... US-led West to finally resolve the
«Russia question»
and create favorable prospects for victory in the confrontation with China.
Such an attitude on the part of the adversary does not imply room for any serious dialogue, since there is practically ... ... science and technology, culture, and so on) on all fronts. This is no longer a source of discord between the opponents of the Cold War period, who then became (unequal) partners. It looks more like the drawing of a clearer piding line between them, with ...
... other options. And certainly, capitulating to the West is no option for Russia, at this point. Things have gone too far.
Beyond the necessity of an overhaul of Russia’s foreign relations there are real opportunities to pursue. Since the end of the Cold War, the leading countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America have risen spectacularly in all respects, from economically and politically to technologically and militarily.
Even before the outbreak of the
“hybrid war,”
China had overtaken Germany not only as Russia’s principal trading partner, but also as the leading exporter of machinery and equipment to Russia. India, a traditional importer of Soviet and Russian weapons, is now emerging as a major technology partner ...
... inherently unfair to them.
A distinctive feature of the modern revolutionary situation is that all significant global players except the United States are dissatisfied with their position. Russia considers the international order established after the Cold War blatantly despotic, and its actions appear to be most revolutionary. China is following the same path, getting less and less reserved in expressing its discontent. China’s actions are induced by its internal development, not by external pressure, as in the case of Russia, and therefore represent a fundamental challenge ...
... powers can not make the situation better, more stable or predictable.
In this regard participation of Taiwan in the Summit for Democracy did not contribute to strengthening peace and stability in the Taiwan strait. As we emphasized in the joint Russia-China article, the U.S. initiative is an evident product of Cold War mentality, it will stoke up ideological confrontation and create new dividing lines. The U.S. understanding of democracy is inconsistent with the U.N. Charter and other basic norms of international law. No country has a right to judge who is ...
... rivals, this time China and Russia, and attempts to build a new bipolarity, where one pole would be the “world of democracies” led by the United States, and the other pole would be the “world of authoritarians” with the leading roles played by China and Russia. From attempts to universalise the American-centric world order, the United States has moved to its consolidation and defence, and from the “post-Cold War” era to the era of a new global confrontation.
US foreign policy is by no means becoming less ideological. Liberal ideology in its newest left-liberal form is turning from a means of expansion into an instrument for consolidating the “collective ...
... states that Moscow should act as a defender of human rights for ethnic Russians living in the near abroad.
“There are several factors that allow us to talk about good chances for success,”
the professor explained.
Firstly, he claims, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was concerned with enemies on more than one front. Now, with Beijing on the side of Moscow, Russia can utilize China as a strategic resource, he went on to say. Secondly, the country is much more prosperous than it was during the latter years of the USSR. And most importantly, the West is significantly less powerful than it was in the past.
“But, to win even ...
... independent players. The United Kingdom and France, which developed their weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, have always been U.S. allies within NATO, and their weapons were always considered by Moscow to be part of the Western bloc’s combined nuclear arsenal. Cold War-era nuclear bipolarity that coincided with a similar ideological and geopolitical division (China remained largely introverted during that period) transformed into multipolarity. Strategic stability ceased being an issue for Moscow and Washington exclusively to tackle.
When India and Pakistan both acquired nuclear weapons at the turn of the ...
... Eurasian heartland states adequate or is a new, qualitatively more cohesive and integrated security equation, broadly along the geostrategic lines envisaged 70 years ago, an existential imperative?
The main factor which the Soviet leadership of the first Cold War decade thought would tilt the scales of the world balance of forces in its favor was the political unity of Russia and China i.e. the Eurasian heartland. The political split in that unity and the antagonism between the two Eurasian core powers was in fact the tectonic event that resulted in the “biggest geopolitical tragedy” in the 20
th
century. Today that antagonism ...
... moment”—the West’s hegemony—that followed it. While it was generally believed that Russia had lost the Cold War (although Russians never thought so, believed that they had overthrown communism themselves, and under no circumstances ... ... leader of the risen “new”—Russia, but failed again.
Many of the changes are quite objective: the rise of Asia, China and the other “new” when the “old” could no longer stop the process because of the nuclear factor....
... West can throw at it, in the way of sanctions. It had already lived through seventy years of relative isolation, through the Cold War years. It could live, again, if need be, for many more years in relative isolation. The Russian’s know how to do ... ... however, Russia also has other partners to trade with – from South America and India and to the mightiest of them all…China. However, the West, I suggest, actually needs Russia, far more than Russia needs the West, in many respects. Especially ...
