... the country, the political pressure on Qatar from a number of neighbouring Arab states and the never-ending tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia are just the most graphic illustrations of this dangerous situation [
1
]. In addition, many Gulf countries are becoming ... ... unrest due to increasing volatility in the global oil market and to in-house reform efforts with so far unclear results.
The GCC is in a state of paralysis and its future remains unclear with many implications of the Qatari crisis still present [
2
]....
... of this session.
For instance—what we are seeing from the UAE in the region would arguably look very different if the U.S.-Saudi Arabia-Iran triangle of engagement took a new turn.
Likewise and although its roots are not the same, what we are seeing vis-a-vis Qatar ... ... considerations. And I would add here that I think it was a huge mistake to enact the blockade of Qatar and threaten a fellow GCC state in such a way, it also exacerbated problems in the sub-region. An unintended bi-product by the way is that it actually ...
... and the Gulf. The EU has a specific relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), they have been working on a free trade agreement for some 18 years and it is still... ... are very close to Europe. In terms of the trend, Europe is increasingly engaging with Saudi Arabia in terms of security, in an assortment of economic projects, religious... ... militias.
Also, over the past 6–7 years, Qatar has started to work very closely with Iran, while Saudi Arabia and Iran have hostile relationships. Iran is responsible for...
... instance, Oman has been actively reinforcing its ties with Iran. Since 2011, it has conducted
joint naval training
with the Iranian fleet. Moreover, Muscat refused to back Saudi Arabia’s campaign against Saleh and the Houthis in Yemen, instead deciding to take a neutral stance in the conflict, a decision that Riyadh was inclined to view as pro-Houthi.
Another country to have broken from the GCC’s ranks and challenge the Saudis’ leading role was Kuwait. It also refrained from any military involvement in Yemen, trying ...
... Qatar standing somewhat apart from the others with the support of Turkey outside of Council, and recently to a certain extent Iran and Iraq. Oman and Kuwait are being prudent and are loathe to sour relations with either side. It is important to note that Oman opposed the Saudi initiative to unite the GCC armed forces under a joint military command and refused to support Saudi Arabia’s ongoing military operation in Yemen (nor did Kuwait or Pakistan, despite their close relations with Riyadh).
...
... playing a short-term zero-sum game of one-upmanship against the US from Europe to the Middle East. Russia’s desire to be a global power requires a more nuanced and long term view; especially of the second and third order effects of its actions.
For the GCC states, and especially Saudi Arabia, Russian backing of Iran (through sale of sophisticated military equipment) and its military and political support of the Syrian regime is of grave concern. The nuclear deal has only emboldened Iran’s aggressive actions and seen an uptick in its support for terrorist groups ...
... never “openly interfered militarily” in Palestine, Yemen or Bahrain. This rhetoric helps the authors not only blow the Iranian threat out of proportion (perhaps because of the Center’s close ties to security services), but also project Saudi Arabia’s national concerns to all countries in the region.
Finally, trumpeting the “Iranian factor” helps sideline the question of domestic threats to the security of the GCC countries. This discourse is turning Iran into an eternal and irreconcilable enemy of the Arab states and the source of all evil – replacing Israel, of which the report makes no mention at all.
REUTERS/Faisal Al Nasser
Igor Ivanov:
Is a Collective ...
... its diplomatic ties and trade was largely a symbolic gesture because there is not much of either in their bilateral relations. Saudi Arabia was likely betting on Tehran’s more bitter and aggressive reaction such as publicly rallying support of Saudi Shia or even shutting the Straight of Hormuz which would have had negative consequences for all of the GCC.
The reasons why the Saudi leadership makes risky moves in its Iran policy are multifaceted. Riyadh openly opposes the nuclear deal that was reached between Iran and the six world powers in ...
... initiation, with significant consequences for the strategic balance. The latest critical development has been formal intervention by the Russian Air Force. This comes at a time when the long-term regional role of key players such as the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, remains up in the air.
Russian and GCC commentators are well-acquainted with the Iranian and Western views regarding this crisis. However, Russian and GCC commentators are comparatively uninformed about each other’s perspectives regarding this key development due to the nascent nature ...
... production and its ability to influence the market. During OPEC’s November 2014 meeting, the organization officially abandoned its role as a swing producer by refusing to cut production and support oil prices.
Some analysts speculated that a Saudi-led GCC decision in OPEC was targeted against Iran and Russia. Saudi Arabia has had its own experience with such market conditions in the 1980s and does not want to repeat the same mistake for the sake of other producers’ benefits. Saudi oil minister Ali Al-Naimi was very clear in explaining Saudi oil policy: ...
