... Akbar Velayati visited Beirut and held talks with the country’s leaders. A day before that, the Royal Saudi Air Defense allegedly intercepted a ballistic missile launched by the Houthis of Ansar Allah at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia immediately accused Iran of aiding and abetting the Houthis and, therefore, of an indirect attack on the Kingdom. Hariri’s statement coincided almost perfectly with an unprecedented “purge” directed by Saudi Arabia’s heir apparent of members of the ruling house that ...
... power rather than a regional, close and hostile power. In addition to that, Russia and Saudi Arabia have proved -to each others- during the past three years they are capable of finding common grounds and pushing their cooperation higher. This is what Iran and Saudi Arabia failed to do in the past thirty years. It is, with no doubt, a result of ideological and non-ideological reasons. Another major development in 2015 was the Iran Nuclear Deal. Apart from the other Global powers included in the deal, it proved ...
On October 5, 2017, along with the historical visit of the King of Saudi Arabia to Moscow, several events were held to focus on the current state of relations and prospects for development of relations between Moscow and Riyadh.
On October 5, 2017, along with the historical visit of the King of Saudi Arabia to Moscow,...
... Federation immediately refuted the reports, but certain differences between the two countries do exist. Moscow continues to support President of Syria Bashar al-Assad. Because of Russia’s stance on Syria, the Arab world perceives it as an ally of Shiite Iran. Saudi Arabia, for its part, cooperates in Syria with varied Sunni groups whose aim is to change the power in the country.
Another potential source of discord are direct shipments of Russian arms to Iran, particularly of S-300 and other surface-to-air ...
... recently met serious opposition even within the Council, which the Saudi leaders had so far considered their own pet structure.
For instance, Oman has been actively reinforcing its ties with Iran. Since 2011, it has conducted
joint naval training
with the Iranian fleet. Moreover, Muscat refused to back Saudi Arabia’s campaign against Saleh and the Houthis in Yemen, instead deciding to take a neutral stance in the conflict, a decision that Riyadh was inclined to view as pro-Houthi.
Another country to have broken from the GCC’s ranks and challenge ...
... were cut off by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi (note that a third of Qatar’s total food imports, valued at USD 1.05 bn in 2015, is shipped into the country via Saudi Arabia and the UAE). What will be the effect, though, on the Sunni alliance led by Turkey and Saudi Arabia, now accused by Tehran of complicity in the twin terrorist attacks on Iran’s Majlis and Imam Khomeini Mausoleum, which claimed the lives of 12 people?
Turkey’s stance will rely on one more factor: against the background of the raging jihad against the Muslim Brotherhood, Ankara cannot leave the following question unheeded: ...
... approach,"
Alliance of GCC and Israel
It is not just the US policy which India has to contend with it is the alliance between GCC countries and Israel. While Saudi Arabia has remained at loggerheads with Israel, recently both are part of the Anti-Iran alliance. Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia along with its GCC partners countries demanded at the Munich Security Conference, that Tehran is punished for propping up the Syrian government, developing ballistic missiles and funding separatists in Yemen. Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir ...
.... Riyadh has come to view the US as sometimes being an unreliable ally, as reflected in its failure to back Hosni Mubarak, and as appearing duplicitous, via its flirtation with the Muslim Brotherhood, and its support for policies that have empowered Iran at Saudi Arabia’s expense, such as the US’ stance regarding Syria, and its spearheading the Iranian nuclear deal.
Diminishing confidence in the US’ willingness to be the regional security guarantor has caused the GCC states to reach out to Russia, ...
... than reflecting the two countries' enthusiasm about the prospects for economic partnership, their excessively insistent statements are being made for the benefit of third countries and domestic audiences.
This does not mean that Russia's work with Iran precludes cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Even so, with investment programmes shrinking in all the oil exporting countries and with the existing strategic contradictions between Saudi Arabia and Russia, Moscow will find working with the two Middle Eastern countries at once to be ...
... will be felt in the entire region for many years to come.
What can external powers do to mitigate the turmoil in the region? To be sure, any external involvement is likely to have only a marginal impact on key regional countries like Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, a new concept of regional collective security proposed by the international community might help to limit the international repercussions of domestic crises like the one that took place in Turkey, and provide for a regional ‘straitjacket’ ...