... relations in the Western Balkans
On June 8, 2020, Russian International Affairs Council, the Embassy of Croatia in Russia, and the Delegation of the European Union to Russia held a joint online workshop to discuss the EU-Russia relations in the Western Balkans.
The discussion focused on the EU priority policies during Croatian Presidency of the Council of the EU, that started on January 1, 2020, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the priorities of the Presidency, the possibilities for interaction between Russia and the EU, particularly in the Western Balkans, and ...
... potential, which is already big enough. Therefore, within the region, as well as among the international expert communities, various actors and their configurations are holding a nonstop informal discussion in order to outline possible scenarios of the Balkans settlement in a long run.
Among the external actors, the UK is the one to be the most active supporter of the creation of “ethnocentric states”, namely, “great” Albania, “great” Serbia, and “great” Croatia. This scenario would mean the following territorial exchange:
: the Republic of Albania, most of Kosovo, part of Macedonia, part of Serbia (Bujanovac and Presevo), Ulcinj part of Montenegro;
: the ...
The border dispute arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia over the Piran Bay was unexpectedly thrown into doubt following revelations that the Slovenian representative broke the impartiality rule. On 22 July, Croatian daily Vecernji List circulated the transcript of tapped phone conversations ...
... also for the understanding why the events of May 1945 cannot have an unambiguous and primary significance for Croatians.
In the meantime,
Zagreb is preparing to stage its own military parade on August 5, 2015
to commemorate the 20th anniversary of Croatia’s victory in 1995. No doubt the organizers want to outdo the parade in Belgrade.
This most striking example shows that celebrating the events of May 8–9, 1945 in the Balkans is too complex to impart a universal ideological imperative and insufficiently noticeable compared to other events of national importance. For this reason, the most convenient solution for the Balkan elites may be to give a more neutral status ...
... fact that the country is playing second fiddle to the main regional project South Stream (only a branch of the main pipeline passes through its territory). On the other hand, despite cooperation with Russia, Zagreb is wary of regional projects in the Balkans. Croatia’s conservative public may perceive such projects as an attempt to revive a kind of Yugoslavia, which they feel does not bode well for the Republic. This can be avoided, if Croatia feels it is an independent and equal partner.