Private military and security companies have become especially popular with the commencement of the global war against terrorism. Afghanistan has become the frontline of antiterrorist struggle where the NATO, US as well as private military and security companies launched their operations. How has the nature of contemporary warfare changed with the emergence of new private military and law enforcement actors? What ramifications would this experience have in Afghanistan?
Private military and security companies have become especially popular with the commencement of the global war against terrorism. Afghanistan has become the frontline of antiterrorist struggle where the NATO, US as well as private military and security companies launched their operations. How has the nature of contemporary warfare changed with the emergence of new private military and law enforcement actors? What ramifications would this experience have in Afghanistan?
New Private Military and Law Enforcement Actors in the Global War Against Terrorism
Private military and security companies are a relatively new phenomenon. After the UN General Assembly had endorsed in 1989 the International Convention on Fighting Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, the sphere of private security services has seen substantial change. Many former mercenaries re-qualified into contractors and reinforced the ranks of private military and security companies. Over the recent decades such companies have become most dynamic and asked-for entities when military campaigns first in Iraq and then in Afghanistan were launched in the framework of the global war against terrorism.
The choice of services offered by such companies is significantly wide: from transportation and logistic freight escort, maintenance of military equipment to personal escort of public servants, physical protection of institutions, military consulting, reconnaissance etc.
The activity of private military and security companies in Afghanistan is a vivid example of the changing nature of modern warfare. More and more often one comes across the notion of “outsourcing of military and law enforcement services” or “privatization of warfare”. To date, services formerly performed by the regular army have been handed over to private enterprises. During the Afghan war the US decided to liberate their troops from such “non-core” functions as escort of military freight or protection of their own bases, narrowing down their mission to combat operations only. 95% of private military and security companies, employed by the US Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan are Afghan enterprises.
However, such practices have generated a good deal of problems. Private military and security services are not regulated by the international law, which means that control over contract troops is virtually impossible.
Difficulties of Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies’ Activity
In 2008 the Afghan Ministry of Interior adopted the “Procedure for Regulating Activity of Private Security Companies” which facilitated setting up of a database on the security companies operating in the country. In 2009 there were 52 officially registered rel="nofollow">military and security companies.
However, the provisions of the document are often violated. Though the “Procedure…” prohibits ownership of or partnership in a private military or security company to the representatives of legislative, executive and judicial authorities as well as their relatives, this provision is actually ignored. For instance, the Watan Risk Management company is owned by the cousins of Afghan incumbent President Hamid Karzai.
The Host Nation Trucking program costs USD 2.16 billion in Afghanistan only. Only transportation and logistics services of the program account for more than 70% of all materiel and technical support of the coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Although the US contracts a licensed company, the latter often passes the contract to subcontractors. As a rule, the subcontractors do not have appropriate licenses for such services. For one, trucking of the NATO bases’ equipment is not performed by the contractor, Watan Risk Management, but its subcontractor headed by field commander Ruhullah, a former strongman, responsible for trucking security on a stretch of the motorway between Kabul and Kandahar. He has more than 600 militants under his command who escort American cargo to the point of destination. The fee for each truck delivery is up to USD 1500. If the monthly traffic over the protected stretch is approximately 3500 trucks, Ruhullah’s profit makes more than five million US dollars. According to Ruhullah, such procedure is necessary as the Taliban can attack convoys at any time. If he takes responsibility for secure trucking, attacks on the convoys are rare. In Afghanistan, warlords like Ruhullah, running their own stretch of a motorway each, are counted by dozens.
Therefore, as the American military relegate part of their functions to private businesses, it entails uncontrolled spending of budget funds, greater rampage of crime, as well as makes the US and NATO military contingent rely on the third parties.
Private Military and Security Companies upon Completion of the Military Operation in Afghanistan
Beside the supply contracts for the military mission foreign private military and security companies are engaged in consulting and training of the Afghan security forces (national police, national army) which are reinforced by the former members of routed illegal armed groups. As a rule, training is conducted by a highly qualified personnel of American private military and security companies.
In August 2010 President Karzai issued a decree demanding to eliminate all foreign and security companies by the end of the year, i.e. within four months, while the task of providing security had to be assigned to local private military and security contractors. The decree was quite unexpected and caused an ambiguous US reaction. It seemed impossible to enforce the decree in the prescribed time. Negotiations resulted in the extension of the withdrawal period granted to foreign companies. Obviously, after the military mission is over and foreign military and security companies withdraw from Afghanistan, a sizable local private military force left behind would be left uncalled in its present numbers. The personnel would have an opportunity to join the national army and police, but an important factor to remember is that the salary of a private contractor is much higher than that of a state security officer. In a private talk with a foreign expert in private military and security business I came to know that a security contractor’s daily pay is USD 150 and more if it’s providing security of an installation and up to USD 750 if he was employed for personal physical protection. Therefore, one has to ensure additional incentives for former security contractors to join the public service. Otherwise, the threat is that private security personnel would join the ranks of illegal paramilitary groups.
One of the motivations must be the consolidation of the incumbent's power in Afghanistan. Today President Karzai is no longer popular and is unlikely to enjoy wide support of the national armed forces after the withdrawal of foreign troops. Some of Karzai’s high-ranking relatives maintain contacts with the Taliban and patronize the Talibs. The policy of double standards pursued by Karzai is fraught with the civil war, comeback of the Taliban or arrival of other extremist groups.
Military and security agencies also have a chance to be engaged in civil construction. The Afghan infrastructure demands complete reconstruction; protection of construction projects, escort of freight traffic of construction materials, and providing on-site security of experts etc. would be in demand. Besides, another mission would be providing security of civil experts who are to replace the military mission. Military and security companies can also assume the task. Therefore, it would be a precedent of shifting the focus of private companies from military to security activity in the post-war time. Keeping in mind that the post-war reconstruction would be a lasting process, private companies’ personnel would have plenty of job offers for a long time in the future. Later, certain private companies can be dissolved, and their personnel can join the national military service.
Conclusions
Summing up, one has to point out that the role of private military and security companies in Afghanistan can be hardly called a well-defined task. On the one hand, they help the army with carrying out the “non-core” functions, on the other hand, they make other states contingent on their services. It is none the less evident that with the changing nature of the modern war the cast of its participants is also changing. Non-government military and security actors would be in demand both during combat operations and post-war reconstruction. This is a very important potential, and the degree of dependence thereon has to be regulated by the national governments. With available legislation regulating the activity of such companies the states would be less vulnerable when outsourcing part of its functions.
Afghanistan was one of the first to introduce the licensing procedure. Though the international law regulating private military and security aspect is still at the blueprint stage, today relations of the Afghan government with such companies have been legally formalized. Law compliance would help to avoid the problems related to the establishment and dissolution of such companies, selection of personnel and their liability for legal wrongdoing, more so because after the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan the majority of local private military and security companies would stay in place. The problems related to their activity are unlikely to become so acute in Afghanistan than in the countries which lack the regulating and licensing mechanism for the operation of private military and security business.
