Security for Greater Eurasia

Security challenges do not exist in isolation, but form constellations, and there is a hierarchy between them, so that the larger and more overarching challenge subordinates the others. The Cold War had the threat of nuclear sharing, followed by terrorism in the post-war period. In the 2010s, climate change topped the agenda, while antagonism between great powers has recently emerged as another clear contender for the status of a “mega-threat.” Climate change and great-power competition are now vying for global primacy. Depending on which of the two will prevail, other threats will fall into its semantic and ultimately bureaucratic shadow.

What is the “mega threat” to Greater Eurasia—great-power competition, climate change or something else? China at first failed to grasp the main goal of Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) initiative, which led to many interpretations and assumptions. After multiple negotiations with Russian counterparts, the Chinese side came to realize that security lies at the heart of the GEP. The conflict in Ukraine only cemented the understanding that the threat of great-power competition is of prime concern for Greater Eurasia. All the other challenges to the continent, including climate change, are likely to be gradually overshadowed by the threat of potential conflict between nuclear powers. Equal and indivisible security is a conceptual response to this threat.

Building a continent-wide security architecture in Eurasia begs the question of what it should be modeled after. The concept of equal and indivisible security and the existing practice of Russian–Chinese relations might well be the answer. Russian–Chinese relations today revitalize and flesh out the concepts that were crafted late into the Cold War to describe what the relations between Russia and the West should look like. This is true for both indivisible and cooperative security. They remained a hoped-for but unfulfilled possibility in relations with the West but have received a second historic chance in today’s ties with China.

Cooperative security is a system based on cooperation and dialogue between nations to prevent conflict and maintain peace through mutual trust, transparency and joint efforts. It is less formalized than collective security and can include various forms of cooperation such as joint exercises, information sharing, consultation and negotiation. Unlike collective security, which aims to deter external aggression, the practice of cooperative security prioritizes conflict prevention through trust building and mutual understanding. Cooperative security comprises a wide range of actors: not only states, but also international organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society and other stakeholders. But most importantly, cooperative security is rooted in the principle of indivisibility.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization can serve as a good example of how cooperative security could be implemented. This multilateral organization, whose decision-making requires consensus, addresses a vast array of threats, actively engaging with various international and regional organizations, and has contacts with NGOs and civil society. While political discourse in the West sees the main value of cooperative security in ensuring human security, the SCO demonstrates the possibility of an alternative, but no less important value—cultural and civilizational diversity. The SCO may well be considered as the institutional core of the Eurasian security architecture.

Security challenges do not exist in isolation, but form constellations, and there is a hierarchy between them, so that the larger and more overarching challenge subordinates the others [1]. This manifests itself in the fact that smaller and niche challenges are described and interpreted in terms of broader challenges. For example, the international fight against money laundering in the 2000s was linked to combating terrorism. Terrorism was seen at that time as a top priority threat. Money laundering had to be tackled mainly because this reduced the opportunities for terrorist financing [2]. At any given moment, the highest priority is usually assigned to a single threat. The Cold War had the threat of nuclear sharing, followed by terrorism in the post-war period. In the 2010s, climate change [3] topped the agenda, while antagonism between great powers has recently emerged as another clear contender for the status of a “mega-threat” (by analogy with megatrends). Climate change and great-power competition are now vying for global primacy. Depending on which of the two will prevail, other threats will fall into its semantic and ultimately bureaucratic shadow.

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At the 9^th International Conference of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) “Russia and China: Cooperation in a New Era,” the idea of indivisible security, which forms the conceptual and value core of both Russia’s flagship foreign policy project of building a Greater Eurasian Partnership and China’s fundamental foreign policy project dubbed the Community of Common Destiny for Mankind, and in particular the Global Security Initiative embedded therein, sounded like a refrain. While elaborating on the key provisions of the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Deepening the Relationship of Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation as of May 2024, the experts spoke a lot about the need for continental integration and shaping a Eurasian security system, which will enable the coupling of the EAEU and the Belt and Road Initiative.

A question could be raised about the “mega-threat” to Greater Eurasia—great-power competition, climate change or something else? Li Yongquan, Director of the Institute for Euro-Asian Social Development at the Development Research Center under the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, pointed out at the conference that China at first failed to grasp the main goal of Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) initiative, which led to many interpretations and assumptions. After multiple negotiations with Russian counterparts, the Chinese side came to realize that security lies at the heart of the GEP. The conflict in Ukraine only cemented the understanding that the threat of great-power competition is of prime concern for Greater Eurasia.

Therefore, all the other challenges to the continent, including climate change, are likely to be gradually overshadowed by the threat of potential conflict between nuclear powers. Equal and indivisible security is a conceptual response to this threat. The joint Russia–China statement following Vladimir Putin's visit to China in May 2024 says that “the parties believe the nuclear powers should uphold global strategic stability, adhere to the principle of equal and indivisible security, and should not encroach on each other’s vital interests—in particular, by expanding military alliances and coalitions, as well as establishing military bases close to the borders of other nuclear powers, especially through forward-deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, along with other strategic military infrastructure.”

The principle of “equal and indivisible security” has a powerful integrative potential [4]. Its scope can encompass almost any notions associated with threats and challenges to security. Consider “sustainable development,” which is closely linked to the threat of climate change, as an example [5]. Certain UN programs [6] and the popularity of ESG principles in the corporate world turned sustainable development into a global ideology. It is defined as development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Viewing sustainable development from the perspective of equal and indivisible security shows that intergenerational relations also feature indivisibility—the progress of the present generation should not harm future generations, asserting an inextricable link between generations, including in security. Therefore, sustainability proves to be pivoted on indivisibility.

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In addition to indivisibility, there is also equality, which has the potential to transform the concept of sustainable development even more. Indivisibility underscores the unbreakable bond between generations, while equality refers to respect for the interests of different groups within each generation. Not all sustainable development initiatives put forward by the Global North are beneficial and acceptable in the Global South. One case in point is the complicated past of the Kyoto Protocol and the ultimate failure of its renewal. International climate change negotiations have often stumbled over the gap between the interests of developing and developed nations. Sustainable development that is equal and indivisible should ease tensions not only between the present and the future, but also between the center and the periphery. Sustainability built on indivisibility and equality has almost universal legitimacy, which is bound to also improve the effectiveness of programs implemented in this area. This “sustainable development in Eurasia” model underpinned by the principles of equality and indivisibility will be very attractive to the countries of the “global majority” and the Global South, as it factors in the interests of future generations and the current concerns of developing nations. A good example of this model’s practical application is the New Development Bank, which specializes in supporting infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS members and in developing countries.

Building a continent-wide security architecture in Eurasia begs the question of what it should be modeled after. The concept of equal and indivisible security and the existing practice of Russian–Chinese relations might well be the answer. Konstantin Kosachev characterized Russia’s partnership as an “alliance against alliances” in his speech at the conference. “This actually means the pooling of efforts against the bloc logic of the 20th century,” he pointed out. The principles of equal and indivisible security are best embodied in cooperative security. This concept emerged in political discourse in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War as a normative goal for relations between Russia and the United States. This goal never went beyond its face value and the bloc logic was never overcome. It was then reinforced by NATO enlargement, while the OSCE, which was supposed to put the principle of cooperative security into practice, has not been adequate to this task. Today’s relations between China and Russia encapsulate this concept.

Cooperative security has evolved considerably as a concept. It was initially interpreted in a liberal sense as collective security plus various forms of state-to-state cooperation, especially in disarmament and arms control. This understanding was supplemented by a fundamental expansion of the subject matter to include aspects of human security, such as combating poverty, environmental disasters, global inequality and hunger. In general, cooperative security is a system based on interaction and dialogue between nations to prevent conflict and maintain peace through mutual trust, transparency and joint efforts. It is less formalized than collective security and can include various forms of cooperation such as joint exercises, information sharing, consultation and negotiation. Unlike collective security, which aims to deter external aggression, the practice of cooperative security prioritizes conflict prevention through trust building and mutual understanding. Cooperative security comprises a wide range of actors: not only states, but also international organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society and other stakeholders. But most importantly, cooperative security is rooted in the principle of indivisibility [7].

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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization can serve as a good example of how cooperative security could be implemented [8]. This multilateral organization, whose decision-making requires consensus, addresses a vast array of threats, actively engaging with various international and regional organizations, and has contacts with NGOs and civil society. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said that his country, which chairs the SCO in 2024, “adheres to the principle of indivisible Eurasian security, which implies mutual understanding and taking confidence-building measures. This approach should form the basis of the strategic goal of forming a security belt around the SCO perimeter.”

While political discourse in the West sees the main value of cooperative security in ensuring human security, the SCO demonstrates the possibility of an alternative, but no less important value—cultural and civilizational diversity. The 2005 Astana Declaration of the SCO stipulates that “the world's diversity of cultures and civilizations is a universal human value.”

The SCO may well be considered as the institutional core of the Eurasian security architecture.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that Russian–Chinese relations today revitalize and flesh out the concepts that were crafted late into the Cold War to describe what the relations between Russia and the West should look like. This is true for both indivisible and cooperative security. They remained a hoped-for but unfulfilled possibility in relations with the West but have received a second historic chance in today’s ties with China.

А continent-wide Eurasian security framework should be resilient and guided by the principles of equality and indivisibility. Cooperative security ticks these boxes. The substance can vary. It depends on the priority threat that the region has. This threat is currently a stiffening competition between the great powers.

1. Buzan B., Wæver O. Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitisation theory // Review of International Studies, 2009, Vol 35, No 2. Pp. 253–276.

2. Gardner K. L. Fighting terrorism the FATF way // Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 2007, Vol 13, No 3. Pp. 325–345.

3. Buzan B. China and climate change governance: A golden opportunity // China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, 2021, Vol 7, No 1. Pp. 1–12.

4. The idea of indivisible security has its roots in the period of détente. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which set ground rules for the interaction between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, spoke of the indivisible security for Europe. The 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe reaffirmed that “security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all the others.” The OSCE summits in Istanbul (1999) and Astana (2010) reiterated the importance of this concept, with the proviso that the security of one country should not come at “the expense” of others. The 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act also recognized this concept and the alliance pledged not to put permanent bases in new member states.

5. This is reflected in the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes Goal 13: “Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.”

6. Millennium Development Goals (2000–2015) and Sustainable Development Goals (2015–2030).

7. Payne R. A. Cooperative security: Grand strategy meets critical theory? // Millennium Journal of International Studies, 2012, Vol 40, No 3. Pp. 605–624.

8. The OSCE is commonly cited as an example; however this organization has repeatedly demonstrated the bloc logic in its activities.