Prospects of the EU enlargement: temptations and calculations

The latest bout of the European Union enlargement generated a range of problems unknown of in the anamnesis of this association. Specific historic experience of the applicants pre-conditioned a relative immaturity of democratic regimes in those countries, weakness of consensus and tolerance culture which has already rooted itself in the West-European society, and which has to a considerable degree secured stable development of Western Europe over the last decades. Long before the official entry of Central and East-European (CEE) countries to the European Union those problems were evident to the EU leaders. However, it neither blocked the admission of new members nor entailed a refusal to pursue the plans of further enlargement at the time when Brussels’ fears have panned out. The paradox is predetermined by the combination of the EU motives – common interests of the integration group with the interests both of individual members and outside actors.

The latest bout of the European Union enlargement generated a range of problems unknown of in the anamnesis of this association. Specific historic experience of the applicants pre-conditioned a relative immaturity of democratic regimes in those countries, weakness of consensus and tolerance culture which has already rooted itself in the West-European society, and which has to a considerable degree secured stable development of Western Europe over the last decades. Long before the official entry of Central and East-European (CEE) countries to the European Union those problems were evident to the EU leaders. However, it neither blocked the admission of new members nor entailed a refusal to pursue the plans of further enlargement at the time when Brussels’ fears have panned out. The paradox is predetermined by the combination of the EU motives – common interests of the integration group with the interests both of individual members and outside actors.

EU and Member-States’ Interests: Toward the Sixth Bout of Enlargement

Central European applicant countries were granted candidate status as a result of cardinal changes which had taken place in the region by the early 1990s. Successful construction of the Economic and Monetary Union, and establishment of the unified internal EU market intensified the desire of the CEE outsiders to participate in the integration. At the same time, shaping of the EU personality in foreign policy in the context of development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy adopted in 1992 nurtured the growth of European Union’s ambitions as a dominating regional actor. Vacuum of force emerging in the CEE countries objectively demanded a stronger presence of capable external actors – and the EU has met the challenge with a sizeable US support.

The motif of geopolitical expedience and, to a certain degree, the syndrome of “big brother” obviously predominated over a sober assessment of eventual pros and cons of a pending enlargement in sustaining the EU stability.

The problems exposed over the last five years should have encouraged Brussels to review the whole EU further enlargement strategy. However, nothing of the sort happened. Today, five countries are officially cueing up for membership: Turkey, Montenegro, Macedonia, Iceland and Serbia. At present Croatia is actually completing the process of accession to the EU. Certain pledges were made to Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Theoretically, what is the borderline where the European integration wave would come to a stop?

There is no doubt that the most welcome and attractive future applicants are European Free Trade Association (EFTA) member states. As is well known, one of the EFTA members, i.e. Iceland, has already become an official candidate in 2011. The country’s size, the quality of its political and economic systems give grounds to believe that Iceland’s membership in the EU is a matter of the next three to five years. As regards the remaining three EFTA members – Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Norway – their accession to the EU can be now viewed as a hypothetical possibility only.

It is worthy to note that though the final strategy of EU enlargement always appears as a formally consolidated decision, the intensity of member states’ interest in implementing a specific vector of enlargement is unquestionably different. For one, rapprochement of the CIS European countries with the EU is of greatest interest to Poland (Ukraine and –a remote prospect – Belarus) and Romania (Moldova). The process of Croatia’s accession to the EU (currently finalized) has always been a matter of interest to Austria and Federal Germany – in many ways because of a historically determined involvement of Croatia into the orbit of German Europe. It is appropriate to mention here that Croatia, in contrast to typologically close Slovenia, was not on the 2004 enlargement list through the same reasons as two other active participants of the Balkan wars of 1990s – Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Extradition of several persons accused of military crimes to the Hague tribunal enhanced Croatia’s chances to obtain a long-cherished invitation, and since June 2004 it has become an official EU applicant.

At the same time, prospective entry to the union of such countries as Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia can be rather viewed as a matter of common interest of the entire European Union.

What is the essence of the interest?

The answer to the question lies in the analysis of the regulations introduced by the Stabilization and Association Agreement endorsed by the EU summit in Feira (Portugal) in 2000 specifically for politically unstable and economically weak countries of the Balkans.

Firstly, in the long run the EU contribution to the improvement of political governance of those states (much talked-about good governance), struggle against corruption, social and economic instability etc. should transform the region from a “black hole” on the EU borders into its stable and appeased constituent part. Namely, a part of the EU, as in 2003 at the summit in Thessaloniki (Greece) participation of the Balkan countries in this format was recognized as the first step to their full EU membership.

Secondly, integration of the Balkan states into the EU is also viewed as a guarantee of termination of intergovernmental and cross-cultural conflicts in the region. Another contribution to the process would be the abolition of internal borders and massive incorporation of EU legal norms into legislation of the newly accepted countries.

Thirdly, the Balkans is strategically important to the EU as a region of energy resources transit. Incorporation of this region will substantially contribute to consolidation of the EU energy security under the conditions of permanent tension in the EU-Russia energy dialog and instability of the world energy market conditions.

Therefore, the interests of internal political stability, geopolitical and geo-economic interests obviously urge Brussels to move toward the Balkans. However, this vector of enlargement may threaten Brussels with no less heavy political and economic problems than accession of the CEE countries. Hence, the actual entry of the majority of regional states into the EU cannot be expected before 10-15 years.

Rogue States of Enlargement: Turkey and Post-Soviet Countries

Ironically, Turkey is even more faraway candidate from the EU membership, while the background of its rapprochement with the EU is decades-long. As early as in 1963 Turkey was granted the status an associated EU member as the country joined the EU Customs Union and became an eligible applicant. The reasons of the EU move were rooted both in the EU interest in the Turkish market, and in a geopolitical setup: Turkey was a NATO outpost in the region. Another reason of involving Turkey into integration orbit has been the energy security factor. Turkey is a next-door neighbor of the Middle East energy exporting junction; it is a transit country for Caspian hydrocarbons. However, EU geopolitical and economic benefits from the rapprochement with Turkey could be always questioned by focusing on the disparity between Turkish political and legal culture and corresponding European standards, as well as civilization rift between the Turkish society and European social medium.

Federal Germany has always been supporting Turkey’s entry to the EU because of an age-old tradition of German-Turkish cooperation, as well as a sizeable Turkish community in Germany. In 1999 Turkish efforts in rapprochement with the EU crowned with an official recognition of the applicant status, which allowed the two sides to launch accession talks. Though Ankara showed its readiness to adjust its legal and political practices to the EU standards, the latter took its time to switch on the green light on Turkey. Reluctance of a significant part of the European elite to have Turkey as a EU member was manifested in full in 2003-2004 in the context of discussions on the draft European constitution. Exactly at that time it was suggested to incorporate an allusion on the Christian roots of European society into the preamble of the document which was eventually not adopted. At that particular moment chairman of the discussion Valery Giscard d’Estaing publicly spoke of impossibility of the Turkish membership in the EU. In the coming years this viewpoint became highly popular in connection with the growing anti-Islamic and anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe.

The number of opponents to Turkish EU membership is also growing in the context of possible institutional ramifications of the move. Influence of an EU member state on decision-making in the EU Council is closely related to the demographic magnitude of the country in question: the larger is the size of its population, the more votes it has in the Council. In this sense the vote of 70-million-strong Turkey would be more important than the votes of such countries as the Netherlands, Denmark or Poland, for example.

Finally, an additional reason to slow down the entry talks was the special case of Cyprus – a state which Turkey refused to recognize. In July 2005 in the context of admission of the first wave of the CEE countries to the EU Turkey signed the protocol on incorporation of ten new members into the Customs Union. Cyprus which had joined the EU was not covered by the protocol Turkey had signed. In response in December 2006 the Council suspended the talks on eight chapters out of 35 incorporated into the negotiation dossier. Though the EU periodically resumes its assurances about the inevitability of Turkey’s admission, by now one can state that Turkey’s EU membership has been tacitly recognized as impossible by the both sides. Namely this can be an explanation of a dramatic change in Turkish foreign policy conduct and rhetoric over the last two or three years. Moderate Islamic government of Turkey has obviously given up its quest to “please” the European Union and made the stake on consolidating its own personality in the international arena. Thus, the EU antagonized Turkey, and reduced its influence both on Ankara’s policy and on the situation in the region in general. It is difficult to determine whether this is a long-term tendency keeping in mind unpredictability of the situation in the Middle East. However, the above factors confirm that the scenario of Turkey’s accession to the EU can be regarded as actually impracticable.

As it was mentioned above, accession of the European ex-Soviet countries to the EU is viable in principle. Both from the viewpoint of geopolitical interests of the EU and its individual members, and from the viewpoint of basic indicators of internal development, the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova look more attractive as future EU members than, for example, Albania or Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, by a strange quirk of fate the European prospects of those states look bleaker than those of much less developed Balkan countries. The reasons are primarily geopolitical aspects.

An obvious obstacle to rapprochement between the EU and Belarus is the political regime of A.Lukashenko. Officially, rapprochement of the EU with the Ukraine is recognized as a priority target both in Kiev and Brussels. At present the two sides are actively engaged in a dialog on establishing a free trade zone, which can bring the Ukraine to a new qualitative level of partnership with the EU. However, as regards the Ukraine, it is premature to talk about further integration including accession to the EU. First, this scenario would cause an extremely negative response in Russia which so far has enough levers to prevent it – let’s remember at least the energy factor in Russian-Ukrainian relations, as well as the factor of the Russian-speaking Left-bank Ukraine. Second, in case the Ukraine is admitted to the EU its demographic potential together with its massive and awkward economy can produce a destabilizing effect both on the EU institutional steadiness and its budget capability.

The most trouble-free and actually attainable result would be the accession of Moldova. However, the Transnistria factor makes this scenario highly hypothetical.

Therefore, to date out of four possible vectors of EU enlargement only the Balkan option is viable, i.e. the most difficult from the viewpoint of problems the EU will have to face in the process of integration of new members. Balkan enlargement would be a degraded, though less sizeable, copy of the CEE enlargement of 2004-2007.

Namely the acknowledgement of this fact makes European politicians avoid mentioning the exact timetable of the project implementation. However, under the condition of an uninterrupted integration process per se its inevitability within 10-15 coming years is beyond doubt.