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The emergence of new political formats is usually accompanied by mistrust of the critically minded expert community. However, the emergence of the Russia-Azerbaijan–Iran bloc spanning the western coast of the Caspian Sea could become a powerful impetus for the interpenetration of the three countries’ economies and for institutionalizing political dialog. Are the summit participants themselves ...
... than 24 times greater (187 bcm and 7,7 bcm respectively) [20] . Moreover, in 2014 only 0,2 bcm of Azeri gas was transported via the Russian pipeline system [21] . In 2014 European Union was a major consumer of Azeri natural gas and oil, thus making Russia and Azerbaijan competing parties. However, the incommensurable volumes of production and export between the two countries cannot make Russia see Azerbaijan as a potential opponent at the European market. The South Caucasus region cannot be regarded as a vital ...
... results. Azerbaijan’s attempts to denounce the 1994 tripartite ceasefire agreement that Baku took a shot at immediately after reaching a verbal agreement on a ceasefire (Moscow, April 5, 2016) by the chiefs of the General Staff of Armenia and Azerbaijan, with their Russian colleague acting as a mediator, are unlikely to be regarded as such political accomplishments. In all probability, it is Moscow’s position that appears to play the crucial role in maintaining the negotiation process and the format that have ...
... restrain” Azerbaijan and make it commit to peace process, Aliyev has got blessings for new and ambitious project of the Southern Gas Corridor, originating in Caspian shores of Azerbaijan. Who did lighten up the powder keg, and why? Speaking to Russian independent Dozhd (Rain) TV, the Azerbaijani Ambassador to Moscow Polad Bulbuloghli confirmed, that it was his country to initiate the armed hostilities, and “that will not seize until Armenian troops are on the ground”. He resorted to the common narrative in Baku about being ...
... another partner between Turkey and Russia. Staying in between two allies is harder for them than for any other country. Especially, Russia’s increasing military presence and activities in Armenia in recent months and opening new credits on buying Russian military equipment by Erevan wonder Azerbaijan more, and pushes Baku to keep close military and economic ties with its northern, geographically natural and strategic neighbor. A peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict seems to be delayed due to this military up-building in ...
... particularly the Central Asian ones, was a far cry from Moscow’s and Yerevan’s position. Despite its undisguised pro-Turkish leanings, Azerbaijan most likely will be reluctant to openly support Turkey in the latter’s confrontation with Russia, Azerbaijan seems unlikely to resume large-scale hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh today. Thus, Armenia appeared to be virtually the only CSTO country to publicly support the position of Russia against Turkey. This notwithstanding, Yerevan is not at all ...
... centre of former military, economic and political power, which is now embodied by the Russian Federation as the legal successor to the USSR. Of the 15 former republics of the Soviet Union, four have no diplomatic relations with one another (Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia). Unregulated border disputes are the bane of practically all Central Asian states. Russia and Ukraine have not broken diplomatic relations formally, but relations between the two countries are at their lowest ebb since December 1991....
... Russia’s military-technical cooperation with Azerbaijan has intensified since 2011 [4] , when Moscow began supplying Baku with S-300PMU2 anti-aircraft missile systems, Mi-35M attack helicopters, and then other armaments. However, progress in Russian-Azerbaijani MTC had been notable in previous years too. Moscow has supplied Azerbaijan with such advanced weapons systems, as Smerch heavy multiple rocket launchers, TOS-1A “Solntsepyok” (English: Blazing sun or Sunheat) heavy flamethrower ...
... to the new set of conditions that followed the events of August 2008 [4] . In the politico-geographical introduction to his new report, Jos Boonstra identifies the South Caucasus as a region that “comprises the former Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.” From a legal point of view, he is absolutely right. With the exception of Russia and several countries of Latin America and Oceania, the international community recognizes Georgia within the borders of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, while the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is not recognized neither by ...
... company’s activities came to be associated with Russian big business in general [22] . The hype in the media was compounded by a number of other problems. Yerevan is very sceptical (to put it mildly) of the military-technical cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan (which Moscow needs in order to maintain the status quo in the Caucasus and prevent Baku from being drawn into the Western orbit, as happened with Georgia) [23] . The “case of Valery Permyakov” (January 2015) seriously aggravated ...
| U.S. wants to establish partnership relations with Russia on condition that it meets the U.S. requirements |
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| U.S. wants to deter Russia’s military and political activity |
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| U.S. wants to dissolve Russia |
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| U.S. wants to establish alliance relations with Russia under the US conditions to rival China |
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