguments in support of my thesis was to point out that nuclear weapons cannot prevent the break-up of large empires or states that possess them. Let us be frank: many of those who are reading this text are sure that external forces were involved in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The fact that the USSR had a huge nuclear arsenal did not deter these forces. Similarly, the final dissolution of the British Empire several decades earlier undoubtedly took place under substantial outside pressure. Nuclear weapons did not help London to neutralise these pressures. How does that go along with the idea of nuclear weapons as a guarantee of the survival of the states that possess them?

Fenenko argues: “It is hard to say how the United States and its allies would have talked to Russia during the Georgian and Ukrainian crises if Russia did not have its strategic nuclear capability.” However, it is equally hard to determine just how Russia’s possession of nuclear weapons influenced the behaviour of the United States and its allies during these crises. Few people doubt that nuclear weapons may be used in the event of a major war that threatens the survival of the nuclear superpower suffering defeat in such a conflict. However, it is hard to imagine that any state would dare to unleash a full-scale war against Russia. The material and reputational costs of such a war for the aggressor would be huge anyway, regardless of whether or not Russia possesses nuclear weapons. By contrast, in the event of a limited nuclear conflict, nuclear weapons (tactical, let alone strategic) could hardly be used if only because it is unclear what targets they could be used against. This is one reason why the fears of some NATO policymakers about alleged “nuclear blackmail” on Russia’s part are unjustified

Strategic Deterrence without "a Nuclear Winter"?

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Alexei Fenenko:
A Dangerous Alternative

The use of nuclear weapons in a surprise attack on the nuclear potential of Russia (or the United States, or, for that matter, any modern nuclear power) is unthinkable because it would in any case bring about a global ecological disaster. The scale of the disaster was not fully known to the scientists mentioned by Fenenko and who in the 1970s were worried by the threat of a surprise disarming nuclear strike of one superpower against the other. One may recall that a decade earlier, in the 1960s, U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategists were seriously discussing the prospects of life after a nuclear exchange that would have destroyed less than a quarter of the population and half of the industrial capacity of the warring sides. It was not until the mid-1980s that scientists proved that a surprise massive nuclear strike (not to mention a nuclear war) would be suicidal for its initiator and therefore could not be successful in principle.

The rapid destruction of the nuclear potential is thought to be possible through the use of high-precision non-nuclear weapons, which are being actively developed, certainly by the United States, Russia and China. The threat of nuclear deterrence potentials losing their value may increase if the anti-missile defence systems being developed by the United States, Russia and China are perfected. However, the existence of this problem more likely puts the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence into question, and certainly does not confirm it. A more interesting (though still only academic) hypothesis is that the introduction of new types of weapons in the arsenals of big powers would eventually cause nuclear weapons to die away because they would be less effective in tackling immediate problems. If it becomes impossible to halt the development of high-precision strategic non-nuclear weapons, missile defence or some other new types of weapon (and this cannot be ruled out), would it not eventually cause nuclear weapons to “die out” as the exclusive and most important means of defence? Would it not be proclaimed to be a predominantly destabilising weapon because of the irreversible destructive consequences of its use? Could it be that weapons capable of inflicting proportional damage on the enemy without the risk of a “nuclear winter” for the whole of humankind would suffice to deter the enemy?

The Risk to Reward Balance

EPA / KIYOSHI OTA / Vostock Photo
Mikhail Troitsiy:
The Nuclear Factor in Global Politics:
Myths and Reality

Fenenko believes that in concluding nuclear arms control agreements, the USSR/Russia and the United States were merely imposing “limits” on the “‘destabilising’ components of the strategic triad”, liquidating some nuclear weapons carriers and paving the way for an “agreed decommissioning of outdated warheads and their carriers”. These were of course important considerations for both sides in terms of maintaining bilateral nuclear parity. However, even more importantly, Moscow and Washington publicly presented their agreements as proof of their honest adherence to general and complete nuclear disarmament pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Both the USSR/Russia and the United States have traditionally been preoccupied with fulfilling their obligations under the NTP and sought to limit the possibilities for non-nuclear states to criticise Moscow and Washington for their lack of commitment to the NTP. Indeed, in their joint statement of 1 April 2009, the Russian and US presidents “committed… to achieving a nuclear free world” (link in Russian).

Fenenko rightly believes that the nuclear shield is not “worth risking”. But in my essay, I did not call for nuclear weapons to be disposed of immediately. I merely argued that we should stop ascribing characteristics to nuclear weapons that they do not have – in the first place the ability to protect a state from any threats other than a direct and large-scale (and therefore unlikely) military aggression.

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An awareness of the fact that nuclear weapons have limited usefulness could prompt us to take a fresh look at Russia’s current security problems, reducing the feeling of vulnerability in the face of the presumed intentions of other states to neutralise Russia’s nuclear deterrence potential. Similarly, the United States could start questioning the logic that a large nuclear arsenal is essential for protecting US interests across the world. Leaving nuclear problems behind and renouncing attempts to exaggerate the role of nuclear weapons as a mutual deterrent and the target of the “insidious opponent”, Moscow and Washington could work more effectively on a wide range of regional and other security problems of mutual interest.

Read more:

Response of Alexei Fenenko «Are Nuclear Weapons Useful? A Response to Mikhail Troitskiy»