... more about protecting its member states from the growing terrorist threat posed by Afghanistan at the initial stage, the Afghan track now remains an important, but not... ... goals and objectives, albeit specific, were difficult to verify in practice, after Russia launched its special operation in Ukraine—as a driver of change and the subsequent... ... countries, including Russia, are members of both structures. Moreover, if we take the Central Asian track, it is the CSTO that remains the real guarantor of high-level security...
On October 6, 2021, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF, India), and Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS, Iran) held a joint roundtable “Developments in Afghanistan and their regional implications: Russian, Indian and Iranian Perspectives”
On October 6, 2021, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF, India), and Institute for Political and International ...
... countries are CSTO members, and they are quite willing to enhance cooperation in the fight against terrorism, separatism and religious extremism.
3. Combatting Cross-Border Terrorism
Russia is keen to combat cross-border terrorism along the axis of Afghanistan—Central Asia—Russia as well as along the contour of Afghanistan—the Middle East—Russia. The threat of militia entering Russia from the Middle East and Afghanistan via Central Asia persists. The same goes for Xinjiang, China, via the respective corridors.
4. Ensuring ...
The value of any potential deal with the Taliban is apparently not entirely clear to Russia, China or any of the Central Asian countries
The value of any potential deal with the Taliban is apparently not entirely clear to Russia, China or any of the Central Asian countries. As a rule, they combine active diplomacy towards Afghanistan with active military preparations, writes Valdai Club expert Vasily Kashin.
The defeat and abrupt withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan, coupled with the instant collapse of the regime it had built in that country, has raised the ...
On July 30, 2021, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) co-hosted a webinar titled “Situation in Central Asia and Afghanistan: Russia’s and China’s approaches”
On July 30, 2021, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) co-hosted a webinar titled “Situation in Central Asia and Afghanistan: Russia’s and China’s ...
... could perceive a Chinese official communication on this subject as a deliberate choice by Beijing to challenge Russian military influence in the post-Soviet space.
Russia’s presence has been limited since the end of the USSR and the end of the war in Afghanistan (1979-1989), and apart from the Russian language, Moscow is now a secondary economic partner in Central Asia, behind China, so the loss of Russian military influence could be misinterpreted.
China and the Water Crisis in Central Asia
While the international community focuses on the Uyghur Muslim and the Wakhan Corridor, the main threat to the Central ...
... greater interaction between countries at that level within the region will bring Russia more benefits than concerns, since it will not be able to become a factor that forms an organised hostility towards Russian interests and values in these countries.
Russia and the Central Asian states jointly touch the southern belt of Eurasia, which includes such states as Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Their own scale and demographics make absorption and full integration with Russia and Central Asia impossible. At the same time, there are historically strong and fundamental ties between this region and such Central Asian ...
... progressive disengagement by the United States and NATO has been considered as a substantial loss by the Central Asian countries. By May of this year, according to the Agreement for bringing peace to Afghanistan, the US should withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. While this event could reshape Russia’s role in the region, the agreement between the Taliban and Washington seems to overlook the potential consequences for the security of Central Asia [
iii
]. Moreover, a widespread fear of Central Asian returnees from the Middle East and the Syrian Civil War grips the whole area.
The fear of spillovers is thus persistently around the corner. As Robert Heinlein stated, “A generation ...
The Working Group on the Future of U.S.-Russia Relations’ Report
Central Asia stands out as a comparatively “nontoxic” region where there are limited, but not insignificant, opportunities for U.S.-Russia collaboration both bilaterally and within multilateral frameworks: in the space industry, civil security, job-creation ...
... and will try to continue this policy for as long as possible.
The
best-case scenario
involves mitigating regional risks in Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Middle East. This would create a favourable environment in which to reduce risks within Turkmenistan as well as the construction of the TAPI pipeline. This scenario would also entail deescalating the confrontation between Russia and the West, as well as the standoff between Iran and the West. This would create the right conditions to build the Trans-Caspian ...