... among other things, undermining their fundamental long-term geopolitical construct, which had been used for decades to structure the system and dynamics of regional relations across the Middle East. It was based on the exploitation of Sunni-Shiite and Iranian-Saudi contradictions, into which anti-American and anti-Israeli manifestations were also implanted as a sign of “Shiite” (aka “Iranian”) influence in the countries of this region. The conflict in Yemen has long ago proved its complete unsuitability for analyzing the Yemeni realities. The sociocultural ...
... circumstances, political and economic trends in the Middle East require a degree of theoretical conceptualization. The authors of this report analyze the current political and economic trends in the region’s Arab countries and non-Arab states, including Iran, Turkey, and Israel. Additionally, the authors examine key foreign policy trends in Middle Eastern states.
Regional Trends in the Middle East: Political and Economic Dynamics
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... while others can be questioned or challenged. However, none of the neighboring states have been able to simply dismiss them in the past and will not be able to do so in the future. It should also be remembered that, unlike its Arab opponents or even Israel, Iran is not dependent on external security providers—it is quite self-sufficient, as befits a true joker.
The current situation in the region may well prove to be a historical fork in the road for both Iran and the Middle East as a whole. What will ...
... Syrian-Turkish rapprochement and Syria rejoining the League of Arab States. [
1
]
The crisis in Eastern Europe has been less significant for the region than many other events happening simultaneously inside the Middle East, such as expanding the Abraham Accords, Israel’s deep political crisis, or the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. However, the crisis in Eastern Europe did have an impact on the food security of the MENA region and it also affected negotiations on oil exports within the OPEC+ format. Still, it would be an exaggeration to argue that since the ...
... hawkish part of the Iranian regime in the Khobar Towers bombing and karine missile scandals, and the position of the Revolutionary Guard is even more powerful today with the Raisi government.
To sum up, the risk of a full military confrontation between Israel and Iran with its proxies in the region is really high especially if the United States would not restrain Israel in Gaza. Even more dangerous would be attacking Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian nuclear reactors. Israel and Iran could see that a full military ...
... every street within Israel itself.
In principle, according to the pattern of development of the strategy of the axis of resistance, it is possible to emphasize the possibility and ability of the axis of resistance to launch a comprehensive attack on Israel (and not just adopt a defensive policy), whether through a barrage of drones and missiles from all fronts (Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza), which will be accompanied by an attack electronic, such that the “Iron Dome” defense system is unable to fully confront such a large-scale attack capable of striking and disrupting air and naval bases, army ...
...
report
published by the Tel Aviv-based Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) as Israel’s way toward using the Chinese factor to its advantage over Iran.
Igor Ivanov:
Is a Collective Security System Possible in the Middle East?
China in the Israel-Iran conflict
The report was obtained by
The Jerusalem Post
a day prior to its publication by the INSS to be
posted
with the dramatic headline ‘China could save Israel from Iran – Report’, signifying the growing attention in Israel to China as ...
... combatting terrorism (anti-ISIS coalition efforts), nuclear non-proliferation (revival of the JCPOA), and interacting with actors involved in those issues.
Third, Biden will face certain domestic opposition to some of the Middle East policy issues, e.g. Iran nuclear deal, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, sanctioned entities and so on.
Finally, having different views, approaches and rationale, US allies in the region (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and Israel) could possibly frustrate some of the plans devised by the new ...
... should be more accurately regarded as the vocabulary of Iranian foreign policy rather than its determinant. Nationalism, sovereignty, and regime survival are the more fundamental drivers of Iran’s external behavior.” [
10
]
Only when a pre-emptive Israeli or U.S. strike against Iran will take place, one will almost certainly witness an Iranian retaliatory action against U.S. allies, with the UAE likely to be the first among these [
11
]. If, on the other hand, Iran attacks without provocation, it might only convince other Gulf ...
... There has not yet leaked any indication of exchanging views from Russo-Iranian diplomatic collaborations on how Tehran and Moscow intend to address the issue and how they want to bring their views closer together.
Shifting Russian Rhetoric in Favor of Iran Against Israel
Ruslan Mamedov:
The Biden Administration and Iran Nuclear Deal: More Constraints than Possibilities
Overlooking Israel’s campaign against Iran in Syria has raised critical voices against Russia inside Iran. This compounds societal, historical ...
