The number of countries that have passed laws on foreign agents, transparency and countering foreign influence is growing worldwide. The geography of such legislation has never fit into ideological divides such as West–East, North–South or “democracies vs. autocracies.” This is not even about the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which has been in force in the United States since 1938. We are often told that “it is a different thing,” although the law allows for an extremely broad interpretation of lobbying for foreign interests and criminal liability. Western and non-Western nations alike have protected themselves from foreign influence.
However, the adoption of specialized laws has become a notable trend in the past two decades. The years 2023–2024 were particularly productive in this regard.
The wave of laws regulating foreign influence reflects a decline in overall trust toward the Western-centric international system. More broadly, it signals the erosion of the legitimacy of the post-bipolar world order, including its Yalta-Potsdam institutions.
The issue of power and control has overshadowed the issue of rules and principles, as clearly seen in the cases of U.S. and EU pressure on Georgia and their support for Moldova.
Under these circumstances, even governments that support European integration are no longer willing to be a revolving door for transnational “civil society.” Standards and rules provide less and less protection to anyone. Tomorrow, your government may face demands for another concession—for example, joining restrictions against Russia—and find itself transformed from an ally into a target for the transborder infrastructure for influence.
Laws to regulate foreign influence are serving not only as instruments of national security but also as tools for strengthening one’s bargaining power in a world that no longer feels legitimate or safe.
Of course, in some cases, there is a certain amount of populism involved. It is easier to shut down Confucius Institutes than to reverse the deindustrialization of the U.S. Although that can also be influenced by draining European capital. This raises the question of when the instruments designed to counter foreign interference in EU states will be used against their own members. Notably, in 2023, open accusations were made (so far at the expert level) about German political foundations promoting German energy interests in France through criticism of the latter’s nuclear industry.
For those who support and profit from globalization, what is happening now is seditious. However, foreign interference and the struggle against it have been natural parts of history, appearing in various forms across the centuries. The past three decades are no exception, it is just that it was not common (and, for many countries, too risky) to draw attention to it.
Perhaps we are simply returning to historical “normality,” or rather, to another round of rivalry among states and the assertion of sovereignty.
The number of countries that have passed laws on foreign agents, transparency and countering foreign influence is growing worldwide. The geography of such legislation has never fit into ideological divides such as West-East, North-South or “democracies vs. autocracies.” This is not even about the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which has been in force in the United States since 1938. We are often told that “it is a different thing,” although the law allows for an extremely broad interpretation of lobbying for foreign interests and criminal liability. Western and non-Western nations alike have protected themselves from foreign influence.
However, the adoption of specialized laws has become a notable trend in the past two decades. The years 2023–2024 were particularly productive in this regard.
Laws against foreign interference were adopted in France (2024) and the UK (2023). In the latter case, the maximum penalty is up to 14 years in prison. Similar legislation is already in place in Canada and Australia.
In December 2023, the European Commission released a draft directive on the subject, but it was shelved amid criticism in U.S. media. That same month, Hungary passed its “law on foreign agents” (a term that has become generic, even though the conceptual frameworks and political approaches vary by country). Slovakia and Turkey are now working on their own versions of such laws.
The wave has swept across the Balkans as well. A foreign agent law was introduced in the parliament of Republika Srpska, withdrawn under pressure from the West, but President Milorad Dodik has vowed to get it passed. In Montenegro, the ruling coalition submitted its own bill to parliament in October. A similar law is under discussion in Serbia.
The situation in the post-Soviet space deserves special mention, as this year Georgia and Kyrgyzstan have passed laws on the transparency of foreign influence and foreign agents.
Crisis of the old system
Critics point to the contradictions between foreign influence legislation and the principles of freedom of speech and freedom of association.
However, this argument is just a smokescreen for their real stance. Legislation on the transparency of foreign influence is so sensitive because it exposes the roots of this influence and hampers its free (unchecked) realization.
For example, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze said in the spring of 2024 that only seven of the largest non-governmental organizations in the country had declared 18% of their income since 2012. Authorities have no information on how the remaining 82% of these funds were spent.
These figures demonstrate the “rules of the game” that emerged in the post-bipolar period of international relations after 1991. Transparency of national borders did not mean transparency in the activities of so-called “non-governmental” actors, which were funded by foreign governments and transnational corporations to promote their agenda.
Between 1990 and 2010, the number of international non-governmental organizations grew at an unprecedented rate, tripling from 20,000 to 60,000. It is clear that there are tens or even hundreds of thousands of people involved in this transborder, truly global market of public services and projects. Today, this infrastructure, predominantly nurtured and financed by Western nations, is struggling for its existence and criticizes the new legal realities.
Researchers have done a good job of studying the mechanisms of using NGOs and their associated communities to mobilize protest movements during “color revolutions,” for example, in Ukraine in 2013–2014. Naturally, the transborder infrastructure included more than just “political” NGOs. It offered vast opportunities to interfere in domestic politics and lobby for the interests of foreign powers and TNCs. The color revolutions were just one of the visible symptoms of a deeper, multifaceted process that extended into such areas as education, culture, social policy, healthcare, energy and food security.
The U.S. itself dealt the heaviest blow to the activities of the transborder “network of color revolutions” when in 2018 it took decisive action against the Chinese presence in American universities and research centers.
This included a famous law banning Pentagon funding for universities hosting Confucius Institutes funded by the Chinese government. Coupled with an aggressive media campaign, this measure made it possible to expel almost all Confucius Institutes—more than 100 of them—from American campuses. The U.S. Department of Justice then launched the China Initiative, investigating U.S. researchers who collaborated with China for potential information concealment.
The U.S. led its fight against foreign influence through various channels in a “dispersed” manner, frequently making use of the famous FARA. If the U.S. no longer wanted to play by the old rules, it was hard to expect other countries to do so.
Reasons for limiting foreign influence
Experts are debating various “structural” reasons behind the current wave of laws regulating foreign influence. These include the shaping of a global environment for information flows, rapid digitalization, the rise of new media capable of deeply influencing human psychology, as well as escalating geopolitical rivalry.
While these factors undoubtedly play a role, attention should also be paid to a parallel process unfolding as states increasingly resist foreign influence.
The issue at hand is the devaluation of democratic practices, in a way. The “thinning” of democratic participation is nothing new. The concepts of “elitist democracy” gained traction several decades ago, drawing on quite old ideas of Joseph Schumpeter. In simple terms, it is fair to say that this model assumes that ordinary people should have little to no involvement in real politics, limiting their role to voting in elections, where the parameters, such as candidate selection, are predetermined for them.
Nevertheless, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the U.S. tried to emphasize the ceremonial and visible adherence to democratic principles as part of its foreign policy to expand influence. Politics is the art of the possible, so these appearances were often sacrificed for pragmatism, with the global media conglomerate glossing over the gaps.
However, it seems that maintaining appearances is no longer a concern as of late. The decision to forgo presidential elections in Ukraine and Georgia is telling. Meanwhile, no one looks troubled by the obvious parallels between the actions of Georgia’s president and protesters and the 2021 Capitol insurrection in the U.S. In Moldova, the elections were held worse than ever, with the Western diaspora playing the decisive role, yet the results were immediately recognized in the West. In Georgia, where the victory of the ruling party was more convincing, the West did not recognize the outcome and is instead backing attempts at another color revolution.
The rejection of old restraints is evident in the U.S. itself. The use of the U.S. judicial system to attack Donald Trump speaks for itself. The very principle of freedom of speech is increasingly compromised by the now ubiquitous bans on the expression of the majority in the name of minority rights and “positive discrimination.”
The masters of the Western-centric international system have never been rigorous in observing “democratic principles.” Still, some commitment to at least a semblance of common procedures and rules created a degree of predictability for elites, including American partners and satellites.
Erosion of the world order
What we see now points to the complex nature of the ongoing processes. In this light, the wave of laws regulating foreign influence reflects a decline in overall trust toward the Western-centric international system. More broadly, it signals the erosion of the legitimacy of the post-bipolar world order, including its Yalta-Potsdam institutions.
The issue of power and control has overshadowed the issue of rules and principles, as clearly seen in the cases of U.S. and EU pressure on Georgia and their support for Moldova.
Under these circumstances, even governments that support European integration are no longer willing to be a revolving door for transnational “civil society.” Standards and rules provide less and less protection to anyone. Tomorrow, your government may face demands for another concession—for example, joining restrictions against Russia—and find itself transformed from an ally into a target for the transborder infrastructure for influence.
Laws to regulate foreign influence are serving not only as instruments of national security but also as tools for strengthening one’s bargaining power in a world that no longer feels legitimate or safe.
Of course, in some cases, there is a certain amount of populism involved. It is easier to shut down Confucius Institutes than to reverse the deindustrialization of the U.S. Although that can also be influenced by draining European capital. This raises the question of when the instruments designed to counter foreign interference in EU states will be used against their own members. Notably, in 2023, open accusations were made (so far at the expert level) about German political foundations promoting German energy interests in France through criticism of the latter’s nuclear industry.
For those who support and profit from globalization, what is happening now is seditious. However, foreign interference and the struggle against it have been natural parts of history, appearing in various forms across the centuries. The past three decades are no exception, it is just that it was not common (and, for many countries, too risky) to draw attention to it.
Perhaps we are simply returning to historical “normality,” or rather, to another round of rivalry among states and the assertion of sovereignty.
This short article is part of a study carried out under the Russian Science Foundation grant No. 22-18-00723 “Interference in Domestic Affairs amidst Great Power Politics.” Link: https://rscf.ru/en/project/22-18-00723/