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It was noted that various restrictions imposed by the United States and its allies against Moscow make Russian inspections under New START impossible Moscow has been irreproachably observing the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and responsibility for the escalation of the treaty issues lies entirely with Washington, Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov said....
... significant, relations among nuclear powers are very far from being well-tempered. The situation is heavily overshadowed by disintegration of the arms control architecture, mostly due to the destructive course of the previous U.S. Administration. The New START Treaty is practically the last surviving pillar. Active diplomacy has provided some glimpse of hope earlier in 2021. The understandings reached by the Presidents of Russia and the U.S. opened a window of opportunity for constructive interaction ...
Comments by Andrey Baklitskiy, Victor Esin, Olga Oliker, Alexander Saveliev and Dmitry Stefanovich To mark the anniversary of START I signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991, the Russian International Affairs Council asked strategic arms control experts several questions about the importance of START I and the prospects for new treaties to be signed. Why was START I a breakthrough?...
If New START had ceased to exist on February 5 this year, the nuclear arms control system would have been completely dismantled Now that the New START Treaty is extended, the parties need to make efforts to work out a realistic new agreement that takes into ...
... still time to extend the Strategic Arms Control Treaty, due to expire in early February, even despite the upcoming presidential transition. Anatoly Antonov, whose diplomatic career largely has been spent focused on major arms control issues, said the START treaty is a “key issue” for Russia. “We have time; we can get it done very quickly.” Speaking at a Brookings Institution online forum last week, he added, “we are in close contact with Marshall Billingslea,” the Trump administration’s ...
... authors argue ‘We must reduce the risks associated with keeping nuclear forces on “prompt-launch” status, whereby they are ready for immediate launch and can hit their targets within minutes. The United States and Russia should commit starting discussions on removing a significant percentage of strategic nuclear forces from prompt-launch status at a later date.’ Unfortunately, the implementation of this proposal (with all its theoretical attractiveness) can lead to the absolutely ...
Vladimir Orlov, Leonid Tsukanov
Vladimir Orlov, Elena Karnauhova
