Constitution on Pause: How the Monopoly of Power and Martial Law Reshaped Ukraine’s Power Structure

Since Volodymyr Zelenskyy came to power in the spring of 2019, Ukraine’s political system has seen fundamental changes. The ongoing transformation goes beyond formal institutional logic and is taking on more and more distinctly authoritarian features. The centralization of power dramatically accelerated after hostilities broke out in 2022, and defense and security became top priorities. Since then, decision-making has effectively drifted from a semi-presidential system to a more rigid presidential model. While the formal role of parliament and other institutions remains unchanged, in practice, key decisions are now concentrated in the hands of the executive. The Office of the President of Ukraine and the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) emerged as the main centers of this new power structure. As a result, extrajudicial methods of governance have expanded, the system of checks and balances has weakened, and the independence of such institutions as the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament), the cabinet of ministers and courts has declined. At the same time, pressure has grown on the opposition and oligarch groups, who held sway in parliament, the media and government appointments.

These developments reflected an institutional drift from a parliamentary republic toward personalist rule, where the executive disregards the separation of powers and consolidates real authority in the hands of a few.

Future political landscape: possible scenarios

The future of the political system in Ukraine remains uncertain and depends on several factors, including the course of the conflict, the stance of Western partners and the readiness of Ukrainian society to return to legal and democratic procedures. Three scenarios seem possible.

First, institutionalized authoritarianism. The current power structure with an outsized role of the president’s office would be kept in place; there would be stage-managed elections with no real competition (and potentially popular candidates^** such as Ukraine’s Ambassador to the UK and former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, would not be allowed to run); and control over political life would increase through extrajudicial means.

Second, controlled democratization. Political competition would be partially restored with moderate opposition allowed back, and the system of checks and balances would be recalibrated while keeping the president at the center of power.

Third, a systemic crisis with the weakening of centralized governance, elite infighting, institutional failure and the need for a fundamental overhaul of the entire power structure.

In each scenario, the degree of power centralization and the elites’ willingness to make institutional compromises remain critical variables. The unfolding transformation of Ukraine’s political regime raises questions about its long-term implications. The consolidation of personalist rule, the rise of extrajudicial mechanisms, and the erosion of checks and balances may lead to a prolonged legitimation crisis and the weakening of democratic institutions. Ukraine’s choice of the future political model will determine not only its internal stability and governance but also its international positioning, including relations with Russia, the West and major centers of power.

Since Volodymyr Zelenskyy came to power in the spring of 2019, Ukraine’s political system has seen fundamental changes. The ongoing transformation goes beyond formal institutional logic and is taking on more and more distinctly authoritarian features. The centralization of power dramatically accelerated after hostilities broke out in 2022, and defense and security became top priorities. Since then, decision-making has effectively drifted from a semi-presidential system to a more rigid presidential model. While the formal role of parliament and other institutions remains unchanged, in practice, key decisions are now concentrated in the hands of the executive. The Office of the President of Ukraine and the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) emerged as the main centers of this new power structure. As a result, extrajudicial methods of governance have expanded, the system of checks and balances has weakened, and the independence of such institutions as the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament), the cabinet of ministers and courts has declined. At the same time, pressure has grown on the opposition and oligarch groups, who held sway in parliament, the media and government appointments.

The growing role of the NSDC and extrajudicial sanctions as a tool for power consolidation

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One of the most striking signs of Ukraine’s new political reality has been the unprecedented expansion of the role^** of the National Security and Defense Council. Once limited in its functions to coordination in national security and defense, this body has de facto gained quasi-judicial powers under Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

What began as a sanctions mechanism meant to target external threats has become a tool of domestic politics. Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his team have used it to sideline political opponents, exert economic pressure and reduce civic space.

The NSDC has been regularly imposing personal sanctions on Ukrainian citizens—politicians, entrepreneurs and journalists—without court decisions and often without publicly disclosed evidence. According to Ukrainian sources^**, over 1,500 Ukrainians are now on the sanctions list. At first, sanctions mostly targeted dual citizens, but since the start of hostilities, the number of blacklisted Ukrainian citizens without foreign passports has grown. Over the past year, 135 such individuals have been sanctioned. Notable additions in recent months include former President Petro Poroshenko, former presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovych^*, journalist Svitlana Kryukova, as well as oligarchs Ihor Kolomoyskyy^*, Hennadiy Boholyubov and Kostyantyn Zhevago, among others.

The formal grounds for imposing sanctions remain confidential. They are enacted by presidential decree following a proposal from the NSDC for a term of up to 10 years or indefinitely. These measures effectively cut off individuals from public and economic life, as they involve the freezing of bank accounts and property, as well as bans on running business, holding employment, launching or owning media outlets, and even accessing basic public services—such as public transport, including trains operated by the state railway company Ukrzaliznytsia. As a result, a flexible and convenient system of political persecution has emerged—one that bypasses the Criminal Code and court procedures, and allows the authorities to isolate “unwelcome” individuals from the social and economic life of the country in no time.

This approach violates the principle of the presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 62 of the Constitution of Ukraine. The Law of Ukraine “On Sanctions” was originally intended to target foreign nationals and terrorists, and only in exceptional cases—Ukrainian citizens involved in terrorist activities. “All these sanctions against Ukrainian citizens are unlawful,” lawyer Oleksandr Leshchenko stressed^**. “If they have committed crimes, they should be prosecuted, and their guilt proven in accordance with the Criminal Code of Ukraine—not subjected to extrajudicial restrictions.”

The de facto replacement of court rulings with NSDC sanctions, which lack effective mechanisms for appeal^**, undermines the foundations of the justice system. Even Ukraine’s Western partners have raised concerns. The European Union, in particular, has called on^** Kiev to cover basic needs such as housing, food and medical care for sanctioned individuals with their frozen assets. Nevertheless, Ukrainian authorities have announced plans^** to further align their sanctions policy with Western countries and have ruled out any revision of their current approach.

Opponents of the government openly call this political repression. Back in 2021, Opposition Platform – For Life (OPFL) party described the sanctions imposed on Viktor Medvedchuk, his spouse and the television networks associated with him—112 Ukraine, NewsOne and ZIK—as an attempt to wipe out the opposition on the path toward dictatorship. Since then, the list of sanctioned individuals has grown longer. The sanctions targeted former Constitutional Court head Oleksandr Tupytskyi; lawmakers Illia Kyva, Taras Kozak, Yuriy Boyko and Nestor Shufrych; businessmen Dmytro Firtash, Pavel Fuks and Vadym Novynskyi; political analyst Kostyantyn (Kost) Bondarenko; journalist and editor-in-chief of the Strana.ua online news outlet Ihor Huzhva, and many others. In parallel, criminal charges were brought against some of them, and several political parties, including OPFL and the Party of Shariy, were suspended or outlawed by court decisions.

Given martial law, the authorities defend these actions as necessary to combat the “influence of the aggressor state” (as Russia is referred to in Ukraine) and “internal enemies.” However, the legal framework of these measures and their selective application set a precedent where judicial power is replaced with political control. Although the NSDC remains a consultative body, it has become an effective instrument of political pressure, unconstrained by judicial procedures or democratic standards.

Concentration of power in the Office of the President and the role of Andriy Yermak

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At the same time, another state institution took a more active role—the Office of the President, which has evolved from an advisory body^** to the head of state into a key decision-making center with powers that go well beyond its constitutional mandate. It is on Bankova Street (the location of the president’s office) where both foreign and domestic policy is shaped, appointments are made, and strategic planning is done.

Andriy Yermak, head of office, played an instrumental role in this transformation. A former film producer and media executive with no prior political experience, he has become Ukraine’s informal second-in-command over the past five years, concentrating the critical instruments of governance in his hands. He is often referred to as the power broker of Ukrainian politics. According to Ukrainian politicians and journalists, he oversees the most sensitive areas—from defense contracts and negotiations with Western countries^** to information policy and coordination of military propaganda.

He combines public activities with behind-the-scenes clout: since 2021, the head of president’s office has been steadily increasing his influence by pushing out rivals from Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s team—among both oligarchs and the president’s friends^** from the production company Kvartal 95 Studio. The dismissals of NSDC Secretary Oleksiy Danilov and Zelenskyy’s longtime friend and top aide Serhiy Shefir in March 2024 prompted political observers to conclude^** that power had shifted entirely to the president’s office and that a hands-on style of governance had settled in. Officials recently appointed to positions in Ukraine’s government and agencies have strong personal ties to Andriy Yermak, including Security Service chief Vasyl Malyuk, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha and Deputy Prime Minister for Restoration of Ukraine Oleksii Kuleba.

Andriy Yermak holds no elected office and does not have a personal political base. As of February 2024, more than 60% of Ukrainians expressed distrust in him, according to pollsters^** Still, Yermak handles negotiations with Western allies, coordinates humanitarian exchanges of prisoners of war and takes part in drafting major policy papers, including proposals for international security guarantees for Ukraine (coauthored^** with former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen) and sanctions measures against Russia (coauthored with former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul).

So the president’s office has transformed from an administrative structure into a full-fledged center of government decision-making. While it technically lacks constitutionally defined powers, the body effectively controls staffing policies in the executive branch and parliament, directs Ukraine’s internal and external communications, and drives the national political agenda. This institutional transformation has narrowed the field for political competition, distorted the system of checks and balances, and ushered in a personalist style of governance.

The constitutional crisis and the canceled presidential election

The question of the legitimacy of Ukraine’s leadership amid martial law has been one of the most pressing challenges to its statehood. Under the Ukrainian Constitution, parliamentary elections were scheduled for the fall of 2023, and the next presidential vote was set for spring 2024. But after martial law was declared, all elections were postponed indefinitely. The Verkhovna Rada refused to begin any election procedures until after hostilities end, citing the legislation on the legal regime of martial law.

And while the powers of parliament are formally extended until “the constitutional order is restored,” no equivalent mechanism exists for the president. The Constitution of Ukraine unequivocally says that the president is elected for a fixed five-year term, and its expiration on May 20, 2024, sparked legal and political debate. The opposition said that Volodymyr Zelenskyy had overstepped constitutional legitimacy and accused him of “usurping power.”

The president and his inner circle (for example, former Constitutional Court judge Mykola Melnyk) invoke Article 108 of the Constitution, which stipulates that the head of state continues to perform their duties until a new president takes office, and Article 19 of the Law “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law.” Shortly before his dismissal, NSDC Secretary Oleksiy Danilov ruled out^** elections during martial law, adding, “We will handle this ourselves, in accordance with our laws and our Constitution.”

Ukraine’s Central Election Commission has taken a similar stance, arguing that in a situation where a vote cannot be held due to martial law, the president’s mandate is extended automatically, as none of the constitutional grounds for early termination (legal immunity, impeachment, resignation or death) apply. However, Article 108 of the Ukrainian Constitution regulates only how presidential powers are exercised until a newly elected president takes office. It does not say what should happen if elections are called off or cannot be held. At the same time, the Constitution lacks an effective mechanism for removing a president whose mandate has de facto run out. The Verkhovna Rada has the authority to call elections but bears no responsibility if they do not take place, which creates an institutional deadlock.

Only the Constitutional Court of Ukraine can deliver a legal judgment on whether the president may remain in office after the end of his term. But no competent authority—including the president, the government, the Verkhovna Rada or other institutions—has made such a request. Although the legal team of president’s office drafted^** a submission to the Constitutional Court in February 2024, it was never filed.

A number of Western partners, despite their political support for Ukraine, have raised concerns about the situation, as the indefinite suspension of elections undermines Ukraine’s image as a democratic state. Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg recalled that democracy cannot exist without elections, while President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Tiny Kox^** stressed the need to maintain electoral legitimacy even during martial law. U.S. President Donald Trump bluntly called Volodymyr Zelenskyy “a dictator without elections.”

The suspension of elections, even if formally justified by martial law, has set a troubling precedent for extending the president’s term indefinitely. Presidential power now lies outside the procedures established by the Constitution of Ukraine, which undermines trust in the electoral system and creates a legal vacuum where legitimacy stems from military and political necessity and elite allegiance rather than democratic mandate. Calling off elections has become a way to hold on to power, while constitutional norms have become subject to ad hoc interpretation.

Erosion of the system of checks and balances

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One key factor behind the consolidation of power in the president’s hands was a unique situation for Ukraine, where it had a single-party majority in parliament. The Ukrainian Constitution was designed to serve as a check on presidential power through an active parliament and an independent judiciary. But after the 2019 election, when the Servant of the People party won an absolute majority in the Verkhovna Rada, parliament lost its policymaking autonomy and became a vehicle for rubber-stamping decisions made by the president’s office.

Between 2019 and 2021, the Servant of the People parliamentary bloc backed every initiative proposed by the executive, including some of the most contentious ones (for example, the law on media concentration, the anti-oligarch law, the land market law, judicial laws and a budget with record-high military spending^**). During that period, the parliament ceased to function as an independent political institution and was reduced to a procedural extension of the president’s office.

The parliamentary group saw growing divisions in 2022 and 2023 amid internal power struggles and a string of scandals involving former leader of the Servant of the People party and parliament speaker Dmytro Razumkov, as well as lawmakers Geo Leros, Oleksandr Dubinskyi and Artem Dmytruk. As party discipline weakened, parliamentary activity plummeted: lawmakers clocked just seven hours of work in March 2023. More than 75% of Ukrainians disapproved of the Verkhovna Rada’s performance in April 2024, according to surveys.

The government found itself in the same subordinate position. Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal lost his autonomy^**, as key appointments were made by the president’s office. In 2023–2024, a series of cabinet reshuffles saw many of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s earlier allies replaced with figures personally loyal to Andriy Yermak.

The judiciary also came under pressure. After the Constitutional Court crisis of 2020, which erupted after judges struck down parts of anti-corruption legislation, Volodymyr Zelenskyy bypassed legal procedures to suspend the head of the Constitutional Court, Oleksandr Tupytskyi and later annulled the 2013 decree that had appointed him. The Supreme Court of Ukraine found these actions unlawful, but Oleksandr Tupytskyi's term had expired by then, so the issue was no longer relevant.

In 2022, Volodymyr Zelenskyy also unilaterally “half-dismissed”^** the head of the Security Service of Ukraine Ivan Bakanov and Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova, even though such decisions formally require parliamentary procedure. The Verkhovna Rada eventually removed them from office, albeit retroactively and with delay.

These developments reflected an institutional drift from a parliamentary republic toward personalist rule, where the executive disregards the separation of powers and consolidates real authority in the hands of a few.

Future political landscape: possible scenarios

The future of the political system in Ukraine remains uncertain and depends on several factors, including the course of the conflict, the stance of Western partners and the readiness of Ukrainian society to return to legal and democratic procedures. Three scenarios seem possible.

First, institutionalized authoritarianism. The current power structure with an outsized role of the president’s office would be kept in place; there would be stage-managed elections with no real competition (and potentially popular candidates^** such as Ukraine’s Ambassador to the UK and former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, would not be allowed to run); and control over political life would increase through extrajudicial means.

Second, controlled democratization. Political competition would be partially restored with moderate opposition allowed back, and the system of checks and balances would be recalibrated while keeping the president at the center of power.

Third, a systemic crisis with the weakening of centralized governance, elite infighting, institutional failure and the need for a fundamental overhaul of the entire power structure.

In each scenario, the degree of power centralization and the elites’ willingness to make institutional compromises remain critical variables. The unfolding transformation of Ukraine’s political regime raises questions about its long-term implications. The consolidation of personalist rule, the rise of extrajudicial mechanisms, and the erosion of checks and balances may lead to a prolonged legitimation crisis and the weakening of democratic institutions. Ukraine’s choice of the future political model will determine not only its internal stability and governance but also its international positioning, including relations with Russia, the West and major centers of power.

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** The link to the resource has been removed in compliance with Russian law. The editorial team has verified that the quotes and information in the article match the media reports.