... Construction of the gas pipeline with a capacity of 10 billion cubic metres a year is expected to take approximately seven years.
Revitalisation of Ankara’s foreign policy and regional competition in the Eastern Mediterranean While other states in the Eastern Mediterranean (Israel, Egypt, Cyprus, Greece and, to some extent, Lebanon) have attempted to form alliances around the energy sector and gas exports, Turkey has remained on the sidelines. Nevertheless, both the regional reconfiguration and the domestic perturbations that affected ...
... resource suppliers for greater energy security. However, abandoning Russian gas is very difficult since a gas pipeline infrastructure has already been created in Europe, making Russian gas relatively inexpensive. Much will depend on whether Greece, Cyprus, and Israel will succeed in jointly building the
EastMed
gas pipeline meant to deliver gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to Greece. Theoretically,
EastMed
could be extended to other European states. It currently has a design capacity of 10 billion cubic metres, which may be increased by tapping the currently unexplored resources of the Eastern Mediterranean....
... author, 18 February 2019.
5
. Erdogan’s sustained threats and hostile actions (see my RIAC papers), were extended by Defence Minister Hulusi Akar’s incomprehensible statement, in late March 2019, that Turkey “controls” inter alia the Aegean, the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus itself! For a useful key to understanding Ankara’s ongoing propagandistic repertoire, see Costas Melakopides, “Brief Remarks on President Erdogan’s and his Allies’ Methodical Use of Logical Fallacies”, RUDN Journal of Political Science,...
... terrorism (MONEYVAL), was perceived to meet, with only minor deficiencies, all of the standards concerning anti-money laundering and the criminalisation of the financing of terrorism.
In intepretting Russia’s course towards the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, despite some opposite appearances, it seems that all of the countries in the region have been in general of secondary importance for Moscow. Only occasionally have some of them, such as Cyprus in the post-Cold War, acquired a high priority in Russian’s political and economic international relations. These countries play from time to time a important complementary part in Russian aspirations in the region, such as a counterweight ...
