An Agenda for Reset-2

On August 7, Obama in fact refused to meet Vladimir Putin in Moscow because Russia had extended a temporary asylum to ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden. The possibility of Obama's refusal to come to Russia altogether cannot be ruled out. "Reset-2" has yet to take place the way it was planned in winter 2013.

This summer, Russian-American relations became focused on "reset-2". The idea emerged in late January 2013 when the Obama administration attempted to revive strategic dialog with the Kremlin. The popularity of "reset-2" or the "minor reset", went up after Secretary of State John Kerry visited Moscow on May 7, 2013 and the parties agreed to resume the BMD/START talks and convene an international conference on Syria, and peaked on June 17 at the G8 forum in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, where Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama signed the Agreement on Securing and Destroying Fissile Materials for Prevention of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In July, emotional tensions within the bilateral relationship soared due to the Snowden affair and the DoS declarations on possible expansion of the Magnitsky List. Some reports also mentioned the likely cancellation of Obama's visit to Russia next September and even a U.S. boycott of the Sochi Olympics. These predictions were not unfounded, since on August 7 Obama in fact refused to meet Vladimir Putin in Moscow because Russia had extended a temporary asylum to ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden. The possibility of Obama's refusal to come to Russia altogether cannot be ruled out. "Reset-2" has yet to take place the way it was planned in winter 2013.

Until the late 2000s, the U.S.A. and Russia had been building their dialog upon the imposed consensus model, based on gradual engagement of Moscow in political and economic relations on U.S. terms, and its soft subjugation to American influence (as was also intended for the U.S.A.'s other partners). In fact, American diplomacy had been imposing its vision of global problems on Russia and presenting the process as a stream of consensus solutions and mutual compromises. The "minor confrontation" of 2007-2008 peaked during the five-day South Ossetia war, after which the model ceased to exist [1].

The problem seems to lie in the fact that during the past five years Russia and the U.S.A. have failed to build a constructive alternative to the imposed consensus system. The Kremlin-White House interplay is limited by a negative agenda that boils down to lowering the risk of an uncontrollable confrontation. During the past 20 years, no positive agenda for a true Russian-American partnership has been formed. As a result, the long-term negative trends in the bilateral relationship continue to accumulate.

Reset-1: Reasons for Failure

Photo: Ruvr.ru
Signing of New START treaty in Prague, 2010

In speaking of Russian-American relations, one should note their similarity to the pattern of Soviet-American interaction. The two countries keep building dialog on the basis of mutually assured destruction, with no stabilizing economic cushion created during the past 20 years. At the same time, Russia is a key country in terms of U.S. strategic priorities. Pundits in both countries often insist on the decrease of Russia's role in American foreign policy, but the present author does not consider this to be the case. Russia is still the only country technically able to annihilate the United States, and manufacture types of weapons analogous to U.S. ones. Hence, any U.S. administration will prioritize reducing Russian strategic potential, while Russia will work to maintain nuclear missile parity.

The reset proclaimed by Vice President Joseph Biden at the Munich Conference on February 9, 2009 remained within the "negative agenda", aiming to handle three practical tasks:

• to prevent a collapse of the arms control regime because of the expiration of START-1 (1991);
• to lower the threat of a military collision between Russia and the U.S.A. after its increase during the five-day war in August 2008;
• to prevent extension of conflicts in the strategic sphere, as seen in the series of diplomatic clashes in 2007-2008.

By mid-2010 this negative agenda was exhausted. The two sides attempted to change over to a positive agenda, which immediately unveiled divergent strategic interests.

President Medvedev and later Vice President Biden attempted to find new priorities in the economic and humanitarian areas, but to no avail. First, Washington seemed to be interested in the reduction rather than the modernization of Russian defense potential. Second, the sides were too far apart on “humanitarian issues”, as became clear during the Magnitsky and Bout episodes. The Obama administration supported Russia’s admission to the WTO and pushed Congress to abrogate the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment, but the sides failed to begin talks on trade accords.

Nor was there any success in creating mechanisms for Russian-American cooperation in the Pacific. During the last four years, there has been a lot of talk about possible economic cooperation in the region. Proposals ranged from a free economic area in the Bering Sea to concessions for American firms for development of the Russian Far East, with the most ambitious project, A Northern Alternative to ASEAN, put forward by the Brookings Institution. However, by the 2012 APEC Summit in Vladivostok, all Pacific cooperation projects came to a standstill as Moscow was consumed by fears that the Obama administration was using the integration schemes to undermine the Russian-Chinese Grand Treaty of 2001.

In the absence of a positive agenda, the strategic dialog disintegrated [2] and in mid-2010, the BMD conflict came to a head [3] . The preamble of the START-3 Treaty specified the connection between reduction of strategic offensive and defensive weapons. Russian diplomacy regarded the wording as a U.S. commitment to limitation of BMD systems, while the American side interpreted it as a suggestion for the future. The sides failed to reach a compromise at the Russia-NATO Council negotiations in Sochi on July 3-4, 2011. On November 23, 2011, President Medvedev warned that in response to the deployment of American missile interceptors in Europe, Moscow was reserving the right to pull out of START-3. On March 7, 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said “Russia has no veto over what we do in NATO” [4], which effectively brought the "reset" to an end.

The Legitimacy Conflict

Photo: RIA Novosti
Barack Obama is signing Magnitsky Act

By adopting the Dima Yakovlev Law, Russia has shown that it does not consider the U.S. to have an exclusive right to "punish" other states.

Against the backdrop of the terminated "reset", the conflict spilled over to domestic affairs. In spring 2011, Washington started to send explicit signals that it preferred to deal with Dmitry Medvedev rather than Vladimir Putin. The Obama administration may have considered Medvedev more likely to to compromise based on the disarmament talks, or may have been willing to play on the differences within the Russian elite. In any case, the White House appeared unfriendly to Putin.

The move revealed a negative trend towards the personalization of Russian-American relations. In the period following World War II, the U.S. establishment used to accept any Soviet or Russian leader. American media could profoundly denigrate Joseph Stalin, Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov or Boris Yeltsin, but in terms of practical policy Washington maintained a dialog with any leader of the USSR or Russia. But in 2011, the White House for the first time opted to link the bilateral relationship to a specific Russian head of state.

In the mid-1990s, Washington took up a new means for pressuring Russia, namely by opening criminal cases against Russian businessmen and government officials. The December 6, 2012 Magnitsky Act has brought the trend to a new level. The legislation provides for limitations on the entry in the U.S.A. and seizure of assets of Russian officials considered by the Americans to be involved in the death of Sergey Magnitsky and found to violate human rights in Russia, even though their guilt has never been proven by any court. Regardless of its motives, the Magnitsky Act has shown that the United States denies the right to legitimacy to a certain segment of Russia's elite.

Moscow responded in kind, as on December 28, 2012 the Russian president signed the federal law "On Measures against Individuals Involved in Violation of Basic Rights and Liberties of the Citizens of the Russian Federation". The law prohibits entry into Russia and specifies seizure of assets of U.S. citizens connected with human rights violations or crimes against Russian citizens, with Article 4 banning the adoption of Russian orphans by Americans. At the same time, the Russian Federation terminated the Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Regarding Cooperation in Adoption of Children of July 13, 2011.

At first sight, the American public's acute reaction seemed strange, as apart from Russia there are about 200 countries that can be used as sources for adoption. However, this is not the point. Over the last 30 years, the U.S.A. has prolifically employed "punishment" of foreign states in its foreign policy. By adopting the Dima Yakovlev Law, Russia has shown that it does not consider the U.S. to have an exclusive right to "punish" other states.

Why Reset-2?

By early 2013, the Kremlin and White House decided that it was necessary to lower tensions, as the snowballing conflict could mean an end to the disarmament talks which serve as the basis for the bilateral relationship, as well as to both sides' refusal to recognize each other's legitimacy. Hence, Moscow and Washington opted to restore contacts.

Resumption of the dialogue was, as per tradition, assisted by the end of the electoral cycle. Late in 2011 and early in 2012, many Americans believed in the need to weaken Vladimir Putin's positions and thus make him more eager to compromise with the opposition. They believed that this would make the Kremlin more prone to concessions vis-à-vis the White House.

However, by early 2013 the Obama administration seemed to have realized that Putin's repeat accession was to last, and that they had to do some fence-mending. The Kremlin, in its turn, became aware that in the foreseeable future it would have to deal with the Democratic administration. The situation generated mixed feelings. Moscow has always been wary of the hardline Republican stance towards it. But should Mitt Romney have won the presidential race, there would have been no negative legacy between him and Putin. The 2000s have shown that the Russian president finds it easier to communicate with the GOP than with the Democrats. Nevertheless, it was the reelected Obama that the Kremlin had to deal with.

The catch was that neither Russia nor the U.S.A. were prepared to review their long-term strategic priorities. As a result, in 2013 the dialog became even narrower than in 2009-2011.

What Reset-2 is

Photo: Nakanune.ru

During 2012, the Russia-U.S.A. strategic dialogue was practically frozen, with cancelled visits becoming customary. President Putin refused to attend the NATO Summit in Chicago on May 19, 2012 and the G8 meeting in Camp David on May 18-19, 2012, while President Obama did the same for the APEC Summit in Vladivostok in September 2012. Such a state of bilateral relations had previously been seen only in the mid-1980s, during the acute Euro-missiles crisis and the "interregnum" in the USSR.

In early 2013, the sides made their first attempts to resume the strategic dialogue. On February 11, the day before Obama's State of the Union Address, the Pentagon leaked a draft report with proposals to cut nuclear potential by 50 percent of the START-3 levels. It proposed 750-800 deployed strategic warheads and 350-400 delivery vehicles for each country. The idea received cautious support from Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottoemeller during her visit to Moscow on February 14-15, 2013. As for ballistic missile defense, she said that Washington was ready to extend guarantees that the European BMD would not be directed against Russia, but would not limit the number of missile interceptors or their deployment areas.

However, Moscow rejected the American proposals. On February 13, 2013, Alexander Lukashevich, spokesman for Russia's Foreign Ministry, mentioned the possibility of negotiations on a "package agreement" to link the reduction of offensive weapons with limitations on BMD, non-nuclear precision weapons and conventional systems. Lukashevich also said that Moscow would "account for all factors affecting strategic stability, including plans for deployment of the U.S. global BMD system, lack of progress in ratification of the CTBT in the U.S.A. and others from the list of 44 nuclear-capable countries (needed for the Treaty to come into force), unwillingness to give up deployment of weapons in outer space, quantitative and qualitative imbalances in conventional weapons in Europe, etc." In practice, this meant linking the START talks with a BMD agreement. But the sides failed to make progress at the February negotiations.

Moscow's approach differed from its position at the 2010-2011 talks. In those days, Moscow had insisted on signing an additional agreement to START-3 in order to settle the BMD conundrum, whereas in winter 2012-2013 it linked the opening of the START talks with other areas of arms control. This meant Russia insisted on revising the 1989 Wyoming Compromise even more extensively than in 2009.

The second attempt to resume the strategic dialog occurred in summer 2013, when in his Berlin speech on June 19 President Obama called upon Russia to lower the "ceilings" for strategic offensive weapons by one-third of START-3, i.e. down to less than 1000 deployed warheads each. At the same time, Obama appealed to Russia to resume talks on reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, and also proposed to hold a special international summit in 2016 to discuss further efforts of the U.S.A. and other countries to safeguard fissile materials on a global scale. As far as the BMD is concerned, just as in 2010, the White House was prepared only to sign an executive agreement.

Photo: snariad.ru

Russia's response was predictably negative. The same day, President Putin said: "We cannot permit the system of strategic containment to become unbalanced, or the effectiveness of our nuclear arms lowered". Vice-Premier Dmitry Rogozin took an even tougher stance by calling Obama's proposals "unprofessional". There was more to this than the disadvantage for Moscow contained in the White House proposal (namely because tactical weapons are probably the only Russian asset able to compensate for NATO's edge in conventional forces in the European theater). Russia's rejection of American proposals would permit the White House to present Moscow as responsible for torpedoing the disarmament initiatives. The situation would be especially troublesome given the 9th NPT Review Conference planned for 2015.

Obama's refusal to meet Putin in Moscow is a logical outcome of the above events. The Snowden affair appears rather to be a pretext, whereas the real reason is in the inability of the parties to resume a full-fledged strategic dialog. Firstly, the Obama administration has once again shown its unwillingness to deal with Putin's government. Secondly, the White House's decision is a response to the Kremlin's refusal to accept Obama's Berlin initiatives. Washington is willing to resume the strategic dialog only on its terms, a disquieting trend that proves that the Democrats are not prepared for genuine compromises.

Prospects for Reset-2

The future of "reset-2" seems vague. So far, neither Russia nor the U.S.A. appears to have incentives to carry on the strategic dialog. At best, the BMD/START talks could go ahead in slow motion. Nor does this really depend on the administration's party affiliation. Neither the Republicans nor the Democrats are prepared to launch an earnest strategic dialog with Moscow in the absence of deep cuts in strategic potential. The Russian side, on the the other hand, regards the negotiations as a de facto guarantee of its sovereignty. The strategic dialog continues to lack an agenda in the traditional sense.

The Obama administration's priority lies in building a new system for American presence in Europe and Asia. Washington is working on its Trans-Pacific Partnership, meant as an integration association to virtually replace APEC and oppose ASEAN and China. In regard to the EU, the White House has revived the 1995 Transatlantic Partnership project, aimed to set up a free trade area uniting the U.S.A. and the European Union countries. Although many are skeptical, in July 2013 the sides began talks aimed at its realization.

Russia is excluded from both of these projects. Through its disarmament initiatives, Washington is pursuing two goals. Moscow's agreement to cut strategic nuclear forces and tactical weapons would mean weakening its nuclear arsenal. Yet if Moscow rejects the American proposals, it may be accused of undermining the disarmament process. Essentially, this appears to be the entire U.S. agenda where Russia is concerned.

In turn, Russia is building the bilateral dialog with an eye to the current White House policies. Moscow realizes that the Obama administration, first and foremost, is still as adverse to Putin as after Russia's presidential elections of 2012; second, disarmament is Washington's only Russia-related priority; and third, the American attitude to the strategic dialog has remained unchanged since the failed 2011 negotiations. The U.S.A. is prepared to resume dialog only if Moscow consents to further reductions of strategic weapons and tactical systems. At the same time, the American diplomacy is not prepared to compromise on ballistic missile defense. Russia will not maintain a dialog aimed exclusively at diminishing the nuclear factor in the bilateral relationship.

Russia is visibly losing its influence on American policy. After NATO withdraws its forces from Afghanistan in 2014, the alliance will not be particularly dependent on the Russian delivery route. The United States is reviving the AfPak project (an association of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the U.S.A., and possibly India) and trying to form a direct military-political dialog with Central Asian states. America keeps turning a deaf ear to Moscow's signals about launching a dialog on the Middle East and Mediterranean settlement. While listening attentively to Russia's proposals, Washington does not invite the Kremlin to discussions on Egypt, Syria or the Arab Palestine.

It is objectively true that Russia needs some act that will push the U.S.A to resume a genuine – not imitation – strategic dialog. Past experience shows that the trigger could be either Moscow's toughness in a military-political crisis, or major deterioration of Washington's positions.

A Positive Agenda

In order to set the bilateral talks on track, Russia and the U.S.A. need a limited positive agenda. At present it could incorporate three areas.

Number one is transition to a multilateral dialog on strategic issues. If strategic nuclear potentials are to go under 1,000 warheads, then the United Kingdom and France, nuclear allies of the U.S., acquire a critical importance for Russian interests. The tactical missile problem gives rise to discussions over the "German question", largely neglected since the 1980s. Hence, the disarmament agenda should contain new areas:

• a compromise on the British nuclear program;
• engagement of the United Kingdom and France in negotiations on participation in the INF Treaty;
• a discussion on the future of Article VII of the NPT Treaty, which specifies the rules for deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear states;
• a discussion on tactical weapons in the context of the "German question", aggravated after 2009;
• a compromise on the BMD European segment in the Russia-NATO format.

The situation seems all the more interesting as Russia and the U.S.A. appear to have a platform for negotiations, namely the pompously-launched Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative of 2009, which lacks an official status. The project is led by the U.S. Carnegie Corporation, the German Robert Bosch Foundation, and the Russian Institute of World Economy and International Relations, and its experts generate annual reports on key European security problems. The first paper was presented at the Munich Conference on February 4, 2012, but met with skepticism due to a lack of concrete proposals for upgrading the Euro-Atlantic security system.

Number two is the development of economic ties, with the priority being framework agreements for promoting American investments in Russia. The conclusion of another trade agreement similar to the Soviet-American accords of 1972 seems unlikely. At present, this can only mean a nonbinding but symbolically significant document. The most realistic possibility is that of talks on a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), which would require no approval by Congress.

Number three is the establishment of mechanisms for regional interaction, with the focus on the NATO contingent's withdrawal from Afghanistan. For Russia, there are two fundamental issues: 1) what guarantees the U.S.A. is prepared to offer Afghanistan within the AfPak project; and 2) how far Washington is prepared to go in building a dialog with Central Asian countries, a major issue for regional security.

At the next stage, Moscow and Washington might commence talks on stabilizing the Middle East, although the prospect seems uncertain for now.

* * *

Currently, there seems to be no outright crisis in the Russian-American relationship, but psychological aversion is accumulating. To fix the situation, the two parties need to produce a qualitatively new agenda. However, the past 20 years have shown that such an agenda typically emerges only after a major military-political crisis. Currently, the sides are facing the difficult task of proceeding with reset-2 without the now-traditional balancing on the brink of a conflict.

At the same time, Russia and the U.S.A. must take into account the adverse experience of the late 2000s. In early 2010, Moscow and Washington seemed to be overwhelmed by the initial successes of the "reset", with many voices calling for the removal of the traditional arms control agenda and the creation of a "union of new partners". But attempted breakthroughs not only failed, they led to the eventual accumulation of strategically significant problems. This is relevant experience for "reset-2", since in the absence of intricate and painstaking work on traditional military-political problems, Russia and the U.S.A. seem doomed to periodically plunge into minor and major confrontations.

1. A.D.Bogaturov, A.V.Fenenko. The Crisis of the Imposed Consensus Strategy // Svobodnaya Mysl Journal. 2008. № 11. Pp. 5–18.

2. Prospects for Transformation of Nuclear Containment / Edited by A.Arbatov, V.Dvorkin and S.Oznobishchev. Moscow: RAS Institute of World Economy and International Relations, 2011.

3. Such a crisis was initially predicted back in mid-2010. See: R.Gottemoeller, D.Trenin. What Comes After New START: The Goals for Future Arms Control and Security Cooperation. Moscow Carnegie Center. June 25, 2010.

4. Speaking on March 7, 2012, Hillary Clinton said "as the OSCE made clear, there were a number of concerns about this latest electoral process that should be investigated and addressed".