... result of internal turmoil. This may, as in 1917, be the result of an unsuccessful war. Hence the bet on a protracted conflict in which they know they have more resources.
Nuclear polycentricity reflects the world’s growing multipolarity
During the Cold War there were five nuclear powers, but then the only real poles were the US and the USSR, plus China with its then small nuclear arsenal. Now Beijing is moving towards (at least) parity with America and Russia, while India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel remain independent players (unlike NATO members Britain and France).
The classic Cold War ...
... pandemic that occurred in 2021 temporarily replaced the war. It had been clear for a long time that the West continued to wage the Cold War against us, but we were waiting for something. Perhaps we were gathering our strength. Probably we did not fully understand ... ... for our country in the world? Who are our allies? Why does no one openly support us as the West supports Ukraine? For example, China.
—
As I have already said, we are acting as an icebreaker heading for a new world, and many countries are taking advantage ...
... functioned mainly on a parity basis. International law continued to be based on the principle of state sovereignty and represented the complex of agreements from which each of
the high contracting parties
could withdraw at any time. With the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR, the collapse of the world socialist system and China’s transition to
a policy of reform and openness
, the sole leadership of the United States became global for the first time in human history.
Pax Americana
system, which covered the Western states and the developing countries for the previous ...
... US-led West to finally resolve the
«Russia question»
and create favorable prospects for victory in the confrontation with China.
Such an attitude on the part of the adversary does not imply room for any serious dialogue, since there is practically ... ... science and technology, culture, and so on) on all fronts. This is no longer a source of discord between the opponents of the Cold War period, who then became (unequal) partners. It looks more like the drawing of a clearer piding line between them, with ...
... other options. And certainly, capitulating to the West is no option for Russia, at this point. Things have gone too far.
Beyond the necessity of an overhaul of Russia’s foreign relations there are real opportunities to pursue. Since the end of the Cold War, the leading countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America have risen spectacularly in all respects, from economically and politically to technologically and militarily.
Even before the outbreak of the
“hybrid war,”
China had overtaken Germany not only as Russia’s principal trading partner, but also as the leading exporter of machinery and equipment to Russia. India, a traditional importer of Soviet and Russian weapons, is now emerging as a major technology partner ...
... inherently unfair to them.
A distinctive feature of the modern revolutionary situation is that all significant global players except the United States are dissatisfied with their position. Russia considers the international order established after the Cold War blatantly despotic, and its actions appear to be most revolutionary. China is following the same path, getting less and less reserved in expressing its discontent. China’s actions are induced by its internal development, not by external pressure, as in the case of Russia, and therefore represent a fundamental challenge ...
... powers can not make the situation better, more stable or predictable.
In this regard participation of Taiwan in the Summit for Democracy did not contribute to strengthening peace and stability in the Taiwan strait. As we emphasized in the joint Russia-China article, the U.S. initiative is an evident product of Cold War mentality, it will stoke up ideological confrontation and create new dividing lines. The U.S. understanding of democracy is inconsistent with the U.N. Charter and other basic norms of international law. No country has a right to judge who is ...
... rivals, this time China and Russia, and attempts to build a new bipolarity, where one pole would be the “world of democracies” led by the United States, and the other pole would be the “world of authoritarians” with the leading roles played by China and Russia. From attempts to universalise the American-centric world order, the United States has moved to its consolidation and defence, and from the “post-Cold War” era to the era of a new global confrontation.
US foreign policy is by no means becoming less ideological. Liberal ideology in its newest left-liberal form is turning from a means of expansion into an instrument for consolidating the “collective ...
... states that Moscow should act as a defender of human rights for ethnic Russians living in the near abroad.
“There are several factors that allow us to talk about good chances for success,”
the professor explained.
Firstly, he claims, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was concerned with enemies on more than one front. Now, with Beijing on the side of Moscow, Russia can utilize China as a strategic resource, he went on to say. Secondly, the country is much more prosperous than it was during the latter years of the USSR. And most importantly, the West is significantly less powerful than it was in the past.
“But, to win even ...
... independent players. The United Kingdom and France, which developed their weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, have always been U.S. allies within NATO, and their weapons were always considered by Moscow to be part of the Western bloc’s combined nuclear arsenal. Cold War-era nuclear bipolarity that coincided with a similar ideological and geopolitical division (China remained largely introverted during that period) transformed into multipolarity. Strategic stability ceased being an issue for Moscow and Washington exclusively to tackle.
When India and Pakistan both acquired nuclear weapons at the turn of the ...