... ultimately adopting the exact same thought process and decision-making for its drone targeting and operational missions. Pakistan and China seem to be openly courting this very behavior today. Middle East Israel Defense Forces (IDF) actually succeeded in destroying a drone that it tracked flying over sensitive military ... ... easily be sucked into regional conflicts where its interests figure prominently. It is inconceivable to think a ‘drone war’ between Iran and Saudi Arabia or Egypt would not end up being a major national security interest for the United States. On that same level Turkey has openly pursued tactical UAVs for its own internal problem ...
... defensive efficacy is a relatively constant and shared weakness across all modern great powers (whether that be the United States, China, Russia, Iran, India, Great Britain, France, etc). In other words, every state that is concerned about the cyber realm from a global security perspective is equally deficient and vulnerable to offensive attack and therefore defensive cyber systems are likely ... ... hold the same potential that made nuclear M.A.D. so effective for so long without being physically challenged through global war: at first nuclear deterrence builds off of the expected second-strike capability, of being able to survive an initial strike ...
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The Antithesis matrix is not a predictor of where revolutions will happen. It is a reminder that societies embedded with multiple forms of social media have the potential to facilitate protest and civil disobedience if other factors on the ground warrant such behavior. It is also a reminder that those regimes where it is likely to have those motivating factors in place should not feel too overconfident in their ability to constrain or co-opt that social media-inspired mobilization: for the matrix ...