... the global political cooperation between the two states. Today, the question is how to coordinate the two countries' long-term foreign political strategies more closely and promote joint initiatives that concern the fundamental issues of the future world order.
Naturally, Russia and China cannot claim a monopoly for developing new rules of the game for the future global political system. These rules should emerge from negotiations, consultations and discussions within a wide variety of multilateral formats, from global ...
... foreign political achievements over the past 30 years. Moreover, isolation would considerably slow down the process of solving those domestic problems that require the most attention.
Second, the strategy of self-isolation would effectively involve Russia withdrawing from active participation in the creation of a new system of international relations and the construction of the new world order. And a new world order will be created regardless. The only question is the price that humanity will have to pay for it. When the era of instability is over and a form of global governance has been restored, Russia will have to play by rules ...
... population and urban population. Despite the relativity of these parameters, an emphasis on the economy and military potential is typical of universal comparisons. The big problem is how to fine tune the indexes to take into account various nuances. A Russian project, The Political Atlas of Modern Times, by Andrei Melvil et al attempted to take into consideration these nuances plus technological development and soft power indices.
Ivan Timofeev:
A New Anarchy? Scenarios for World Order Dynamics
However, universal power formulas have shortcomings. The first is that any global distribution of power will be asymmetrical. This is a reflection of objective reality and is hardly a drawback of the method as such. Almost any power ...
... Eastern Studies and the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University
The 5th annual report by RIAC, RAS Institute of Far Eastern Studies and the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University presents the сommon views of leading Russian and Chinese international affairs experts on the development of Russia–China cooperation in 2018 and the first quarter of 2019.
The authors analyze the dynamics of Russia–China interaction on the most pressing matters of international and ...
... think-tank or ensemble of think-tanks of Advanced Studies, as an intellectual microcosm or advanced prototype of a strategic alliance (not merely a strategic partnership) seems an imperative need.
Igor Ivanov:
The Belt and Road Initiative: Towards a New World Order
The threat to Russia is nothing less than deeply, profoundly existential. If Iran is disaggregated by military action two things will result simultaneously. In a small scale equivalent of the collapse of the USSR and the dawning of the unipolar moment after the Cold ...
... allegations of FaceApp-related risks, Schumer’s concerns indicate that the U.S. believes the Kremlin and Russian hackers to be one of the key threats. Western politicians’ fears are to a certain extent based on the fact that, after the takeover of Crimea, Russia is viewed as a country that undermines the liberal world order and attempts to promote its own alternative.
It’s easy to understand this thinking if we recall European leaders’ reaction to a statement made by the Russian president in a June 2019 interview with The Financial Times, when he said that ...
... collapse. From this viewpoint, the death of INF is very risky because it might lead us into a world without any arms control whatsoever, not just a world with no bilateral US-Russia arms control agreements.
GT: How would relations among China, the US, and Russia affect world order?
Kortunov:
They would have a very important impact because these countries define the rules of the game. For example, if Russia and the US do not want to disarm, nobody will be ready to disarm. If China and the US cannot agree on free trade,...
... created. It was assumed that this hyper-globalized global economy would become more ambitious in scale than the economic order of the Cold War period. Third, it was important to actively export liberal democracy throughout the whole world.
Igor Ivanov:
Russia, China and the New World Order
The execution of these three tasks fit in with the main liberal theories, such as liberal institutionalism, economic interdependence and the theory of a democratic world. Thus, in the minds of its architects, the construction of a strong, ...
... international security and strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific.
The organizers of the Forum are traditionally Tsinghua University and the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. The main theme of the Forum this year was “Stabilizing the World Order: Common Responsibilities, Joint Management, and Shared Benefits”. Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) has been participating in the event since 2012, since the Forum was launched. Igor Ivanov, RIAC President, made a report at the plenary session of the Forum “Geopolitics and Relations between Major Powers”....
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There were elements in the West, who were satisfied with the way the Cold War seemingly ended, because it looked like the Russian side had unilaterally surrendered. Even then, there was no attempt to implement the Kissingerian formula of drawing in Russia and China into co-managing a world order that was unstable because of the emergence of or transition to multipolarity. The evidence was in 1991 itself, when the last-ditch Franco-Russian formula to avoid or delay a war in the Gulf was brushed aside or ignored. The world order was ...
