Is Arctic Cooperation Falling Prey to the Ukraine Crisis?

On January 20-21, the Norwegian city of Tromsø once again was the venue for the international conference "Arctic Frontiers 2015" devoted to development issues in the Arctic region. With relations between Russia and the West at a low point due to the Ukraine crisis, questions arise if their future cooperation in the Arctic can be made possible in a full-fledged format. We met with RIAC Member Andrey Zagorsky, Director of IMEMO Department of Disarmament and Resolution, to get his insights about the emerging pattern in the handling of Arctic affairs.

On January 20-21, the Norwegian city of Tromsø once again was the venue for the international conference "Arctic Frontiers 2015" devoted to development issues in the Arctic region. With relations between Russia and the West at a low point due to the Ukraine crisis, questions arise if their future cooperation in the Arctic can be made possible in a full-fledged format. We met with RIAC Member Andrey Zagorsky, Director of IMEMO Department of Disarmament and Resolution, to get his insights about the emerging pattern in the handling of Arctic affairs.

Dr. Zagorsky, what do you see as the main avenues of Arctic developments in 2015?

First of all, last year’s discussion of the Arctic agenda was fairly productive.

In October-November 2014, the International Maritime Organization finalized the key provisions of the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters known as the Polar Code. About the same time, amendments were adopted over the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), while the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) will be modified next May. After the amendments come into effect in 2017, the Polar Code provisions will become obligatory for ships sailing in Arctic waters.

There seems to be some progress in the debate over the preservation of fish stock in the central Arctic Ocean, as last February, the five littoral states agreed on a roadmap for drawing up the final document, although the aggravated Russia-West relationship has put off the practical steps until times improve.

Andrey Zagorsky

The working groups of the Arctic Council have also been quite active on scientific cooperation, the action plan or some other framework for preventing oil spills (in addition to the 2013 accords on the prevention of marine oil pollution), as well as on measures for major cuts of soot and methane discharges.

So far, it is not clear whether the final documents will be ready by next April. Some of them are rather delicate, among other things, for economic reasons. At the same time, the discussion of practically all matters in the Arctic Council is notably free of conflicts between the participants, indicating that the Arctic offers one of the few avenues for cooperation that still contains a tangible constructiveness and willingness for cooperation among the member countries.

Also of great importance is the fact that the United States, which will to take up the Arctic Council presidency from Canada this year, appears eager to isolate its function from international turbulence for the sake of closer cooperation.

I believe the next two years will be immensely significant in view of mutual socialization for the Arctic Council members, especially the Asian states that in 2013 joined the group as observers. The smooth operation of the body definitely hinges on the observers' engagement in the broad consensus on the Arctic agenda prevailing in the council over the past five-six years.

Do you think the priorities of the chairmanship will change?

First of all, continuity is required from each incoming Arctic Council chair, which is made easier by many medium- and long-term projects agreed upon by member states at the biennial ministerial meetings. Of course, each chairman-to-be wants to introduce one's own priorities. These are never defined single-handedly but are discussed by all participants, driving the new chair holder to a consensus on all its initiatives.

Flickr / Lars H. Smedsrud
Arctic Frontiers Conference

The United States presented its vision of the 2015-2017 Arctic Council agenda last October, with certain amendments to be definitely made in the remaining months in order to reflect the views of other member countries.

Washington's presidency is focused on three areas, i.e. continued efforts to form the governance regime for the Arctic Ocean; climate change in the Arctic, its impact and adaptation; problems of the indigenous population and improvement of its quality of life on the basis of sustainable development or green economy. I think Americans will also do a lot to strengthen the Arctic Business Council set up last year.

In fact, the U.S. plans to concentrate on the follow-up of existing projects, which refers to measures for preventing oil spills and notable cuts to soot and methane discharges. Several steps are expected to consolidate cooperation among Arctic Council members under the 2011 agreements on air and marine search-and-rescue cooperation, as well as oil spill preparedness and elimination.

During the chairmanship preparation stage, the Americans have put forward quite sensible proposals and initiatives, for example on regular biennial multilateral exercises of the Arctic Council members under the two above agreements for practical responses to emergencies. To this end, last year they suggested the establishment of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, similar to arrangements efficiently operating in the Northeast Atlantic and North Pacific. The Americans would also like to run tabletop drills on joint emergency response, as well as a full-size multilateral exercise.

The implementation of these initiatives appears quite helpful for the implementation of the Russian Federation Arctic Strategy 2020 that prescribes the step-by-step construction of a region-wide system for monitoring the Arctic Ocean environment and cooperating in emergency response.

Arctic Council

Some time ago, the Americans floated the idea of holding an Arctic Summit in 2016, when the organization will celebrate its 20th anniversary. However, now this is believed to be unlikely, although it is still mulled over by the U.S. Arctic punditry.

The list of initiatives put forward by the United States and other countries is definitely longer, and only one year ago many hoped the U.S. chairmanship would open new opportunities for significantly expanding Arctic cooperation.

Regrettably, despite its very constructive agenda, the Arctic Council and the entire area of the circumpolar cooperation exist within the broader international context. The Ukraine fallout inevitably affects the situation, although not so much in aggravating the relations between the Arctic Council members as in their greater focus on minimizing the potential damage to the Arctic cooperation, distracting the countries from efforts to increase cooperation.

Last year, teamwork was suspended on several avenues. For one, more trust and cooperation in the Arctic security was expected through the institutionalization of annual sessions of the chiefs of staff from the member states. The two initial meetings took place in 2012 and 2013, while the 2014 gathering was cancelled and seems unlikely this year. Originally planned for last fall, the launch of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum has been postponed, as well as the 2014 joint exercise of the U.S., Russian and Norwegian navies that had been held on a regular basis.

Due to the adverse bilateral background, Moscow seems increasingly wary of any ideas emanating from Washington even if they appear helpful for the realization of its own Arctic policies.

Of course, the facts of life may hardly arouse enthusiasm but rather suggest that the U.S. chairmanship will be remembered not so much by remarkable events or decisions boosting regional cooperation as many thought one or two years ago, as by lost opportunities for strengthening the Arctic Council and regional cooperation as whole.

Interviewer: Maria Gurova, RIAC Program Assistant