... and dialogue can and should exist. Such formats include bilateral security treaties and agreements, such as the recently concluded Russia-DPRK and Russia- Iran treaties, multilateral agreements, and established international organisations, such as the SCO, the CSTO, and the EAEU, to name a few. The Eurasian security architecture is unlikely to be made part of a single and consolidated institutional system. At least such a rigid institutional structure is unlikely to materialise any time soon. The Eurasian security architecture has greater prospects ...
... between the two countries.
In recent years, the SCO has increasingly been portrayed as a platform for constructive discussions on security—in other words, without excessive ideologization and politicization. Russia has been particularly insistent on the SCO’s central role in Eurasian security, arguing that the organization should lay the foundation for a new system of cooperation among states
in line with the Shanghai Spirit
, which would replace Eurocentric and Euro-Atlantic models. It seems too early to speak of a complete ...
... addressing the North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, Russia relied on multilateral frameworks including UN Security Council solidary voting on economic sanctions against Pyongyang and the six party negotiating mechanism. In the South East Asia region Moscow preferred not to take sides in local territorial disputes and to enhance bilateral relations with ASEAN nations, especially with Vietnam.
Ivan Timofeev:
Eurasian Security Architecture: Five Questions and Five Answers
Since the beginning of the special military operation in Ukraine this approach to the region has changed in a significant way. There are no longer prospects for improving Russia-Japan or ...
... brand-new venue for the parties’ connectivity cooperation [
8
].
Yet, both projects would require from Russia and India significant investment, political will and creativity to not only make them economically feasible, but make sure they fit into broader Eurasian security architecture. And this is where Moscow and New Delhi might face convergence issues. Another challenge is of geopolitical nature, as involving India in Greater Eurasian Partnership proposed by Russia may clash with the fact that its core has long been posited as linking of Eurasian Economic ...
... perspectives may be helpful. In this paper, the author intends to focus not so much on common, but rather on divergent views that should be kept in mind while trying to forge new proposals on security in Asia and beyond.
Threat perceptions
Ivan Timofeev:
Eurasian Security Structure: From Idea to Practice
Needless to say, there is a lot of concurrence between Moscow and New Delhi on a broad range of security challenges across Asia. Both nations are concerned about potential regional crises that might break out in various places of the continent like Afghanistan or Myanmar, in Central Asia, in the Middle East ...
... world order only if it is used to form and develop multilateral institutions. First of all, this concerns Eurasia—the space in immediate proximity to Russia and China. The most optimal format for dialogue on issues related to both the formation of the Eurasian security architecture and the economic development of the Eurasian region is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
The SCO was conceived as a forum for communication between Russia, China and the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), dedicated to maintaining regional security and creating conditions for ...
... requires consensus, addresses a vast array of threats, actively engaging with various international and regional organizations, and has contacts with NGOs and civil society. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev
said
that his country, which chairs the SCO in 2024, “adheres to the principle of indivisible Eurasian security, which implies mutual understanding and taking confidence-building measures. This approach should form the basis of the strategic goal of forming a security belt around the SCO perimeter.”
While political discourse in the West sees ...
... with Central Asian countries, demonstrating an interest in strengthening their “sustainable security.” At the same time, the fact Russia, China, and most of the countries in the region are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization allows the SCO to be viewed as a platform for conducting multilateral dialogue on the issue.
The first step towards developing the appropriate support measures for Central Asian countries is to decide on the main areas for ensuring “sustainable security.” Concepts ...
... regards the problem of regional terrorism and extremism as relevant but not as urgent as for most other regional players.
In addition, a certain difference in the assessment of the SCO’s significance by Russia and China is apparent. For Russia, the SCO’s potential for Eurasian security is largely linked to its anti-Western discourse and forming a united front with China, India, and possibly Iran. The SCO, while failing to offer a consolidated position on the Russian special operation in Ukraine, still “tunes away ...
