Diverging views of Russia and Iran on Syria are unlikely to cause a true breakdown of their tactical partnership
Russia’s ongoing special military operation in Ukraine has sparked broad and intensive debates about future modalities of the relations between Russia and Iran in Syria.
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... sixth round of the project “A New Agenda for Russia–UK Relations”
On October 27, 2021, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) held a closed workshop on approaches of Russia and the UK in Iran and Syria. The workshop was organized within the framework of the sixth round of the project “A New Agenda for Russia–UK Relations”.
The goals of the meeting were to discuss the interests of Russia and UK in the Middle East, and to search for convergence ...
... to strike a fair balance and/or employ other means to this end.
Andrey Kortunov:
Meeting Security Challenges in the Gulf: Ideal Solutions and Practical Steps
Iran: Recalibrating Russia’s Balancing Act
First and foremost, the strategic dilemma with Iran in Syria must be publicly clarified at the elite and civil society levels. Secondly, Russia has to re-engage Iran more enthusiastically than ever before, with or without the removal of U.S. sanctions. It also must bring India on board as well, taking advantage ...
... solution.
Elsewhere in the Levant, the so-called Kurdish question remains acute. Turkey is
absolutely against
the Kurds having any sort of autonomy in Syria, which could prove problematic for the larger compromise that Russia wants to broker between it, Syria, Iran and the U.S. there. One way or another, all of their interests must be respected. A possible outcome could be Damascus restoring sovereignty over its Northern border region in exchange for Kurdish demilitarization coupled with a broad political and,...
... Iraq, etc.) who feel threatened by increased Iranian military presence in Syria. Therefore, the Syrian profile is largely viewed in the context of US policies towards Iran, Russia and Turkey, rather than as a separate foreign policy concern.
Russia and Iran in Syria and Beyond: Challenges Ahead. RIAC and the Institute for Iran-Eurasia Studies Working Paper
Interestingly, though, the new Administration refused to send its representative to the 15th round of the Astana Syria talks held in Sochi on Feb. 16–17,...
... Both Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran regard each other as necessary components of the regional architecture that they envision for the Middle East. The paper attempts to shed light on the views of Moscow and Tehran on these issues.
Russia and Iran in Syria and Beyond: Challenges Ahead
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... It is predicted that, if Donald Trump prevails, Iranian potential will remain hampered by sanctions, while a Joe Biden victory might cause Washington to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (nuclear deal) and, as a consequence, strengthen Iranian economic presence in Syria. Is it any surprise then that the active exchange of delegations between Russia and Syria in September and October 2020 (the visit to Damascus by Co-Chair of the Permanent Russian-Syrian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific ...
... the intra-Syrian dialogue into a single stabilization package.
Maxim Suchkov:
Russia in the Middle East: “Be with Us — and Remain Yourself”
Another important set of issues raised by our Damascus partners pertains to Russia being “an ally for Syria, Israel, Iran and Turkey” in the continuing conflict and to what the nature of Russia–U.S. contacts is.
It is no secret that the foreign political services of both countries have always maintained a working exchange of current information. This is particularly ...
... period between 2011 and 2015, has given Russia an unprecedented opportunity to launch a new phase in its foreign policy and bolster its position in the world.
Russia’s presence in Syria can thus be explained by the fact that it is difficult to involve Syria, Iran and Hezbollah in the following:
Direct military contact with Turkey, the United States and Israel.
The management of negotiations and settlements with armed groups and maintaining security in areas where settlements have been reached, such as Daraa ...
... cannot be ignored what many observers have said, that the invitation of Iran to participate in Astana talks in 2017 was an attempt by Ankara and Moscow to push Tehran to fulfill its obligations because it is difficult to control groups affiliated with Iran in Syria, and unlike Tehran, Russia has managed to build bridges with the Syrian political and armed opposition through Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Four differences
The differences between Russia and Iran (which have not yet reached a crisis level) in Syria ...