... understood how to apply the old rules of ancient Empires. To practice control over a region, one should create smaller groups within, the interests (and treatment) of whom run diametral to one another. The Soviet Union continued this tradition of the Russian Empire, so that in the early stages of sovietization of the entire South Caucasus, the final status of the disputed areas between Armenians and Azerbaijanis was settled by Moscow. Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan became parts of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (AzSSR). The Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party took it upon itself to resolve the dispute for (or against) the local populace....
... with a Muslim country, and of confirming Turkish regional ambitions in the Middle East and the Black Sea. If Turkey intervenes militarily, the only two possible options will be to leave Nagorno-Karabakh to the Azeris or else a military intervention by Russia to support Armenia in its actions in Nagorno-Karabakh, as the Westerners do not want to risk interfering.
Azerbaijan can count on the sporadic presence of Chechens, often mercenaries, who are used to taking part in this type of conflict, as has been the case in Abkhazia and Syria. Mercenaries ...
... in both political and military dispositions. In the first case, we are talking about the opposition of the parties located in approximately the same "weight class", moreover, under the scenario of hostilities limited to the territories of Nagorno-Karabakh (without involving Armenia), direct participation of Russia in the war is practically excluded. The economic and demographic advantage of Azerbaijan, besides a significant gap in the equipment and strength of the armed forces of the parties, creates certain risks of conflict escalation. This is confirmed ...
... Nagorno-Karabakh region, the CSTO indeed proved to be a cosmetic image of Russia-Armenia defence and security relations.
EPA/DMITRY LOVETSKY/Vostock Photo
Murad Gassanly:
Azerbaijan and the Four Day War: Breaking
the Karabakh Deadlock
Moreover, in the light of Russia's procrastination efforts on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia is also eager to gain political dividends from the West on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Furthermore, Yerevan officials are willing to achieve some sympathy prior to parliamentary elections in Armenia, notably after the popular dissent rallies ...
... statement on the settlement of the conflict.
6
. Two exclusive interviews given by President of Azerbaijan
Ilkham Aliev
and President of Armenia
Serzh Sargsyan
to RIA Novosti are telling in that regard. Both presidents expressed a high opinion of Russia’s activity on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
7
. In April 1993, Turkey closed its land border with Armenia (a little over 300 kilometres). Currently, the border
remains
closed.
8
. In 1992, at the initiative of Tehran, then presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, and Azerbaijan’s acting head of state Yagub Mamedov signed the ...
Like all other post-Soviet countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Armenia celebrated its 25th anniversary of independence in 2016, which is a fitting ... ... its relations with not only Azerbaijan and Turkey, but also its major ally — Russia, and indispensable security partner — the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh... ... Quartet on Ukraine.
MilitaryArms.ru
Hovhannes Nikoghosyan:
An Echo of the Little War in Nagorno-Karabakh
Meanwhile, the relations with Brussels and Washington will depend not...
... why, from Moscow’s standpoint, it is necessary to maintain a balance between the parties in order to avoid an aggravation of the conflict. What’s more, arms supplies to Armenia as well as initiatives such as the establishment of a joint Russian–Armenian
military force
not only help maintain a balance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but also bind Yerevan to Moscow with even closer ties and strengthen Moscow’s positions in Transcaucasia.
EPA/DMITRY LOVETSKY/Vostock Photo
Murad Gassanly:
Azerbaijan and the Four Day War: Breaking
the Karabakh Deadlock
...
... with the country’s socioeconomic situation), yet it will be significant in the context of national security. Therefore, the two main points to consider about Mr. Putin and Mr. Sargsyan’s meeting are the regional factor and the factor of Russian-Armenian relations.
The escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh was a serious challenge that jolted Armenia, gave a great impetus to the sociopolitical movement in the contended territory, and made people think about the role of Russia and of the Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Besides the authorities,...
... that will bring the parties back to the negotiating table. In conceptual terms, the answer to this depends on a complex configuration of external and internal diplomatic and military-political factors that have not yet encouraged optimism.
1
. With Russia acting as a mediator, a ceasefire agreement was signed by the respective defense ministers of the three warring parties (Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) and confirmed by subsequent agreements in 1994-1995. See more:
http://www.vn.kazimirov.ru/docs.htm
... of UN Security Council Resolutions of 1993
The four resolutions, adopted by the UN Security Council back in April – November, 1993, have once again been referred to by the government in Baku as allegedly allowing the use of armed force against Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.
AP Photo/Abbas Atilay
Sergey Minasyan:
The Karabakh Dimension of the
Russian-Turkish Crisis
In a nutshell (so much as possible regarding UNSC Resolutions as such), throughout the time when the Security Council had the situation in and around Nagorno-Karabakh under its consideration, along with developments in the battlefield,...
