... blocking Azerbaijan’s maximalist aspirations.
Jens Stoltenberg’s visit to Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi in March 2024 was quite revealing in this regard. Brussels believes now is the time for geopolitical homogenization of the region. The crisis in Russian-Armenian relations, Georgia’s desire to monetize its status as a NATO “aspirant” as soon as possible, the bolstered cooperation between Baku and Ankara (NATO’s second largest army) – all these factors work to promote the West’s agenda. However, the mosaic in the Caucasus is multicolored. And the Alliance (along with ...
... which have a strategic dimension, is in transport and logistics. Both countries are interested in the implementation of the Persian Gulf-Black Sea international transport corridor. This project
is designed
to link India to the EAEU and EU markets via Iran, Armenia, Georgia and the Black Sea, especially given the fact that India is facing logistical problems connecting with the EU both via Russia, due to the conflict in Ukraine, and via the Suez Canal, due to traffic congestion and growing tensions in the ...
..., but also the two Turkic allied countries. Of course, Ankara and Baku would prefer a corridor that would pass through today’s Armenian territory, but without Yerevan’s effective control (the question of formulas is secondary here).
Not only the Armenian leadership but Iran, too, do not agree with this approach, because Iran fears robust pan-Turkism along its own borders. Hence Tehran’s growing interest in what transpires in southern Armenia. The Islamic Republic does not recognize self-proclaimed entities (this applies ...
... Their skilful implementation will benefit the country. Like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan is benefiting from rising energy prices.
Armenia, Georgia and Kazakhstan can be considered the main beneficiaries from migration from Russia. At the same time, the question ... ... significant increase in fuel prices, which will also inevitably affect economic growth.
Finally, two other neighbouring countries, Iran and North Korea, should be mentioned. Tehran has a unique window of opportunity. The risk of a shortage of oil in the world ...
... Meanwhile, the share of
Belarus
and
Kyrgyzstan
is almost next to nothing.
Relations between Tehran and Yerevan are somewhat different. Armenia
makes up
approximately 15% of all trade with the EAEU. Additionally, more than 25% of all EAEU imports from Iran go to Armenia. Armenia is thus a valuable partner for Iran, purchasing food and industrial products, as well as oil and gas from the country. These special relations are reflected in the fact that Iran makes up almost 9% of Armenia’s trade turnover.
Definite ...
... stands to benefit most from trade with Iran, as the country is under the economic blockade of Turkey and Azerbaijan and has no common borders with EAEU member states.
The Armenian leadership considered building a third high-voltage power line between Iran and Armenia, as well as the North–South highway, the Meghri hydroelectric power station, and the Meghri Free Economic Zone as the main incentives for Armenia–Iran trade relations. But these projects have stalled in recent years due to economic and domestic ...
... spoke about the key issues of the international agenda that will be discussed at the forthcoming UN General Assembly, including the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, end of the war in Ukraine, reduction of tensions over the nuclear deal with Iran, and Turkey's heated relations with the West.
- Andrey Vadimovich, how do you assess the prospects for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia on the fields of the UN General Assembly?
- Any meeting between high representatives of these two countries is very important, since contacts, exchange of positions, comparison of viewpoints, perhaps the establishment of relations are maybe small,...
... as is also the case with Moscow. As for the European Union, Brussels
has no independent peace-making projects
with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh. France is the European Union’s representative in the Minsk Group.
The Neighbour Factor: Turkey and Iran
It is impossible to achieve a settlement of the ethno-political conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan without taking into account the interests of neighbouring powers, Turkey and Iran, both of which claim the role of independent actors with interests different from those of Moscow and Washington.
Russia and the West are far from ...
... opportunities for Yerevan — depending on how well Armenia will manage to cooperate in economic and security spheres in a more competitive environment. The two indicators for these relations will be the railway construction project and transit of Iranian gas through Armenia.
Azerbaijan will continue to remain the major threat for the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia. Gas exports will not be able to compensate for Azerbaijan’s dwindling oil production, even after the completion of the second stage of ...
