The Caucasus: Out of Tune
Georgian men in traditional national costumes
sing along to their accordion-playing colleague
during a performance at a folk festival at the
open air National Ethnographic Museum in
Tbilisi, Georgia, 21 July 2012
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Ph.D in History, Leading Research Fellow at MGIMO University, Editor-in-Chief of International Analytics Magazine
Is it possible to ensure stability and security in the Caucasus through engagement by other states? Jos Boonstra, Head of the Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia Program at FRIDE, offers his view on the subject. Given the current situation, how feasible today is the Caucasus “concert of powers,” which could contribute to the transformation of the region from a combustible power keg into a kind of “post-Soviet Mediterranean,” rich in natural, recreational and tourism resources?
Is it possible to ensure stability and security in the Caucasus through engagement by other states? Jos Boonstra, Head of the Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia Program at FRIDE, offers his view on the subject.
J. Boonstra’s Working Paper “The South Caucasus Concert: Each Playing its Own Tune” is not the first time FRIDE has addressed problems in the Caucasus. In April 2011, Jos Boonstra together with Neil Melvin, an expert at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) [1], published a report on “challenging the security deficit” in the Caucasus region [2]. The new working paper, released in September 2015 is part of a continuation of this research published four years ago.
A Different Interpretation of “the Caucasus Concert”
To date, problems in Transcaucasia are not a priority on the global agenda. However, the proximity of the region to the Middle East (three Transcaucasian republics border Turkey, while Armenia and Azerbaijan have common borders with Iran), to Central Asia (through the Caspian Sea), to the European Union (the Black Sea), and to Russia (the country’s territory includes the North Caucasus) has made the region into an intersection of different and often conflicting interests. Unresolved ethnic and political conflicts, let alone numerous internal political and socio-economic problems, are aggravating and destabilizing the situation there.
Given the current situation, how feasible today is the Caucasus “concert of powers,” which could contribute to the transformation of the region from a combustible power keg into a kind of “post-Soviet Mediterranean,” rich in natural, recreational and tourism resources?
These circumstances raise the question of how to identify opportunities for resolving the existing disagreements and decreasing instability. Given the current situation, how feasible today is the Caucasus “concert of powers,” which could contribute to the transformation of the region from a combustible power keg into a kind of “post-Soviet Mediterranean,” rich in natural, recreational and tourism resources?
Having entitled his working paper “The South Caucasus Concert: Each Playing its Own Tune”, J. Boonstra reveals a certain degree of skepticism towards the possible emergence of a conflict-free era in that turbulent region [3]. Indeed, without a gifted conductor and a main melody, even the most outstanding musicians will be unable to play any music and will only produce noise. How does the author assess today’s players in the Caucasus “concert”?
When looking at the September Working Paper, it is necessary to bear in mind that in 2011, Jos Boonstra and Neil Melvin identified the main problem for Transcaucasia as the “vacuum” left by the withdrawal of the UN and OSCE missions in Georgia. Jos Boonstra and Neil Melvin regarded this “international presence” as a counterbalance to unilateral Russian domination – an a priori negative factor, in their view. The authors did not bother to understand the reasons behind the rivalry between Russia and other actors, nor to evaluate the overall conflict dynamics which made the mandates of these international organizations irrelevant to the new set of conditions that followed the events of August 2008 [4].
In the politico-geographical introduction to his new report, Jos Boonstra identifies the South Caucasus as a region that “comprises the former Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.” From a legal point of view, he is absolutely right. With the exception of Russia and several countries of Latin America and Oceania, the international community recognizes Georgia within the borders of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, while the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is not recognized neither by Armenia, nor by Russia, the EU, or the United States. The discrepancy between the formal legal boundaries and the entities that exist de facto pose the main problem for the security of the Caucasus. Meanwhile, after more than two decades from the collapse of the Soviet Union, unrecognized and partly recognized republics “have acquired all the real attributes of statehood – from constitutions and cabinets of ministers to the police and the armed forces.” [5] Most importantly, they have acquired their own political identity, which allows us to distinguish them from stable criminal enclaves or “pirate republics.” They have also worked out their own idea of what constitutes security and who can be entrusted with its guarantee.
Jos Boonstra and Neil Melvin regarded this “international presence” as a counterbalance to unilateral Russian domination – an a priori negative factor, in their view.
One can blame as much as one wants these de facto entities for expelling members of other ethnic groups, of ethnocratic considerations when establishing bodies of power and control and resolving ownership issues. But this will not alter the fact that their very appearance has been the result of a long-standing conflict with their “mother country.” Theу are faced with the constant threat of revenge on the part of the “mother country,” involving international interference (or at least the tacit support of powerful external forces) [6]. The conflict has its roots in this distrust of the Abkhazians and South Ossetians of the West, of international institutions and of security guarantees from them. This explains the geopolitical choice of these de facto entities in favor of Russia. Accordingly, the understanding of the “Caucasus concert” by Sukhumi and Tskhinvali does not coincide with that outlined by Tbilisi.
However, J. Boonstra does not seem to notice this contradiction (just as he ignored it in his previous Working Paper of 2011), and therefore he appears to see the major threat to the statehood of the newly independent countries of the region in the form of Russian dominance, rather than the issues of their internal political cohesion, nation-building and regional policy. In his view, the events in the Caucasus in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 “show very clearly that Russia is prepared to use force to safeguard its interests in neighboring regions.” Thus, the thesis centered on the exclusive responsibility of Russia for the use of military methods in solving acute ethno-political conflicts is advanced as a matter of course. One gets the impression that the countries of the Caucasus, which seek to build up cooperation with NATO and the West, seem to be unaware of the military operations of the Alliance in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo) and in the Middle East. As a result, the projected picture is simplistic. The Russian position is presented as something inflexible and given once and for all, although in reality it has evolved much over the past two decades (from Abkhazia’s blockade and sanctions against the breakaway republic to the recognition of its independence) [7].
European Prospects for the Caucasus
The discrepancy between the formal legal boundaries and the entities that exist de facto pose the main problem for the security of the Caucasus.
The author emphasizes that the main purpose of the working paper is to look at the issues of the Caucasus region from a “European perspective.” In this context, it is important to identify the differences between the United States and the European Union in their approaches to the Caucasus. Jos Boonstra singles out three priorities for Washington and Brussels. In his view, the United States’ top interests are “stability in the wake of Russian expansionism and an unstable Middle East; democracy promotion; and the resolution of protracted conflicts.” “Development, trade and energy, democracy and human rights” constitute Brussels’ priorities, apart from stability. Thus, J. Boonstra comes to conclusion that the EU’s resources do not go beyond the scope of the soft power formats.
J. Boonstra appears to see the major threat to the statehood of the newly independent countries of the region in the form of Russian dominance, rather than the issues of their internal political cohesion, nation-building and regional policy.
The European policy, in his view, can be categorized as the “Merchant-Vicar”, while the American one as the “Soldier-Vicar.” [8] But for all their differences, the US and the EU are equally concerned about Russian influence and are ready to counter it, although they lack the required resources. It’s not an pointless question to ask which resources the author considers as providing sufficient and effective means for deterring Russian hegemony. And most importantly, what will happen to the region should Moscow for some reason or other lose interest in it? These are the questions that the author fails to answer. As such, describing the regional interests of Russia, he notes the connection of the Transcaucasian agenda with issues of security in the North Caucasus. According to him, Russia “is itself a Caucasus country.” But if this is so, what is the point in talking about domination as a dangerous challenge to the interests of the EU and the US, which, according to the author himself, are not sufficiently involved in Transcaucasian processes?
Jos Boonstra categorizes Russian politics in the region as that of the “Soldier-Diplomat.” But why the “Soldier-Diplomat” under the Russian flag is more dangerous than the “Soldier-Vicar” under the US one remains unclear. Moreover, reducing Moscow’s role to the military-diplomatic sphere appears quite erroneous. It should be noted that nearly half of all foreign investment in the Armenian economy comes from Russia, and the latter has been the only country involved in the reconstruction of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after 2008, which were destroyed during the conflict. The effectiveness of this reconstruction process can (and should) be open to debate, but one thing is certain: Russia's actions testify to an immanent striving not only for geopolitical domination, but for changing the status quo. In addition, prior to 2008, Moscow repeatedly refused to comply with Sukhumi’s and Tskhinvali’s request for recognition of their independence.
The Russian position is presented as something inflexible and given once and for all, although in reality it has evolved much over the past two decades.
It would seem that the author, who opposes Russia’s hegemony and attempts for exclusive spheres, would have welcomed practically the only successful case of cooperation between Russia and the West within the OSCE Minsk Group, which was created to encourage the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But here, Jos Boonstra is just as categorical. According to him, the OSCE Minsk format “has proven to be ineffective at conflict resolution, though it remains the only format to manage the conflict.” This argument would be correct if there had been signs that the opposing parties of long standing, namely Armenia and Azerbaijan, were willing to achieve a compromise. However, there are no such signs. Moreover, the number of armed incidents on the contact line is increasing from year to year, and the bellicose rhetoric has never died down. At that, the involvement of the EU in the settlement process actually boils down only to the participation of France in the OSCE Minsk Group. According to prominent German political scientist Sabine Fischer, the role of the European Union is “extremely low.” [9] Brussels offered virtually no alternative proposals, except for a repeatedly voiced “updated version of the Madrid principles,” supported by the US, Russia and France [10]. Given this, does it make sense to ostracize the format that helps avoid the escalation of border incidents into a large-scale war? This question requires no answer.
In search of opportunities
The most important part of the paper is a set of proposals that the author offers, probably looking to European political circles involved in decision-making over EU actions in the post-Soviet space. In fact, they boil down to continuing the existing Brussels projects, such as the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership [11] without due introspection of the results already achieved, as well as developing cooperation with the US, the EU and Turkey.
But how can such cooperation be reconciled with the interests of Russia and Iran? The author examines the interests of the Islamic Republic in the region as well. However, in contrast to Russia’s stance, they appear “vague” to him. “It seems unlikely that Tehran will become a substantial factor in the near term as energy infrastructure (if agreed on and built) will take many years to come into being. In addition, the region is not a top priority for Tehran given its other pressing priorities such as the rivalry with Saudi Arabia, its policy towards Israel, and broader Middle East challenges,” writes J. Boonstra. However, due to the Syrian conflict and the unsettled Kurdish issue, Turkey today appears to be involved in Middle Eastern affairs to a far greater degree. Nevertheless, the author does not consider this to be an obstacle hindering Ankara’s intensified activity in the Caucasus. Furthermore, given strategic cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan, it could easily become an additional risk factor in relations with Armenia.
What will happen to the region should Moscow for some reason or other lose interest in it? These are the questions that the author fails to answer.
Jos Boonstra pays much attention to issues of democratization as a prerequisite for regional stability. However, in the proposed recommendations, he does not specify concrete measures to change the situation for the better. The author criticizes authoritarian rule in Azerbaijan today and the emerging differences between the official Baku and the West. But are the US and the EU ready to sacrifice cooperation with the country that they view as an energy alternative to Moscow (which, in Boonstra’s opinion, has only one interest, namely dominance in the region and the submission of Russia’s neighbors to its interests)? The Working Paper offers no systematic review of this issue.
As a result, the Caucasus Concert does not appear feasible even in the remote future. And the actors involved seem unlikely to put together a solid ensemble even with the help of the strengthened “triple alliance”, composed of the US, the EU and Turkey, which has been suggested as the main setting for Transcaucasia’s stabilization. There will be no progress if Iran’s and Russia’s interests are not consulted, if the nature and peculiarities of de facto states are not understood, and these entities are ignored not just as officially unrecognized countries, but as actors of the ethno-political processes in a complex conflict-stricken region. Musicians can play in concert if and only if they are all willing to follow a melody. This very melody could well be created by several composers through a struggle between their creative ambitions and egos. But once created, it will be performed.
Regrettably, the “innovative thinking” offered in the Working Paper only reproduces the familiar logic of the Cold War era, when the containment of Russia and cooperation excluding it was regarded as reflecting the greatest political and diplomatic prowess.
1. http://www.sipri.org/about/bios/melvin
2. Boonstra J / and Melvin N. Challenging the South Caucasus Security Deficit // http://fride.org/ download/WP108_South_Caucasus_Eng.pdf
3. Boonstra J. The South Caucasus concert: Each playing its own tune // http://www.cascade-caucasus.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/WP-128-ok.pdf
Transcaucasian republics are often referred to as Southern Caucasia or the South Caucasus by European and American scholars.4. So, since March 1994, the priority task of the OSCE Mission in Georgia had been to engage with the Joint Control Commission (which included Russia, Georgia, North Ossetia as an entity making part of Russia and South Ossetia, which was formally recognized by all, including the Russian Federation, as a part of Georgia). However, the “five-day war” rendered the Dagomys Agreement of 1992 (which established the Joint Control Commission) obsolete. Russia, which recognized the independence of South Ossetia, launched an initiative to transform the OSCE Mission and to create on its basis two separate missions (one in Georgia and another in South Ossetia). However, other members of the OSCE insisted on the “territorial integrity” of Georgia and on the continued work of the previous Mission. See: http://ria.ru/trend/osce_mission
Similarly, after Russia recognized Abkhazia's independence, the former disagreed with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council (US, France, Britain, and China) about the prospects for the work of the UNOMIG (United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia) on the territory of Abkhazia. For Russia, Abkhazia was an independent state, while the other permanent members of the UN Security Council considered it to be an integral part of Georgia. On June 15, 2009, Russia vetoed a technical rollover, thereby blocking an extension of the presence of the UNOMIG. The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (nearly 150 peacekeepers) thus ceased its operations. See: http://www.un.org/ru/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomig/5. D.V. Trenin. Foreword to the Russian edition // In B. Coppieters’ Federalism and Conflict in the Caucasus. Moscow. Carnegie Moscow Center. 2002, p. 4 [in Russian]
6. S.M. Markedonov. De Facto Post-Soviet States: Twenty Years of State-Building. Yerevan. Institute of the Caucasus. 2012 [in Russian]
7. Аntonenko О. Uncertainty: Russia and the Conflict over Abkhazia // Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution. Ed. Bruno Coppieters and Robert Legvold. – Cambridge, MA: 2005. – Pp.208-217.
S.M. Markedonov. Referred to works.8. Here the author takes advantage of the symbolic denomination offered by French philosopher and sociologist R. Aron (1905-1983), who called the two major actors in international relations “the Soldier” and “the Diplomat.” See: Aron R. Peace & War: A Theory of International Relations. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966.
9. Sabine Fischer: Europe Needs to Involve Abkhazia to Maintain Open Channels of Communication http://www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=20987 [in Russian]
10. http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1298313.html
11. The European Neighborhood Policy is a foreign relations instrument of the EU to strengthen socio-economic, political and cultural contacts with the countries neighboring united Europe. Key ideas and approaches to the policy were formulated in the report entitled “Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors” (2003). It was launched after the 2004 enlargement of the Union to cover ten new member countries from Eastern and Central Europe, as well as Cyprus and Malta. The Eastern Partnership is an EU project, initiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland and Sweden. The project focuses on bringing closer the European Union and 6 post-Soviet countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). The Eastern Partnership was inaugurated in Prague on 7 May, 2009.
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