New Chance for the OSCE

The European security system is facing hard times. However, lessons should be learned from crises. Decision-making on key issues must involve all countries in the region. The OSCE provides ample opportunities for seeking consensus and is able to adapt to new challenges.

The European security system is facing hard times. However, lessons should be learned from crises. Decision-making on key issues must involve all countries in the region. The OSCE provides ample opportunities for seeking consensus and is able to adapt to new challenges.

Since the Dark Ages, the cessation of military conflicts in Europe has been the main motivation for those advancing projects aimed at developing pan-European institutions.[1] However, the realization of these ideas remained a pipe dream until the 20^th century. Two world wars both changed and weakened Europe, forcing a number of major powers to temper their selfish ambitions and go the length of unprecedented integration with their neighbors. However, the initial institutionalization of the European security system was not based on a pan-European foundation. The potential for conflict, crucial for the fate of Europe, only shifted from the country to the bloc level, but was not eliminated. Against the backdrop of political changes within the socialist camp, it was the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, adopted by the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in November 1990 that incarnated the hope of solving this fundamental problem. The dissolution of the USSR, conflicts in the former Soviet Union, and destabilization in the Balkans pushed work on new pan-European security arrangements into the background. These fires had to be put out immediately through available, although rather imperfect, means.

Europe left this period of political upheaval with a changed worldview and a set of new foreign policy doctrines. Amid the ruins of the socialist project, the successful system of Western institutions emerged as an island of stability and prosperity. Over the next fifteen-twenty years, joining NATO and the European Union bolstered the confidence of many countries in their security and their rosy prospects for political and economic development. It seemed only natural to disregard the possibility that NATO and the EU could fail in becoming pan-European structures, and that their expansion could stall heavily, leaving Europe divided. Moreover, the word “Europe” began to be increasingly used to indicate the European Union, leaving a substantial part of European countries in a type of “gray zone.”

Pan-European Specificities

The development of NATO and the EU, including the partnerships of these organizations with non-members, constituted the core of the evolving European security system in the 1990s - 2000s. But at the same time, true pan-European institutions already existed, namely the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which emerged as a result of the Helsinki Process.[2] The wide range of participants (in June 2014, the Council of Europe had 47 member-states and the OSCE – 57 participating countries) constitutes both an advantage and a problem for these organizations. Discussing security issues with all of Europe is of great value on its own account, since decisions supported by the member-states are unlikely to face serious difficulties with implementation, a particularly important fact in crisis situations.

However, arriving at meaningful solutions is not an easy task. Any multilateral structure that relies mainly on decision-making by consensus, faces the risk of making most of its participants hostages of the least cooperative members-countries. This latter category is able to set the “lowest common denominator” which defines the ultimate level of ambition of the organization’s potential courses of action. Any organization with limited membership undoubtedly enjoys more freedom in terms of decision-making than one with a wide representation, due to differences in the political culture of the latter’s members, the peculiarities of the political process which cause significant divergence of opinion even between close allies, and finally large geographic distances.

Therefore, if Europe is just a geographical notion, the pan-European nature of organizations becomes pointless and stands in the way of effective decision-making. However, the Council of Europe and the OSCE operate from the assumption that the countries in the region (both European and Euro-Atlantic) are brought together by something more than geographic proximity and common roots, i.e. common values and a common interest in ensuring stability and safety. Paying lip service to mutually acceptable wording is much easier than realizing decisions in practice, especially if initial approval had been given rather reluctantly or enjoyed little support on the part of the new political forces that came to power. This explains the current state of pan-European structures. A substantial part of their activities focuses not on the adoption of certain binding decisions, but on making recommendations that will be put into effect not under the threat of retaliation for a failure to comply, but because all participants find them useful.

Pan-European structures could reap the benefits of the principle of subsidiarity and apply it on a limited scale. This principle provides for transferring decision-making to a higher level only if problems cannot be solved effectively at the lower one. Accordingly, problems that are successfully solved by an organization with a limited membership should not be transferred to a region-wide institution. In practice, it inevitably happens that less representative organizations tend to assume the right to make decisions on issues affecting the entire region, while more representative structures strive for decision-making on a wider range of issues. This contradiction is typical for bureaucratic structures and is unlikely to be resolved once and for all; it is a normal part of the ongoing political game.

Flexibility and Initiative

Improving the efficiency of a pan-European organization is not easy. Given the repeated instances of the bloc mentality, this has become an even more difficult problem in the field of international security. Solving it requires thinking unconventionally. Nominally responsible for issues of comprehensive security in the Euro-Atlantic region, the OSCE is trying to reconcile something that is not at all easy to be reconciled. The organization is quite unusual – it has no charter, it was not established by an international treaty, and it gives wide scope for the initiatives of individual member-states. These unique aspects give rise to harsh criticism,[3] while at the same time open up additional opportunities that the states should learn to take advantage of.[4]

The efficiency of international organizations is often assessed by the success or failure of their country-members in reaching consensus. However, another important aspect of every organization’s effectiveness is the quality of its staff which must ensure the implementation of the decisions made. In this regard, the OSCE looks quite favorable. With a total annual budget of 144.8 million euros (2013),[5] the organization maintains a permanent presence in the Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the Representative on Freedom of the Media focus assiduous attention on issues important for European security. Notable efforts have also been applied to disseminate information about the activities of the organization in a readily understandable format. The OSCE is present on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google+, LinkedIn, SoundCloud, and Instagram, as well as publishes the Security Community magazine. The Organization's ability to adapt to the modern information environment is fundamentally important in a time when the dynamics of conflict and threats to security depend not only on the government policies, but to a large extent on the perceptions and actions of individual citizens living in the OSCE area, in particular in conflict-prone regions.

The political rather than legal nature of OSCE commitments looks more like an advantage than a disadvantage in contemporary contexts. The opportunities to force states to implement international agreements are limited in any event. The actual implementation of arrangements, both legal and political, is determined by states’ understanding of their own interests. A substantial part of OSCE commitments, in particular with regard to confidence-building measures in the military sphere, has been translated into specific actions and, in fact, happens to be the only mechanism working to overcome divisions on the European security. This capability of the OSCE has acquired particular importance in the context of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014.

Trial by Ukraine

The dramatic events in Ukraine notably forced a reassessment of the issue of European security. The practically non-existent probability of armed conflict in this part of Europe turned into a reality in a matter of weeks. The most advanced mechanisms of international security in the region, based on the decision-making of the limited number of countries, failed. Stepping-up OSCE activity appeared to be natural measure to provide at least some international monitoring of the security situation in different Ukrainian regions. The established OSCE practice of observing presidential elections assumed particular significance during this crisis.

The key role of the country chairing the OSCE became apparent also during the crisis. The perfectly prepared and ambitious Swiss Chairmanship was able to mobilize all possible resources, including the personal involvement of President of the Swiss Confederation Didier Burkhalter, in order to work out a roadmap for a peace settlement as soon as possible and promote its implementation. Interestingly, to increase the effectiveness of the Chairperson-in-Office, for the first time a joint work plan was adopted to guide the consecutive chairmanships of Switzerland and Serbia during 2014 and 2015.

As has repeatedly happened in the history of Europe, the crisis delivered a heavy blow to past achievements and simultaneously opened up new opportunities. The developments around Ukraine shook the previously established status quo in the field of European security. The current series of mutual accusations of violating international norms is understandable but futile. Sooner or later, the confrontational rhetoric will inevitably decline, and the countries of the Old World will have to define which lessons to learn from the crisis and which changes the European security environment requires.

Helsinki+40

August 2015 marks the 40^th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This anniversary has triggered continued discussions concerning the future of European security, in particular, within the framework of the joint project, launched by the RIAC and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The Helsinki principles often face skepticism. It is easy to give examples about violations not incurring noticeable consequences for the offender. But rules are needed not because they cannot be broken, but because adherence to them makes people’s life comfortable and safe and help them to coexist and interact with their neighbors. In this regard, the continued relevance of the Final Act can hardly be disputed.

In terms of values and norms, the framework of European security has already been established, although it needs further elaboration.[6] As to the institutional framework, it seems reasonable to focus on strengthening and developing the existing mechanisms rather than creating new ones unless absolutely necessary. The Ukrainian crisis has shown that the development of a pan-European system for settling disputes and ensuring confidence is not an option but a compelling need.

The OSCE provides ample opportunities for this. But success requires rendering more support to the organization by the member countries. It is in their power to refrain from many month delays in approving a rather modest OSCE budget, as what happened in 2014, to establish a body of resources to react quickly to crises, to improve the coordination of OSCE efforts with those of other international organizations, while not shying away from meaningful discussions and resolution of acute problems.

The OSCE is both a pan-European and multifunctional organization. Leaving its fundamental principles intact, the organization’s potential could be used to develop a dialogue on economic issues, particularly regarding mutually beneficial free trade zones and the implementation of advanced integration initiatives. The OSCE can offer a platform for negotiating energy security issues, discussing new challenges and threats, and promoting security with the freedom of movement. The OSCE will be what the participating countries make of it. And if the chance to establish a full-fledged European security system is missed again, the participating countries only have themselves to blame for it.

[1] A.O. Chubar'jan. Evropejskaja ideja v istorii: problemy vojny i mira. Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija Publishers, 1987.

[2] A.V. Zagorskij. Hel'sinskij process: peregovory v ramkah Soveshhanija po bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestvu v Evrope, 1972-1991.   Moscow, Prava cheloveka Publishers. 2005

[3] L.S. Voronkov. Hel'sinskij process i evropejskaja bezopasnost'. Chto dal'she? Moscow, MGIMO-Universitet Publishers, 2012.

[4] A.V. Zagorskij, M.L. Jentin. Zachem uhodit' iz OBSE? // Rossija v global'noj politike. 2008. № 4 (http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_11148)

[5] OSCE Annual Report 2013, p. 100. (http://www.osce.org/secretariat/116947?download=true).

[6] N.K. Arbatova. Rekonstrukcija evropejskoj bezopasnosti // Nezavisimaja gazeta. March 23, 2009. (http://www.ng.ru/courier/2009-03-23/9_europe.html)/