Russia-Syrian cooperation in military and technical field is beneficial for both sides. However, in order to put it into effect it’s necessary to have not only favorable conditions in place in Syria proper, but the wish and potentiality of Russia.
It’s not going to be about the grammatical peculiarities of the Arabic. In the light of unfolding events in the Arab east theoretical issues retreat. We will consider one of the most important aspects of Russia-Syrian military and technical cooperation, and namely the prospects of the Russian naval base in Syria, in the contemporary context of the Syrian dimension of the Arab spring.
It’s not going to be about the grammatical peculiarities of the Arabic. In the light of unfolding events in the Arab east theoretical issues retreat. We will consider one of the most important aspects of Russia-Syrian military and technical cooperation, and namely the prospects of the Russian naval base in Syria, in the contemporary context of the Syrian dimension of the Arab spring.
Actually, Russian naval base in Tartus (about 250 km away to the north-west from the capital city and 90 km to the south from the large port of Latakhia) is a logistical facility for material and technical maintenance of Russian ships (E&P #720) which is the part of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Although it is the only Russian naval base in the Mediterranean, it has only some floating docks and a small floating workshop for repairing vessels and also some infrastructural facilities. The base is serviced by a small, up to one hundred, staff of military seamen therefore it is at present the symbol of Russia’s presence in the Mediterranean and on all counts cannot be regarded as a full-fledged conventional naval base.
The peculiarity of Russia’s E&P in the port of Tartus is that the major Syrian pipeline originating from the north-eastern areas of the country feeds in this port. Besides, oil storage facilities are located in neighboring Banias. In accordance with the lease agreement Russian and Syrian militaries are supposed to coordinate their actions in case of breakout of war hostilities. Obviously, this safeguarding function could serve as a good argument in favor of preserving Russian naval presence in Tartus under any the ruling regime.
The E&P in Tartus was established under the Russia-Syrian agreement of 1984. Back in the 1970-s the number of warships within the 5th operational squadron (the Mediterranean Squadron) reached 80, and the creation of a Mediterranean naval base became a necessity. However, in 1991 the 5th squadron ceased to exist, Russian warships rarely entered the Mediterranean, and as a result, the Tartus E&P was barely used.
The issue of the Russian strategic base was raised again only a decade later. The writing off the three-fourth of Syrian external debt to Russia in 2005 became a great impetus for the resumption of Russia-Syrian military and technical cooperation. In 2006 Russia and Syria signed $4bln worth contracts on arms supply. By 2009 the value of contracts reached $19,4bln.
Dredging works performed by Russian technicians in the port of Tartus started in June 2006. At that very time an ambitious goal of creating a Mediterranean-based Russian warship squadron led by the Black Sea Fleet flagship missile cruiser “Moskva” was cherished by Russian military authorities. But back in 2007 our experts held the prospects of the Tartus base in a pretty low esteem because, with the then scarce funding of the Russian Navy, it was hardly possible to expect the soonest comeback of Russia to the Mediterranean.
In August 2008, President of Syria B. Assad was positive about turning the Tartus E&P into a Russian naval base saying that it would be beneficial for Syria as well. However, there didn’t exist at that time any specific written agreements or accords between the two countries. It was obvious that without a full-scale reconstruction the facility would be inappropriate for the deployment of Russian warships.
Lately significantly much more attention has been given to the Tartus E&P. Floating docks and coastal infrastructure facilities have been regularly repaired (in 2008 and 2010). In 2009 a new floating dock was delivered to Tartus from the Sevastopol Black Sea naval base. In early 2010 it was informed about the forthcoming modernization of the base with a view to increasing its logistical capacity for the Russian warships to carry out the duty in the Gulf of Aden. However, the Russian Navy General Staff labeled the information about turning the E&P into a full-fledged naval base an exaggeration, and, ultimately, the whole thing boiled down to minor repair works.
In spring 2010 the E&P received the flagship of the Russian Navy, large nuclear-powered cruiser ‘Peter the Great” which was visited on the roads by the Head of Syrian Navy, Syrian Navy officers, Russian Ambassador to Syria and other officials. Currently, E&P provides for the replenishment of Russian ships remaining off the harbor, moors anti-submarine warships and logistic support ships.
In September 2010 Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy said that Russian E&P would be initially developed as a stationing site for, among others, super-ships, such as airborne ships and cruisers, and only then as a naval base. The first stage of the modernization was planned to be completed as early as 2012.
Today the fate of the Russian E&P is unclear because of the uncertainty about future political regime in Syria. For the opposition, provided it comes to power, this issue is unlikely to be on the top of the agenda. But one thing is clear that, whatever the circumstances, new Syrian leadership will not commit themselves to the liquidation of Russian E&P in Tartus, and Russia-Syrian military and technical cooperation will not suffer much. This is what Mr. S.Vershinin, head of the department of the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs responsible for foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa said in September 2011. Besides, it’s wrong to argue that Russia unconditionally supports any actions of the current Syrian Administration and ignores the interests of the opposition. If there is a regime change in Syria, perhaps, only the situation when pro-extremist radicals come to power (which is unlikely) may undermine the existing agreements between our countries in the sphere of military and technical cooperation.
At present the issue of the Russian base in Tartus is being constantly discussed both in foreign and Arab mass media. For example, the Lebanese “Daily Star” sees direct link between Russia’s Navy presence on the Syrian coast and B. Assad’s ability to retain power.
In September 2010 Russian Minister of Defense announced Russian plans to supply Syria with mobile coastal missile systems “Bastion” equipped with 300 km-range anti-ship supersonic guided missiles “Yakhont”. These missile systems are, among other things, called upon defending the Tartus E&P. Apart from the missile systems there was discussed the possibility of supplying to Syria over-the-horizon radar (OTH radar) “Monolith B” which would significantly enhance air- and anti-submarine defense of the Syrian coast.
Besides, Syria recently signed an agreement and concluded a contract with Iran on establishing Iranian air-force base nearby Latakia.
The build-up of Syrian military power runs counter to Israel’s plans and causes great concerns in the US Department of State. Hence, with high probability we should expect strong opposition from Israel and USA to Syria’s plans. For example, Israel has already hinted that the deployment of air defense missile system “Iskander” and air-defense system S-300 as well as possible deployment of electronic surveillance radar on the Russian base in Tartus may pose a threat to Israel’s security and require adequate measures. The Tartus-deployed Russian air defense system will allegedly be able to protect the major part of Syrian territory from air strikes, and it can give a free hand to anti-Israel Islamists.
The United States and Israel are afraid that the arms supplied to Syria may get in terrorists’ hands. But, in fact, USA and Israel are more likely to be concerned about supplying Syria with missiles which make even American warships vulnerable and insecure. At the same time the whole eastern Mediterranean coast will be defended against Syria-hostile amphibious assault.
It seems, that contrary to all the concerns Syrian opposition movement and even the possible change of power in the country will not give up for lost the presence of Russian Navy in Syria. Common sense will inevitably win and Russian E&P will keep on developing and modernizing. Russia-Syrian cooperation is beneficial for both sides, therefore it must be continued. But in order to put it into effect it’s necessary to have not only favorable conditions in place in Syria proper, but the wish and the potentiality of Russia.
