Print
Rate this article
(no votes)
 (0 votes)
Share this article
Maria Nebolsina

Research Fellow of the Euro-Atlantic Security Center at MGIMO University, RIAC Expert

President Obama's policy in Afghanistan seems consistent, but it is far from straightforward. The U.S. administration faces a conundrum: it is time to complete the Afghan antiterrorist operation, but peace is not within sight. But the president still has his second term to wind up the mission with minimum losses for the Democratic Party.

President Obama's policy in Afghanistan seems consistent, but it is far from straightforward. The U.S. administration faces a conundrum: it is time to complete the Afghan antiterrorist operation, but peace is not within sight. But the president still has his second term to wind up the mission with minimum losses for the Democratic Party.

Strategies and Plans Before Troops Withdrawal

Obama’s Afghan policy has not really changed much since his first presidential campaign. In 2008, he designated Afghanistan and Pakistan as the central counterterrorist front, a reference to the military surge in Afghanistan. Thanks to withdrawal of troops from Iraq in 2010, Washington was able to reinforce the Afghan contingent with 30,000 troops. Somewhat earlier, in 2009, America’s AFPAK [1] strategy emerged, combining counterterrorism with the socio-economic development of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The White House also promised to start closing down the Afghan operation in 2011[2], handing over power to the Afghan people in 2014 [3]. By the end of Obama’s first term, one more essential event took place, i.e. the killing of Osama bin Laden by Navy SEALs in the territory of Pakistan.

Photo: longwarjournal.org
Quetta Shura, a leading Taliban organization

Divided into NATO and American zones of responsibility, Afghanistan’s southern, southeastern and eastern provinces have posed the most danger. The hottest areas were largely focused on by U.S. soldiers, in partnership with minor formations from the UK, Australia and Canada. Forces from other NATO countries were placed elsewhere: the Italians chiefly in the west and the Germans in the north. Strength-wise, the largest force formations were sent to the southern, eastern and southeastern provinces [4].

From the start of his presidency, Obama pushed forward to wrap up the Afghan campaign as soon as possible, despite high instability in the region. Unlike President Bush, and despite his election pledges, today Obama continues to shift his Afghan policy from “the war on terror” to closing down the operation and troop withdrawal. The proof seems to lie in the fact that Obama is failing to implement the strategy that he announced at the West Point Military Academy in late 2009 [5]. That plan included three key aspects:

  • The military component, i.e. the 30,000-strong troop surge, was intended to take the initiative back from Taliban, train Afghan security forces, launch the handover of power to the national government, and launch the withdrawal of ISAF forces in July 2011.
  • Working collaboratively with the UN, allies and Afghans to produce an effective strategy for social development and improving security (to this end, Obama asked the allies to follow suit and send more troops to Afghanistan).
  • Cooperating with Islamabad to enhance antiterror operations, as terrorism is also a serious domestic concern for Pakistan, as members of the Taliban are known to seek refuge in the country, which is also a nuclear power. In his address, Obama also promised to support members of the Taliban who voluntarily lay down their arms and turn their backs on violence. Following White House appeals, some European countries slightly reinforced their troop contingents. Notably, the list of U.S. allies was expanded to include Malaysia and Armenia, each sending 40 soldiers, as well as Mongolia, which provided 36 servicemen. These forces are quite small when compared to the scale of the operation, but the more important point is that this demonstrates non-NATO countries’ positive response. As for Georgia, its troops were noticeably augmented from 175 as of late December 2009 to 925 in late October 2010 [6].

Although adopted, the strategy does not seem to have achieved a stable dialogue with Taliban, to say nothing of seizing the initiative, or Pakistan’s support for the Americans. Islamabad appears to double dealing: giving Washington verbal support while at the same time housing Quetta Shura, a leading Taliban organization, and offering its territory for insurgents’ operations in Afghanistan. The situation is further aggravated by the inefficient and corrupt administration of Hamid Karzai, who poses no real threat to the Taliban and is more focused on holding on to power after the military campaign is over.

Leaving Plus Staying

Photo: outlookafghanistan.net
President Hamid Karzai's elder brother,
Abdul Qayum Karzai, is apparently planning to
enter the race to be elected Afghanistan's next
president.

Ostensibly cognizant of the risks connected with withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, the Obama administration chose to retain a 10,000-strong force after the military operation is officially completed. This announcement came shortly after Obama’s reelection [7]. On the one hand, this contingent should not have any great impact on the developments, but on the other – the United States will remain directly involved in the situation for a longer period of time.

Notably, a year ago former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ryan Crocker mentioned that the American military mission could last beyond 2014 provided the Afghan government requested the operation be extended [8]. The recent statement on presence of the 10,000-strong force stresses that this requires Karzai’s consent [9]. He is highly likely to give that consent because he has a great deal to gain from it. First, this is a signal to Taliban that the West is still in the country. Second, the handover of authority to the Afghans should involve a transitional period, to include further training of the national security forces, assistance in transportation and logistics, etc. Third, in 2014 Afghanistan is to hold presidential elections. That will require order and relative peace before, during, and for some time after the event. This is a must both for Afghanistan and the United States, with this latter particularly eager to avoid a foreign policy fiasco after the withdrawal of the main contingent, irrespective of whether or not the president's elder brother, Abdul Kayum Karzai, since Hamid Karzai has recently pledged that he has no intention of trying to smooth the path for his relatives to take key positions.

Over time, the remaining limited U.S. contingent will likely leave Afghanistan, but after their lengthy stay Washington is unlikely to be able to effect a graceful exit without assistance from neighboring states. In order to save the Afghan operation from becoming a running joke about the Democratic Party’s efficiency, Obama will have to apply considerable foreign policy effort to prevent another war in Afghanistan from igniting before his presidency expires.

Post-Conflict Diplomacy and Cooperation

Photo: Flickr / Truthout.org

Humanitarian and other cargo critical for rebuilding Afghanistan will travel through Russian territory, as specified by the 2008 transit agreement between Moscow and NATO [10]. Russia's involvement in the post-conflict rebuilding of Afghanistan is inevitable, essential and mutually beneficial for Moscow and Washington. Russia could become the key logistical area, allowing the United States to finalize the military operation and quit Afghanistan without incurring serious political losses, while also preventing military damage for Afghanistan and adjacent countries.

Transition from military action to diplomacy is Obama's chief task for his second term. The U.S.-led coalition should be replaced by multifaceted cooperation both within the Moscow-Washington and the United States-CSTO frameworks. In the near future, political cooperation is likely to be bilateral, broader United States-CSTO collaboration remains a remote perspective. Cooperation between Russia and America in the commercial and business sphere, in work to attract capital to restore Afghan economy seems more likely. Russia also appears to be America's most reliable partner in the establishment of the Pakistan-Afghanistan dialogue. There are not many Pakistani officials who would cooperate with the Taliban. With U.S. support, Islamabad could clarify its seemingly divided position, thus weakening Quetta Shura’s position in the country. Russia could join these talks with Pakistan, for example through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which Islamabad has observer status, something Kabul is eager to obtain.

Combining the efforts of several countries is the only way to normalize the situation in Afghanistan. If this fails, the instability there could spread across Central Asia, which borders Russia. Any loss of balance in Afghanistan, Pakistan or in the Central Asian vicinity would also upset the Democrats' foreign policy strategy, and cooperation with Russia would be likely to minimize the ensuing damage.

1. President Obama’s Afghanistan–Pakistan (AFPAK) Strategy, March 27, 2009

2. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Eisenhower Hall Theatre, United States Military Academy at West Point, December 01, 2009

3. National Security Strategy, May 2010

4. International Security Assistance Force (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)

5. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Eisenhower Hall Theatre, United States Military Academy at West Point, December 01, 2009

6. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures (1, 2)

7. "U.S. Looks to Set Size of Afghan Presence After 2014”, November 26, 2012, “The Wall Street Journal”

8. “U.S. Troops Could Stay in Afghanistan Past Deadline, Envoy Says”, December 10, 2011, “The New York Times”

9. “U.S. Looks to Set Size of Afghan Presence After 2014” by Julian E.Barnes and Adam Entous

10. Comments by Information and Media Department of Russian Foreign Ministry relating to Kyrgyz media reports on NATO cargos transit from Afghanistan through the Ulyanovsk airport.

Rate this article
(no votes)
 (0 votes)
Share this article

Poll conducted

  1. In your opinion, what are the US long-term goals for Russia?
    U.S. wants to establish partnership relations with Russia on condition that it meets the U.S. requirements  
     33 (31%)
    U.S. wants to deter Russia’s military and political activity  
     30 (28%)
    U.S. wants to dissolve Russia  
     24 (22%)
    U.S. wants to establish alliance relations with Russia under the US conditions to rival China  
     21 (19%)
For business
For researchers
For students