... deterrence based on the ability to set in motion mutual assured destruction will not be, as it has been so far, the principal element of global strategic stability; it will be the only one.
Reliable round-the-clock communications between the military and security headquarters of the major powers and hotlines between their leaders would help deal with incidents: U.S.-Russian deconfliction in Syria has demonstrated the effectiveness of maintaining contacts. Yet deconfliction has to be balanced against the profound lack of mutual trust between the political and military leaderships of the great powers. Having fewer windows on the opponent—and ...
... Turkey’s strategic plans to complete the creation of a long buffer zone in the north of Syria, which includes Idlib territory to the north of the M-4 road by using the anti-Assad militants under its control. In doing so, Turkey wants to ensure the security of its borders and gain more room for the relocation of Syrian refugees. This time, temporary agreements between the military and the secret services won’t be enough for reliable stabilization. It is time for Russia and Turkey to seek more meaningful compromises based on a common vision of Syria’s political ...
... temporary deployment of US anti-aircraft systems on the Turkish-Syrian border is possible. Meanwhile, Russia's role as a key player in the Syrian crisis is important. Russia, backed by Syrian air forces to Turkey, has said it does not guarantee the security of Turkish flights over the Syrian sky. From Russia's point of view, Adleb and Aleppo are part of the Syrian territory, which is why Syria is seeking to clear these areas of opposition forces and Turkey has entered Syria without permission from Syria and tells Syrian forces not ...
... investment. On the other hand, the fact that no actors in Libya present an equal threat to Haftar may in fact augment the appeal to Russia. Additionally, due to its small population, the price of influence in Libya is smaller than in Syria. Finally, if the Syrian conflict winds down in favor of Russia’s ally Bashar al Assad, the Kremlin will have a newly expanded capacity to focus elsewhere. (3)
Russian options in Libya
Despite its support for the Libyan Political Agreement at the U.N. Security Council in December 2015, soon after the arrival of the U. N. -backed government in Tripoli in March 2016, Russia has been actively supporting forces in the Libyan conflict that are working to undermine the new government. It is hard to explain ...
... Russia’s place in that order. The Soviet Union used to march around the world spending huge resources on a lost ideological cause and an outsize geopolitical ambition. The Russian Federation has learned from this. When it travels abroad, it goes for security buffers as in Ukraine, status as in Syria and mostly money elsewhere. There is no grand design, but a lot of opportunity-seeking, based on the merits of each potential engagement. Russia imposes no models on others and in its present state, hardly serves as a model for anyone.
And there ...
... pictured fleeing Ras al Ain town, Syria on October 9, 2019. © Reuters / Rodi SaidI guess the Russians are now trying to prevent Turkish and Syrian troops from being involved in direct combat and to find a long-term solution to ensure that the northern Syrian security zone is not permanently occupied by the Turkish. But in this security zone are mainly Assad opponents and Turkey-equipped Islamist assassin militia who want to overthrow Assad and continue to fight against him, as well as they want to expel and ...
... disaffection are surfacing more and more often in response to the dramatic financial constraints, growing economic hardship, and loss of life in the Syrian war (Iranians Respond, 2018). Questions are being asked about the limits of Iran’s regional security and Syria’s place therein as a crucial component of its broader strategy in relations with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.
Turkey, which opted for rapid regime change in Damascus and support for Islamist organizations with ideological proximity to Recep Erdogan’s ...
... Nevertheless, Russia has been making deals with Turkey to help Ankara prepare for a potential assault in the northeast of Syria, including a recent — and tenuous — agreement to impose a temporary cease-fire in Idlib that would help Turkey free some Syrian opposition forces for their deployment to the Euphrates area.
Grigory Lukyanov, Ruslan Mamedov:
Russia and Turkey: Approaches to Regional Security in the Middle East
The rationale seems to be that the start of Turkish military operation may in fact benefit Moscow. The calculation is that once Turkey launches its assault and the Americans are unable to provide a cover for them, the Kurds ...
... the profound systemic crisis is yet to be found. Most countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia) have launched the needed socioeconomic reforms, albeit belatedly, but outcomes are difficult to predict. In other parts of the Arab world (Syria, Libya, Yemen), civil war has been the means of resolving questions of power. In these countries there is an inextricable tangle of ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ governments, numerous militias, terrorist groups, and foreign military contingents,...
... Saleh) and Assad fits this model quite well. For Russia, the horror of Islamic State[1] encroachment (which took over pieces of Syrian territory directly because of the state paralysis that occurred due to American support for rebel opposition groups) is ... ... determined. Indeed, it has always been the amorphous and ambiguous nature of rebel opposition to Assad that posed the biggest security threat and concern to the region according to Russian intelligence analysis. Consequently, America has been deemed too ...
