... Kremlin’s ability to pursue even limited collaboration with the West in the MENA region, like in many other parts of the world. The evident lack of trust between Moscow and Western capitals might complicate many regional problems, including resurrecting the Iranian JCPOA, maritime security arrangements in the Gulf, deconflicting in Syria, and multilateral mechanisms for dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If Russia, alongside China, the U.S., and the EU, approaches the MENA security problems as a zero-sum game, this is likely to further complicate ...
...
Ruslan Mamedov
, MENA Program Manager, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)
Discussion points:
Causes for previous failures to build a regional security
Ways to facilitate talks in post-JCPOA era
Changes and role of Russian policy in the Persian Gulf
Biden administration policies and its influence on Saudi-Iranian talks. Impacts of Iran’s presidential elections on regional talks
Working language: English.
June 28, 2021, 15:00 GMT+3
The event will be streamed online via RIAC website, YouTube channel, and RIAC page on Facebook. Please, leave your questions ...
... existing security problems in the region but to provide more predictability and mutual confidence in dealing with unavoidable micro-, mini- and mega-crises which are already looming on the horizon. In that spirit, I offer the following suggestions.
Iran and the Gulf Arab states have an immediate interest in taking care of their security interests by themselves, at least in terms of crisis prevention and crisis management. Let us elaborate a little on this point. If ‘deterrence’ has been partially ‘re-established’ ...
... Initiative; Gurvan Le Bras, Deputy Director at CAPS (Centre for Analysis, Planning and Strategy); and Mahaut de Fougières, Policy officer at Institut Montaigne.
Russian and French experts discussed the approaches of the two states to security in the Gulf region and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on regional conflicts. Particular attention was paid to the dynamics of the U.S.-Iran relations and the motives of the two states in implementing their policies in the region. The discussion also touched upon the topics of regional competition, for example, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel. Russian and French ...
... if America is going in another direction. If the US is pro escalation or de-escalation, for instance, favouring knockout wins or balances of power.
I am not saying that local actors do not have agency, far from it. They have agency including on this Gulf issue, but where America puts its thumb down on the scales, has a major impact.
My focus is on the Saudi-Iran fault line, not because it’s the only fault line, but it is a defining fault-line, and I take that to be the subject of this session.
For instance—what we are seeing from the UAE in the region would arguably look very different if the U.S.-Saudi ...
... potentially prolonged war that bears enormous risks and could weaken Trump positions in the elections. In addition, a system of linkages with different non-state actors in the Middle East, built by Iran for decades, increases the risk of an asymmetric Iranian response and threatens US allies in the Persian Gulf and Israel.
Such a war would have affected global markets, given the importance of the Middle East to world’s oil trade. Any escalation threatens the safety of navigation through the strategically important Strait of Hormuz. 20.7 million barrels ...
Iran and the Arab states of the Gulf would gain from taking control over their security interests
The beginning of 2020 was marked by yet another major crisis in the Middle East region. The crisis culminated with the US elimination of General Qasem Soleimani and could have slipped ...
... international naval interaction in the Persian Gulf should allow the countries involved in the confrontation to open a dialogue on naval doctrines, hold regional meetings between ministers of defense and set up hotlines between military agencies.
At some stage, Iran and its current opponents in the Gulf could agree to exchange preliminary notifications on plans to conduct naval exercises and hold air force training flights, as well as on exchanging observers at exercises and providing each other with data about purchases of naval ships, submarines,...
... problems of Syrian settlement, the ongoing civil war in Yemen, and overcoming the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The meeting in Rabat was devoted to the ongoing escalation of the US-Iran relations, threats of military-political escalation in the Persian Gulf zone, the search for Iran’s integration models, and the regional security system. The Russian side was represented at the meeting by Andrey Kortunov, RIAC Director General, Irina Zvyagelskaya and Elena Suponina, RIAC experts.
... been the Assad regime: though secular in ideology (Ba'athist), it is headed by Arab Alawite (a sect of Shiite Islam that is a small minority in Syria) Bashar al-Assad and is controlled mainly by Alawate Shiites. It is backed by Shiite Persian Iranians and the Arab Shiite Lebanese militia Hezbollah. Sunni Muslims, in general, do not like Shiites, and that is an understatement; many Sunnis do not even consider Shiites to be Muslims. That is why so much money from rich Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar is going to fund, train, arm, and equip Sunni jihadist extremists like ISIS to go fight Assad’s regime, and this has been the case for a while now. It is part of the reason why the Syrian Civil War is so ...
